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ABSTRACT 
Why are national constitutional courts able to affect the actions of national legislatures?  The 
roles and relationships of both constitutional courts and legislatures are defined in the national 
constitution.  Although there is variance across countries, in general constitutional courts are 
empowered to ensure that laws conform to the principles and values enshrined in the constitution.  
National legislatures are, at least to some extent, required to conform legislation to the decisions of the 
constitutional court.  Yet both the constitutional court and legislature could alter or avoid these roles.  
Constitutional courts can expand or contract their duties by applying the constitution in either a broad 
or restricted manner.  Similarly, national legislatures can expand or contract the influence of the 
constitutional court by complying with or ignoring past and future constitutional court decisions. 
This dissertation builds on the works of  Fish and Kroenig (2009), Schimmelfinning (2006), 
Maveety and Grosskopf (2004), Finnemore (2003), and Stone (1990) to explain the balance of power 
between national constitutional courts and national legislatures in the protection and extension of 
fundamental rights and democracy.  By creating a measure of constitutional court autonomy and using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods, this dissertation will seek to demonstrate that national 
constitutional court and legislative autonomy must be viewed from both the national and supranational 
perspective and that a reduction in national legislative autonomy may increase national diffusion of 
democratic norms and the protection of human rights. 
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
In a Romanian Chamber of Deputies debate, the speaker stated that the current bill conflicted 
with a Constitutional Court ruling thus was a waste of time.1 
 
A Polish Sejm debate considered whether the law under discussion fulfilled requirements of past 
Constitutional Tribunal decisions.2 
 
The Czech Senate debate noted that overturning the bill passed by the Chamber of Deputies 
required a Constitutional Court challenge.3 
 
Is this evidence of a democratically elected legislature ceding autonomy to the Constitutional 
Court?  Is the result an improvement in human rights? 
New democracies, particularly those transitioning from communism, face a daunting task.  They 
must establish new constitutions (Zielonka, 2001), adjust their legal system (Reichel, 1999), develop a 
respect for individual rights (Roth, 2004), and develop democratic institutions (Pigenko, 2001).  In 
Central Eastern Europe, they also face help and pressure from the European Union (Piana, 2003).   
Post-communist countries established constitutional courts to protect against a reoccurrence of 
authoritarianism (Albi, 2009).  In other words, constitutional courts are the protectors of democracy and 
human rights.  Yet, in the above examples, it appears that the democratically elected legislatures are 
deferring to undemocratically appointed constitutional courts.  Is this the case?  If so, are those 
constitutional courts fulfilling the promise of human rights protections?   
                                                          
1
 Spoken by Deputy Madaras on February 28, 1996.   
2
 Debate of September 27, 1996 
3
 Debate of September 12, 2004. 
2 
While much research speculates on the relationship between courts and legislatures, little 
research exists demonstrating this relationship and its impact on human rights.  This dissertation fills 
that gap by documenting and assessing the influence of the constitutional court over the legislature, the 
conditions under which it occurs, and its impact on human rights. 
1.1 Research Question Introduced  
“More and more often, the Constitutional Tribunal is called upon to make rulings and 
interpretations of laws which address matters of crucial importance to the country's social, economic 
and political life.” (Polish News Bulletin, 2010) 
 
“Constitutional Court today suspended the ratification process of the Treaty on the European 
Constitution in Slovakia, having accepted a complaint by a group of citizens who suggested that the 
adoption of the Treaty by the National Council [Slovak parliament] had been unconstitutional.” (Radio 
Slovakia, 2005) 
 
“Romania's highest court ruled that government-imposed pension cuts are unconstitutional, casting doubt 
on Bucharest's ability to shrink its budget deficit and raising questions about whether the country will 
qualify for further help from the International Monetary Fund. The decision, handed down by the 
Constitutional Court Friday in Bucharest, underscores the potential problems facing other European 
governments as they struggle to push through unpopular spending curbs and adhere to limits set in 
bailout agreements with international lenders” (Fairclough, 2010) 
 
The above quotes from both national and international news sources illustrate that 
constitutional courts – courts that have the ability to rule on the constitutionality of legislative action - 
significantly influence national legislation and legislative outputs legislatures.  While this power has been 
3 
a long-standing attribute of many national courts, as constitutional courts increase their awareness and 
use of international law, they now can include those sources as in their review of national legislation.  
This has serious implications for democracy.  These powerful unelected bodies are extra national 
sources to alter, change and influence national policy.   
National constitutions define the roles and relationships of constitutional courts and 
legislatures.  Although there is variance across countries, in general constitutional courts ensure that 
laws conform to the principles and values enshrined in the constitution.  National legislatures are, at 
least to some extent, required to conform legislation to the decisions of the constitutional court.  Yet 
both the constitutional court and legislature could alter or avoid these roles.  Constitutional courts can 
expand or contract their duties by applying the constitution in either a broad or restricted manner.  
Similarly, national legislatures can expand or contract the influence of the constitutional court by 
complying with or ignoring past and future constitutional court decisions. 
Two widely accepted measures of democracy are competition and free and fair elections (Dahl, 
1971).  A political system that fosters competition and free elections requires the protection of civil and 
political rights.  Also required is respect for the rule of law; the “rules of the game” documented in the 
national constitution, and subsequent legislative actions.  To accomplish this, democracies structure 
their government in a way that ensures the legislative branch remains independent from both the 
executive and judicial branches (Federalist 51).  They believe is that the independence of branches 
fosters representation, competition, and political debate (Federalist 51).  Does legislative independence 
prevent the constitutional court from demanding specific changes to legislative actions?   
Constitutional courts established after World War II were a symbol of democracy and protection 
against the return of dictators (Solyom, 2003).  The expectation was that they would protect and 
consolidate democracy by protecting the rights and legal principles enshrined in the national 
constitution (Solyom, 2003).  Consequently, constitutional courts had the power to review legislative 
4 
actions for conformity with the constitution (Solyom, 2003).  If they constitutional court found a piece of 
legislation unconstitutional they had two options.  They could annul the legislation.  Alternately, they 
could return the legislation to the legislature for changes prior to enactment.  Such decisions set 
precedent and guidelines for future legislation.   
Instead of seeing constitutional courts as defenders of democracy (as described above) some 
argue they are institutions struggling to maintain their efficacy in an increasingly populated legal 
environment (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  Regional and international courts are increasing jurisdiction and 
legitimacy at the expense of national constitutional courts (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  To justify their 
jurisdiction and perceived value constitutional courts are beginning to identify themselves as “niche 
vendors” in the protection of human rights (Schimmelfennig, 2006).   
At the same time, legislatures are turning policy debates into constitutional court cases (Pehe, 
1991).  These cases give national constitutional courts opportunities to protect and expand rights.  In 
addition, by incorporating supranational and international jurisprudence, constitutional courts can 
protect human rights not enshrined in the constitution (Waters, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 2006).  National 
legislatures, therefore, must consider the opinions of national constitutional courts as they draft and 
debate legislation, arguably decreasing legislative autonomy.  
Current research focuses on the independence of national legislatures, the activism of the 
judiciary, or the strategic interaction between the two institutions.  However, the role of the balance of 
power between the national legislature and national constitutional courts in the consolidation of 
democracy and protection of human rights receives little attention.  Also largely ignored is the effect the 
limitations imposed by constitutional courts on legislative autonomy.  Thus, are national constitutional 
courts in post-communist countries effectively protecting fundamental rights as evidenced by 
independent measures of human rights?  Are national legislatures considering constitutional court 
decisions, past or future, as they draft legislation thus constraining their actions?  Furthermore, are 
5 
national constitutional courts utilizing supranational and international law to strengthen their position 
vis-à-vis the national legislature and, therefore, disseminating international norms of democracy and 
human rights?   
This dissertation builds on the works of  Fish and Kroenig (2009), Schimmelfennig (2006), 
Maveety and Grosskopf (2004), Finnemore (2003), and Stone (1990) to explain the balance of power 
between national constitutional courts and national legislatures in the protection and extension of 
fundamental rights and democracy.  It creates a measure of constitutional court autonomy and uses 
both qualitative and quantitative methods to test three hypotheses.  It demonstrates that national and 
supranational factors affect both constitutional court and legislative autonomy.  This dissertation seeks 
to determine if limits imposed on legislative autonomy by national constitutional courts and 
supranational institutions further the consolidation of democracy and protection of human rights.  
Therefore, this dissertation evaluates the interactions of the national legislature, constitutional court, 
and supranational institutions.  Approaching these relationships from a strategic perspective, it posits 
that limitations on legislative autonomy by constitutional courts and supranational institutions are 
necessary to protect democracy and human rights.  To test this argument this dissertation focuses on 
post-communist countries under the jurisdiction of the supranational institutions of the European 
Union. 
1.2 The Changing Terrain of Politics and Legislative Autonomy 
How important is national legislative autonomy in the changing terrain of politics?  The 
independence of legislatures (a term used here as interchangeable with parliaments) from the other 
branches of the government is an established component of democracy.  An independent, 
unconstrained legislature can prevent abuses of powers by the executive and judicial branches.  This 
ability of the branches to check each other is necessary for the execution, preservation, and 
consolidation of democracy.  Furthermore, legislatures are the voice of the people in government.  
6 
Yet actions in the name of democracy and the protection of human rights are challenging 
legislative autonomy, and their ability to perform their functions without interference.  This situation is 
prevalent in post-communist Europe where legislatures are attempting to build a democratic 
government, represent their constituencies, protect human rights, and establish their independence in 
an environment where constitutional courts have a reputation for being activist.  These legislatures also 
face pressures from supranational institutions, such as those of the European Union.   European 
institutions establish rules and norms, including those related human rights, ensuring protection for 
citizens of all the member countries.  National legislatures must abide by the European directives.  In 
addition, transnational organizations, which are increasing efforts to diffuse democratic and human 
rights norms also pressure national legislatures.   
Existing research assess the autonomy of legislatures in relation to the executive branch and the 
European Union (EU).  Research also explores the combined impact of the European Union and national 
constitutional courts on the development of the national legislature’s autonomy.  However, existing 
research ignores the relationship between the constitutional court and legislature in the consolidation 
of democracy and protection of human rights.  Do constitutional courts empowered by European Union 
court decisions support or undermine the autonomy of legislatures and consolidation of democracy?  
Have the institutions of the European Union supported the efforts of national legislatures to consolidate 
democracy or have they spread democracy by eroding the autonomy of national legislatures?   
Three hypotheses derived from the works of Fish and Kroenig (2009), Schimmelfennig (2006), 
Maveety and Grosskopf (2004), Finnemore (2003), and Stone (1990) assess the effects of national and 
supranational legal institutions on legislative autonomy and the consolidation of democracy in post-
communist accession and pre-accession European Union countries.  One hypothesis evaluates the ability 
of constitutional courts to alter national policy preferences reflected in legislation to comply with 
evolving human rights norms.  The second hypothesis evaluates the ability of supranational legal 
7 
institutions to alter the interaction between national constitutional courts and legislatures.  The third 
hypothesis assesses the impact of the transition to democracy on the influences on and of the 
constitutional court.  Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this dissertation seeks to 
demonstrate that a reduction in national legislative autonomy increases national diffusion of evolving 
international human rights norms.   
This dissertation uses constitutional court decisions and legislative debates in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Romania to test these hypotheses.  If constitutional courts are undermining 
legislative authority, the legislative debates should reflect both a consideration of past and future 
constitutional court decisions and a willingness to follow constitutional court directives in structuring 
legislation.  Conversely, there is no impact to legislative autonomy if references to the constitutional 
court are missing from legislative debates.  Constitutional court decisions reflect supranational influence 
through references to international law and jurisprudence.  Conversely, if constitutional court decisions 
rely only on national law there is no proof that the court is using international law and norms to protect 
democracy and human rights. 
However, both constitutional courts and legislatures are political bodies and, therefore, behave 
politically.  Consequently, to understand the relationship between legislatures and constitutional courts, 
one must understand the political behaviors of these institutions.  The next section will discuss the 
political behaviors of the legislature and constitutional courts. 
 
1.3 The Political Behaviors of Constitutional Courts and Legislatures  
The behaviors of constitutional courts and legislatures toward each other vary both across and 
within countries.  Constitutional courts and legislatures can be confrontational, openly disagreeing with 
each other, or cooperative, working in tandem to foster the aims of the state.  Each of these behaviors 
can serve to protect the rule of law and democracy in the state.  Confrontational behavior between the 
8 
constitutional court and legislature allows the two institutions to communicate with each other, air 
disputes for public understanding and reaction, and allow each institution to check the power of the 
other.  Cooperative behavior between the constitutional court and legislature provides a united front 
against the powers of the executive and allows a separation of responsibility to achieve policy ends for 
the state.  It is possible that the variance is attributable to the state’s transition to, and consolidation of, 
democracy.  Europe provides multiple examples of these different behaviors.4   
Poland and Hungary provide examples of cooperation between constitutional courts and 
legislatures to check the powers of the executive.  When the Polish executive, Lech Walesa, attempted 
to expand his powers during the early 1990s, the constitutional court was able to provide an effective 
check on his actions (Schwartz, 1998) through decisions that were final and binding.5  Realizing the value 
of the constitutional court to democracy, architects of the new constitution of Poland removed some of 
the constraints originally placed on the court (Schwartz, 1998).  By rewarding the efforts of the 
constitutional court, the legislature demonstrated its solidarity with the court in its efforts to protect the 
developing democracy.  Similarly, the Hungarian Constitutional Court cooperated with the Parliament 
and Prime Minister when, in 1991, it ruled in favor of a weak presidency and limited the powers of then 
                                                          
4
 Although these examples  use Europe because it is a single region with multiple examples and it has influential 
supranational courts, it is not the only region with multiple examples.  Constitutional courts in the Philippines and 
South Africa also provide examples of confrontational relationships with the legislature when the constitutional 
courts held the legislatures to democratic norms.  Interviews of justices on the Philippine Supreme Court (functions 
as a constitutional court) demonstrate that the court views social justice as a function of the court, a role that is 
reflected in decisions that protect and compensate the poor (Haynie, 1994).  Given the importance of the Philippine 
elites, and their interests, the court can protect the poor and support overall state policies (Haynie, 1994) without 
costing the legislature political capital.  Although the Philippine Constitution outlines the cases for which the 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction, the Congress is given some power to control the actions of the court (Philippine 
Constitution), thus Congress has avenues for retaliation should they feel the court was acting beyond its means.  In 
South Africa the constitutional court adjudicated the importance of social rights in South Africa (Pieterse, 2004).  
The South African Constitutional Court indicated the importance of social rights in its decision of the 1998 
Soobramoney case, provided guidance in establishing policies in the 2000 Grootboom case, and dismissed the 
government’s claim that social right matters were not justiciable in the 2002 Treatment Action Campaign Case 
(Pieterse, 2004).  Since the South African constitution provides few opportunities for Parliament to retaliate by 
manipulating the role of the court, the court does rely on Parliament to refer laws for review and the decisions of the 
court are public providing Parliament opportunities to retaliate either by ignoring the constitutional court or publicly 
undermining its authority (South African Constitution).   Thus, although avenues were open for legislative action, 
both the Philippine and South African courts were able to hold the legislature to the norms of democracy without 
retaliation.   
5
 Based on the jurisdiction of the Polish Constitutional Court as reported in Jurist World Law. 
9 
president Arpád Gōncz (Solyom, 2003; Schwartz, 1998).  Unlike Poland, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court’s organization and operation can be regulated by the Hungarian Parliament (Hungarian 
Constitution Article 32/A).  Consequently, the Polish and Hungarian cases demonstrate that cooperation 
between legislature and constitutional courts on matters of institutional powers can occur regardless of 
the legislature’s power to influence the constitutional court.  These examples from Poland and Hungary 
prompt important questions about why, and when, courts and parliaments cooperate to check 
executive power. 
In Estonia, the constitutional court equivalent and legislature display cooperative behavior that 
separates responsibility to achieve policy ends for the state.  Here the equivalent of the constitutional 
court is making tough decisions to protect the rights of citizens even when these decisions would 
impose severe political costs on the legislature.  In 1998 cases protecting the linguistic rights of 
minorities,6 the Estonian Supreme Court established protections for democratic rights despite lack of 
public support (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  If the legislature had taken the initiative to pass laws 
assuring these protections the repercussions could have been quite politically costly, but by trusting 
these decisions to the Supreme Court, the legislature was able to remove itself from blame while still 
ensuring the progression of democratic reforms (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  Despite the fact that 
the Supreme Court was acting without direct democratic support, it did so with the cooperation and 
support of the legislature (Decision 3-4-1-7-98) and by ensuring the decisions were carefully grounded in 
legal terms and justification (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  Although the Estonian Supreme Court did 
not make policy, it did set a path that the legislature could follow without expending political capital 
(Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  In this example, we find reason to question why and when national 
parliaments would choose to cooperate with and cede policy initiative to a constitutional court. 
                                                          
6
 Specifically the Language Act Amendment Case where the Court declared the amendment unconstitutional 
(Decision 3-4-1-1-98) and the Harju County Court Case where the Court supported the petition of the Harju County 
Court and annulled portions of the Language Act because they restricted the right to vote (Decision 3-4-1-7-98). 
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The Hungarian Constitutional Court also demonstrates a confrontational relationship with the 
legislature that resulted in a check on the legislature’s power.  In 1993, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court refused to uphold laws that reset the statute of limitations in criminal cases, thus ensuring that 
the criminal law guarantees in the constitution could not be derogated (Solyom, 2003; Schwartz, 1998), 
forcing the legislature to follow existing due process in their efforts to achieve transitional justice.  In 
this case the court could be seen as antagonizing the legislature, since it directly challenged actions of 
the legislature yet the legislature did not retaliate despite its ability to regulate the constitutional court 
(Hungarian Constitution Article 32/A).  In Hungary, then, we must ask broader questions about the 
causes and consequences of aggressive, antagonist court behaviors vis-à-vis national parliaments.  The 
subsidiary question, of course, is why, and when, parliaments tolerate such actions. 
Confrontational behavior between the legislature and the constitutional court could also be the 
result of politics not associated directly with legal matters as evidenced by the behavior of the Ukrainian 
Parliament toward the constitutional court.  In this case, the Ukrainian Parliament refused to elect its 
portion of justices and to swear in the judges appointed by both the president and judicial council thus 
rendering the Ukrainian Constitutional Court ineffective (BBC, 2006).  Additionally, the Parliament 
passed a law limiting the constitutional court’s ability to revise amendments to the Ukrainian 
constitution (Ukraine President, 2006).  These actions were not a result of legislation before the court or 
actions of the court but political action by parties within the government to maintain power (Hilfe Daily 
Briefing, 2006).  Why is the Ukrainian Parliament exhibiting confrontational behavior by limiting the 
constitutional court rather than cooperatively working with them as legislatures in other countries 
have?  Why do the political roles of the constitutional courts differ?  Furthermore, why do legislatures 
choose to either support or attempt to restrain the constitutional courts?   
Supranational courts such as the European Court of Justice can also influence the behavior of 
both the constitutional courts and legislatures.  Indeed, the superimposition of supranationalism on the 
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questions raised above provides additional and intriguing justification for this study.  Romania provides 
an example where confrontational behavior between the constitutional court and Parliament occurs 
because Parliament holds the constitutional court to the goals established by the supranational bodies.  
When, in a 2003 decision, the constitutional court overturned reforms that were necessary for accession 
of Romania to the European Union (Decision 148 of April 16, 2003) the legislature modified the reforms 
but threatened the court via the press to ensure approval of the revised reforms.7  If the constitutional 
court had not passed the revised reforms, the legislature could have voted to override the court’s 
decision (Romanian Constitution Article 145), an action that would have undermined the constitutional 
court.  Yet the legislature upheld the position and legitimacy of the constitutional court by signaling to 
the court that it was pressing the boundaries the legislature intended to uphold.  Why did the legislature 
choose to revise the reforms rather than override the constitutional court? 
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the above examples.  It lists the types of behavior (cooperative 
or confrontational), the country, the behavior of the constitutional court, and the behavior of the 
legislature.8  These examples clearly demonstrate that the strategic interactions of constitutional courts 
and legislatures toward each other vary dramatically between cooperation and confrontation, both 
within and across countries.  Poland and the Ukraine demonstrate the importance of these behaviors.  
Because the courts were behaving cooperatively in Poland they were able to work together to check the 
expansion of power by the President, and potential abuse of office, as the democracy developed 
(Schwartz, 1998).  Conversely, the confrontational behavior by the Ukrainian legislature toward the 
constitutional court has resulted in rendering the one body that can protect the country against 
infringements of its constitution (BBC, 2006).  
 
                                                          
7
 As reported in The Economist. 
8
 Appendix B contains this table expanded to include all examples used in this proposal. 
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Table 1.1 Illustrative Constitutional Court and Legislative Behaviors 
Behavior Country Constitutional Court Action Legislative Action 
Cooperative Estonia Court adjudicating policy path that 
legislature could follow 
Legislature able to 
follow path without 
cost to political 
repercussion 
 Poland Constitutional court stopped 
expansion of presidential power 
Legislature removed 
constraints on court 
 Hungary Ruled that presidency should 
remain weak and limited powers of 
president 
No action to punish 
court through 
regulation of 
constitutional court 
 Hungary Struck legislation that would have 
extended the statute of limitations 
and allows prosecution of 
communist party members 
No retaliation 
Confrontational Romania Struck reforms mandated by the 
EU 
Threatened the court 
through the press 
 Ukraine Constitutional Court is non-
functioning 
Block appointment of 
justices, remove 
jurisdiction over 
constitutional 
amendments 
 
One can create a schema of behaviors from the actions of the constitutional courts and 
legislatures provided in the examples above.  When constitutional courts and legislatures are 
cooperative they each take a role in protecting and enhancing both democracy and its associated rights.  
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Conversely, when constitutional courts and legislatures are confrontational courts adjudicate narrowly 
and in close adherence of the law and legislatures use constitutional means to limit the effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the courts. 
While the extant literature provides some clues about conceptualizing and explaining these 
behaviors, conventional wisdom comes up short for two reasons.  First, existing explanations fail to 
address the conditions under which these behaviors vary both within and across countries.  In part, this 
is because the existing explanations do not address the development of the behaviors as the country 
transitions to democracy.  Second, existing explanations focus on either the relationship between the 
supranational court and the national branches of government or the relationship between branches of 
government, neglecting the three-way interaction between supranational government, national 
legislature, and national constitutional court.   
Supranational institutions increasingly influence national institutions such as constitutional 
courts and legislatures.  This is particularly true for member countries of the European Union.  The next 
section will discuss the impact of supranational influences on autonomy. 
1.4 Supranational Influences 
Supranational influences on both constitutional courts and legislatures can come from two 
different sources.  The first is regional institutions.  For example, if the country is a member of the 
European Union the laws, institutions, and jurisprudence of the European Union affect both the 
constitutional court and the legislature.  Second, international institutions, such as the United Nations, 
international treaties, and the jurisprudence of international courts, affect the constitutional court and, 
to a lesser extent, the legislature.   
The European Union affects both constitutional courts and legislatures in two ways.  First, the 
European Union establishes laws and norms that member countries must follow.  This requires national 
legislatures to pass laws enacting European Union treaties and prevents them from making laws that 
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would contradict European Union regulations, directives, and rulings.  For example, the European Union 
regulates the number of hours that bus drivers may work in the member countries (UKDrivers.com, 
n.d.).  Consequently, national laws may not authorize or require bus drivers to work longer hours.  
Similarly, decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) may also require legislatures to 
change laws as in the case of the prisoners’ right to vote (BBC, 2011).  In this case, the British Parliament 
has to change British law to accommodate the ECHR ruling.   
Another way the European Union affects national constitutional courts and legislatures is that it 
offers an alternative venue for national political dispute resolution.  Individuals, groups, political parties, 
and organizations are able to access European Union institutions to effect change or to alter a law if 
they are not able to resolve the situation to their satisfaction at the national level.  For example, a 
citizen of a member country can take a case to the European Court of Human Rights without first taking 
the case to the national constitutional court.  Similarly, groups might have more success lobbying for 
laws at the European Union level than at a national level.  
At the international level, a wide range of actors affects national legislatures and constitutional 
courts including the United Nations, international courts, other states, and transnational actors.  The 
United Nations facilitates the creation, signature, and ratification of international treaties that become 
legally binding on a state.  As a result, national legislatures must create laws to enforce the spirit of the 
treaties.  When the international treaty becomes binding on the state constitutional court jurisprudence 
includes the treaty.  This allows the constitutional court to ensure compliance with the rights and norms 
enshrined in the treaty.   
Transnational organizations and states can use international treaties to force changes to 
national law and action.  For example, the United States is under increasing international pressure to 
end the death sentence as countries use the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to protect their 
nationals even if the person sees himself as an American citizen (The Week, 2011).  The International 
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Court of Justice supported this position in three separate cases, Paraguay v. United States, Mexico v. 
United States, and Germany v. United States.  Because of these efforts, United States Congress 
introduced laws to ensure future compliance with the treaty and a review of past cases. 
These supranational influences do not affect national institutions equally.  All supranational 
contact has the potential to influence both constitutional courts and legislatures through the sharing of 
ideas.  Transnational actors, particularly non-governmental organizations advocating of human rights 
and democracy, can share ideas and strategies (such as legislation or legal arguments).  Transnational 
actors can use these ideas to influence both constitutional courts and legislatures.   
One method transnational actors use to influence constitutional courts and legislatures is legal 
dialogue.  Constitutional courts engage in legal dialogue in two ways: through ideas presented by the 
parties to a case and through legal arguments used to justify decisions.  However, constitutional court 
cases limit the scope of legal dialogue.   
  Legislatures focus on national rather than international policy.  Therefore, their exposer to 
direct supranational influences is more limited than constitutional courts.  Transnational actors and 
constitutional court decisions provide indirect supranational influence.  Supranational influence of 
legislatures is stronger in the member countries of the European Union due to its enforcement of cross-
national political parties.   
It is important to include the supranational influences when considering the balance of power 
between constitutional courts and legislatures for two interrelated reasons.  First, supranational human 
rights and democracy norms argued in front of the constitutional court result in either the support or 
nullification of legislative laws.  Second, as legislative losers seek to advance national human rights and 
democratic norms they will move their argument to the constitutional court.  Consequently, the political 
behaviors of the constitutional court and legislature occur in an atmosphere that includes supranational 
influences.   
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1.5 Rights and Constrained Legislatures 
Efforts to limit the autonomous actions of national legislatures by national constitutional courts 
and international bodies share the common purpose of protecting democracy and human rights.  As 
mentioned, the goal national constitutional was to protect against the destruction of democracy and 
human rights violations that resulted in World War II.  Similarly, the goal of regional and international 
human rights treaties and courts was to ensure protection of human rights against state action.  
Therefore, in theory when constitutional courts invalidate part or all of a law enacted by the 
democratically elected legislature it protects democracy and human rights.   
Constitutional court protection of human rights can be an important tool of the human rights 
advocate (Gearty, 2006).  Strategic human rights litigation can effectively challenge laws that violate the 
rights of unpopular minorities (Yeazell, 2004).  Similarly, litigation at supranational or international 
courts can influence national constitutional courts and legislatures.  However, there is also a risk that 
strategic litigation will fail thus enforcing legislation perceived to violate rights (Van Glahn and Taulbee, 
2013).  Therefore, it is important to understand the relationship between constitutional courts, 
legislatures, and international bodies in the protection of human rights and democracy. 
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of this relationship in three ways.  First, it 
explores the ability of constitutional courts to alter the actions of legislatures.  It is important to ensure 
that, once the constitutional court has made a ruling to protect democracy or a right, the legislature 
follows that ruling for both the law at issue and future laws.  Second, this dissertation explores the 
ability of international laws and norms to alter the actions of both constitutional courts and legislatures.  
Protections for both human rights and democracy exist at both the regional and international level.  
National courts must use regional and international human rights laws and norms to ensure full 
realization of the protections.  Finally, this dissertation assesses the impact of both constitutional court 
and international influence on the actual protection of human rights.  It is important that both the 
17 
legislature and constitutional court discuss human rights and democracy.  It is even more important that 
the talk becomes positive action; that the country does not backslide in terms of human rights. 
This research is significantly different because it looks to legislative debates to consider the 
impact of both constitutional court decisions and international laws and norms.  Existing research looks 
at judicial decisions or enactment of specific laws.  It does not consider whether constitutional court 
decisions play a role in legislative debates on a regular basis.  Existing theories posit that legislatures 
threaten to move the political debates to the courtroom but do not use legislative debates to identify 
the cause of frequency of this political strategy.     
1.6 Chapter Overview 
This dissertation will progress as follows.  The next chapter reviews existing literature and 
identifies the weaknesses in explaining the research question.  Extant research on legislative and 
constitutional court autonomy (including its relationship to judicial independence) and supranational 
influence on the legislature and constitutional court is included.  Chapter Two concludes with a 
proposed explanation of the shifting balance of power between the national legislature and 
constitutional.  The explanation incorporates the following:  Fish and Koenig’s (2009) measure of 
legislative power; Schimmelfennig’s (2006) view that constitutional courts are using human rights to 
ensure their efficacy; Maveety’s and Grosskopf’s (2004) view of constitutional courts as disseminators of 
institutional norms; Stone’s (1990) view that constitutional courts alter the policy making process; and 
Finnemore’s (2003) view that international politics has been altered by the legalization of ideas.  The 
chapter closes with an explanation of hypotheses that used to test this theory.   
The third chapter explains and justifies the methodology used in this dissertation.  Included is a 
detailed explanation of the quantitative and qualitative tests of the hypotheses as well as their 
applicability to the subject.  An explanation of each variable used in the tests, and their associated 
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measurements follows.  The cases used to test the hypotheses are then justified.  Finally, the chapter 
establishes the criteria needed for acceptance of the hypotheses. 
The following three chapters test the hypotheses derived from the explanation presented in the 
second chapter.  In each of these three chapters, is an explanation of the data associated with the test 
of the hypothesis and the results of the quantitative and qualitative tests.   
The final chapter draws conclusions from the findings and reviews the impact on future 
research.  
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2 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AUTONOMY, AND INFLUENCES 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter addresses four areas.  First, it discusses existing research on judicial independence.  
This section explains that judicial autonomy is a subset of judicial independence.  It is important to 
understand judicial independence before comparing it to legislative autonomy.  Second, it discusses 
existing research on the interactions between constitutional courts, legislatures, and supranational 
courts.  This includes identification of ways current research fails to address the research question.  
Third, it argues that combining the insights of five existing research efforts helps answer to the research 
question.  The final section presents three testable hypotheses.  Insights from the five research areas 
provide the basis for these hypotheses.   
Democratically elected legislators draft, debate, and pass laws.  Often citizens opposed to the 
laws challenge these laws as unconstitutional assertions of authority.  These challenges assert that the 
laws violated civil, political, economic, or social rights; in short, the laws violate basic human rights.  For 
example, the Czech legislature, following a European Union directive, passed a law mandating retention 
of telecommunications data (Paulsworth, 2011).  The Czech Constitutional Court overturned parts of the 
law as a violation of the constitutional right to privacy (Göttinger, 2011).   
National courts that determine the constitutionality of laws are Constitutional Courts.  These 
courts are comprised of unelected judges nominated and confirmed by democratically elected officials.  
Constitutional Court judges can have long tenures.  When reviewing laws these unelected constitutional 
courts have three options.9  First, they can uphold the law.  In this case, the law remains as it is and 
requires no further action by the legislature.  Second, they can declare all or part of the law 
unconstitutional.  This is the option chosen by the Czech Constitutional Court in the example above 
                                                          
9
 NB: The three options listed here are categorical summaries of the existing research presented in this chapter.  
Citation of the underlying works occurs with the presentation of the research. 
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(Göttinger, 2011).  When this occurs, the aspects of the law found to be unconstitutional are no longer 
in effect.  Third, the constitutional court can instruct the legislature to make changes to the law.  This 
option requires action by the legislature to amend the law. 
If the constitutional court invalidates or mandates changes to the law the legislature also has 
three options.10  First, the legislature can allow the law to remain invalidated.  Second, the legislature 
can rewrite the law following the directives of the constitutional court.  Third, legislature can ignore the 
constitutional court (Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  The constitutional court has no method to enforce 
its decisions (Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  Thus, there is nothing forcing the legislature to change laws 
as mandated by the constitutional court (Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  Ideally, the legislature will 
follow the advice of the constitutional court both for the law in question and as they draft future laws. 
The ability of unelected constitutional courts to direct how democratically elected legislatures 
write laws raises fundamental normative and empirical questions.  First, does invalidating or changing 
laws passed by an elected body in the interest of human rights limit the ability of legislatures to act 
democratically?  Second, do constitutional court decisions accurately and consistently reflect 
international standards of human rights and democracy?  Alternatively, are the decisions localized, 
episodic, and uneven?  Third, are constitutional court decisions influenced law, personal policy, or other 
factors?  Fourth, do legislatures consider constitutional courts as they draft and debate laws?  Fifth, do 
constitutional courts use international law to expand human rights protections?  Finally, normatively, 
are judicial decisions protecting human rights worth the associated democratic and majoritarian 
limitations?   
These are critical and important questions.  They explore the fundamental nexus between 
constitutional courts, legislatures, and supranational norms of human rights and democracy.  While 
existing research addresses specific areas related to these questions, much remains unexplored.   
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 NB: Again, this is a summarization of the work presented in this chapter.  The underlying research is cited as it is 
presented below. 
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For example, research addresses the strategy used by constitutional courts in their dealings with 
legislatures (see e.g. Epstein and Knight 1998; Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  In the United States, given the 
three branches of government, this research is known as Separation of Powers literature.  Other 
research examines the use of international law by constitutional courts (Waters, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 
2006, Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004) or the interaction between supranational courts (such as the 
European Court of Justice) and national constitutional courts (Alter, 1998; Volcansek, 1990 and 1989).  
Finally, another avenue of research addresses the effort of constitutional courts to increase human 
rights protections (Schimmelfennig, 2006; Navia and Rios-Figueroa, 2005; Alter, 1998).    
Despite these research efforts, key puzzles remain unaddressed.  We do not know why 
legislatures allow constitutional courts to set guidelines for writing laws.  Nor do we fully understand 
how constitutional courts affect human rights and democracy.  Finally, little comparative research exists 
on the interactions between constitutional courts and legislatures.  
2.2 Judicial Independence and Autonomy  
One key to increase understanding in this area is to understand the difference between judicial 
autonomy and judicial independence.  There is significant research on judicial independence, but less on 
the separate but important idea of autonomy.  Judicial independence debates center around three 
points: the definition of judicial independence; whether it is possible to have a fully independent 
judiciary; and, whether a completely independent judiciary is necessary.  This section reviews existing 
research associated with each of these points.   
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2.2.1 Defining Judicial Independence  
The first debated point is the definition of judicial independence.  Before any assessment of 
judicial independence occurs, we must understand what it involves.  Consequently, we need a definition 
of the concept.  Existing research centers around three definitions of judicial independence.11 
One definition of judicial independence is that judges are able to decide cases without any 
outside influence (Staton et al, 2010; Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009).  This involves freedom from 
personal and public sources (Simmons, 2007; Pasquino, 2003; Peretti, 2002).  On the public level, a fully 
independent judiciary is free from influence by other branches of government (Simmons, 2007; 
Pasquino, 2003; Peretti, 2002).  On the private level, judges on a fully independent judiciary are free 
from personal bias (Simmons, 2007; Pasquino, 2003; Peretti, 2002).  This definition requires the judiciary 
to decide cases only according to legal principles (Simmons, 2007; Pasquino, 2003; Peretti, 2002). 
However, some researchers feel that the above definition of a fully independent judiciary is too 
strict (Staton et al, 2010) and use a second definition that excludes concern with personal influences.  
They recognize that judges come to the bench with an inherent personal bias (Staton et al, 2010).  
Although personal bias influences judicial decisions, it does not compromise independence (Staton et al, 
2010; Finn, 2004).  However, independence requires insulation of the judiciary from the policy bias of 
other branches (Staton et al, 2010).  This definition requires the judiciary to decide cases according to 
legal principles but acknowledges that personal bias will affect the interpretation and application of 
those principles (Staton et al, 2010; Finn, 2004).   
The third definition bases independence on the outcome of judicial decisions (Rios-Figueroa and 
Staton, 2009; Pasquino, 2003; Burbank and Friedman, 2002; Cameron, 2002).  To be independent judges 
rule as they feel is appropriate for the case (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Pasquino, 2003; Burbank 
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 Research concerning the definition of judicial independence includes: Staton et al, 2010; Rios-Figueroa and 
Staton, 2009; Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004; Pasquino, 2003; Peretti, 2002; Burbank and Friedman, 2002; Cameron, 
2002.  Each of these are addressed in paraFigures that follow. 
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and Friedman, 2002; Cameron, 2002).  An independent judiciary then has the power to enforce their 
ruling (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Pasquino, 2003; Burbank and Friedman, 2002; Cameron, 2002).  
Consequently, independence is not dependent on the insulation of judges but on their ability to alter the 
behavior of others (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Pasquino, 2003; Burbank and Friedman, 2002; 
Cameron, 2002).   
The basic difference between these definitions of judicial independence is the role of influence 
over the judiciary (Staton et al, 2010; Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Finn, 2004).  The first definition 
rejects influence over the judiciary from any source (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Simmons, 2007; 
Pasquino, 2003, Peretti, 2002).  This definition sees any influence as a reduction of judicial 
independence (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Simmons, 2007; Pasquino, 2003, Peretti, 2002).  The 
second definition only considers influence over the judiciary from outside sources (Staton et al, 2010).  
Personal bias and experience influence judges as they decide cases without affecting their 
independence (Finn, 2004).  However, when other branches of government influence judges it reduces 
judicial independence (Staton et al, 2010).  The third definition assesses the influence of the judiciary 
instead of influences on the judiciary (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Pasquino, 2003; Burbank and 
Friedman, 2002; Cameron, 2002).  This definition requires the judiciary to make and enforce the 
decisions they feel are appropriate for the case (Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Pasquino, 2003; 
Burbank and Friedman, 2002; Cameron, 2002).   
An important differentiation in the definition of judicial independence is de facto versus de jure 
independence (Howard and Carey, 2004).  Howard and Carey (2004) argue that legally guaranteed 
judicial independence (de jure) does not reflect the actual workings of the judiciary (de facto).  Notably, 
de facto independence is an important component in the judicial independence definitions surveyed 
above.  For example, personal bias (Staton et al, 2010; Finn, 2004) and respect for decisions (Rios-
Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Pasquino, 2003; Burbank and Friedman, 2002; Cameron, 2002) can be 
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legislated but easily ignored (Howard and Carey, 2004).  Therefore, consistent with Howard and Carey’s 
(2004) argument, the reality of judicial independence, regardless of the definition, depends less on the 
law than the actual workings of government.   
2.2.2 Is Complete Independence Possible  
The second debate concerns the ability of any judiciary to be completely independent (Popova, 
2010; Staton et al, 2010; Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004; Burbank and Friedman, 2002; Peretti, 2002).  
Although complete independence of the judiciary may seem desirable, four arguments explain that this 
is not possible (Popova, 2010; Staton et al, 2010; Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004; Burbank and Friedman, 
2002; Peretti, 2002).   
First, the design of democratic institutions encourages interdependence (Simmons, 2007; Finn, 
2004).  Democracies separate the act of making laws from the act of ensuring their legality (Simmons, 
2007; Finn, 2004).  In other words, democracies separate powers of government among branches 
(Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004).  Ideally, the power of one branch balances the power of the other 
(Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004).  Each branch has the ability to check an abuse of power by another branch 
(Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004).  To accomplish this, each branch is accountable to the other branch 
(Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004).  The phrases used to describe this are “separation of powers” and “checks 
and balances” (Ginsberg et al, 2011).  For example, the judiciary checks the legislature by invalidating 
laws (Ginsberg et al, 2011).  Similarly, the legislature checks the judiciary through the appointment 
process (Ginsberg et al , 2011).  As a result, neither branch is completely independent from the other 
(Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004).  Some countries purposely designed their judiciaries to have less power 
than the legislature (Pasquino, 2003).  In these cases, the country intentionally prevented complete 
judicial independence (Pasquino, 2003).  Whether the institutional design includes separation of powers 
or specifically limits the judiciary, the democratic intent prevents complete judicial independence 
(Simmons, 2007; Finn, 2004; Pasquino, 2003).   
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A second point arguing against complete judicial independence concerns how collegial courts 
function (Peretti, 2002).  Collegial courts, such as constitutional courts, are courts where a panel of 
judges decides a case rather than one individual judge (Peretti, 2002).  Decisions of collegial courts 
reflect the position of all members (Peretti, 2002).  As the judges discuss and debate the case to arrive at 
a decision they influence each other (Peretti, 2002).  Therefore, each judge is subject to an outside 
influence (Peretti, 2002).  No judge on a collegial court is independent from outside influence (Peretti, 
2002).  Any courts designed as collegial cannot, therefore, be completely independent (Peretti, 2002).   
The third point against complete judicial independence involves the process of becoming a 
judge (Popova, 2010; Peretti, 2002).  Citizens elect some judges (Popova, 2010; Peretti, 2002).  These 
judges reflect the views and biases of the citizens who elected them (Popova, 2010; Peretti, 2002).  In 
some cases, particularly constitutional courts, elected officials such as legislators appoint judges 
(Popova, 2010; Peretti, 2002).  These judges share opinions and biases of the elected officials (Popova, 
2010; Peretti, 2002).  In either case, those responsible for putting the judge on the bench influence the 
judge (Popova, 2010; Peretti, 2002).  This prevents complete judicial independence (Popova, 2010; 
Peretti, 2002).   
Finally, judiciaries rely on others to enforce their decisions (Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  
Police, legislators, and executives ensure that judicial decisions are enforced (Burbank and Friedman, 
2002).  Ignoring unpopular decisions is an option available to these groups (Burbank and Friedman, 
2002).  The legislature and executive enforce judicial decisions regarding laws and policies (Burbank and 
Friedman, 2002).  Enforcement of these decisions is not as obvious to the average citizen as enforcing a 
criminal decision (Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  Thus, it is easier to ignore decisions regarding policy 
and law (Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  Judiciaries want their decisions to be enforced (Burbank and 
Friedman, 2002).  Consequently, they are unlikely to make unpopular decisions (Burbank and Friedman, 
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2002).  This creates an influence on the judiciary preventing complete judicial independence (Burbank 
and Friedman, 2002). 
2.2.3 Is Complete Judicial Independence Necessary   
The final judicial independence debate concerns the necessity of judicial independence for 
democracy and rule of law (Popova, 2010; Staton et al, 2010; Finn, 2004; Kourlis, 2003; Burbank and 
Friedman, 2002; Keith, 2002).  Scholars make two arguments against the need for complete judicial 
independence. 
The first argument concerns holding courts accountable for their decisions (Finn, 2004; Burbank 
and Friedman, 2002).  Scholars argue that limits on court actions are required to protect the democratic 
process (Finn, 2004; Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  A completely independent court is an unchecked 
court (Finn, 2004; Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  An unchecked court has the potential to abuse its 
power thus undermining the democratic process (Pasquino, 2003).  
The second argument against complete judicial independence concerns the predictability 
associated with rule of law (Stephenson, 2006; Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  Predictable laws provide 
guidelines for citizen behavior and the consequences for bad behavior (Stephenson, 2006; Burbank and 
Friedman, 2002).  These scholars argue that complete judicial independence produces unpredictable 
decisions (Stephenson, 2006; Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  These unpredictable decisions prevent a 
clear understanding of the law and consequences (Stephenson, 2006; Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  
Since rule of law depends on laws that are understood and predictable, a fully independent judiciary 
undermines the rule of law (Stephenson, 2006; Burbank and Friedman, 2002).   
Other scholars contend that complete judicial independence is necessary for rule of law and 
democracy (Staton et al, 2010; Kourlis, 2003; Keith, 2002).  These scholars believe only independent 
judiciaries make the politically difficult decisions holding governments accountable for their actions 
(Staton et al, 2010; Kourlis, 2003; Keith, 2002).  They offer two arguments to support this point.   
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First, judicial independence facilitates holding other branches accountable to the rules of 
government (Kourlis, 2003).  Judicial decisions holding the legislature accountable are more likely when 
there is no influence by the legislature (Kourlis, 2003).  If the influence by another branch makes 
decisions against that branch difficult, the judiciary cannot effectively hold that branch accountable to 
the rules of government (Kourlis, 2003).   
Second, the protection of rights needs an independent judiciary (Staton et al, 2010; Keith, 2002).  
Rights violations occur when the government exceeds or abuses its power (Gready and Philllips, 2009).  
Decisions protecting the rights of citizens are more likely when the judiciary acts without fear of 
retaliation (Staton et al, 2010; Keith, 2002).  In addition, decisions against an abusive branch of 
government are unlikely if that branch is influencing the judiciary (Kourlis, 2003).  Consequently, the 
judiciary needs to be free from both influence and retaliation to protect rights (Staton et al, 2010; 
Kourlis, 2003; Keith, 2002) 
This debate about the necessity of judicial independence illustrates two contradictory points.  
First, some amount of judicial independence is necessary to ensure accountability and the protection of 
rights (Staton et al, 2010; Kourlis, 2003; Keith, 2002).  Second, the judiciary requires accountability to 
ensure predictability and judicial constraint (Finn, 2004; Burbank and Friedman, 2002).  The next section 
presents a resolution to this contradiction within the judicial independence debate. 
2.2.4 A Middle Ground  
To answer the research question acceptance of two points from the above debate is necessary.  
Most importantly, the protection of rights requires some level of judicial independence (Staton et al, 
2010; Howard and Carey, 2004; Keith, 2002).  For example, Howard and Carey (2004) prove that de facto 
judicial independence correlates with the protection of civil and political rights.  Although personal bias 
influences judges in their policy choices, it does not prevent judges from ruling that another branch is 
violating rights (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  The influence of personal bias can produce decisions that 
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increase the protection of rights (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  For example, a constitutional court judge 
may have a personal bias in favor of social justice (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  As a result, the judge 
adjudicates increased protections for social rights (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).  Thus, judiciaries protect 
rights at a level of independence below complete independence.  
Furthermore, democratic governments limit judicial independence (Finn, 2004).  An intentional 
design feature of democratic governments separates the powers of government among different 
branches (Federalist 47).  This design forces branches to cooperate with each other to achieve policy 
goals (Mesonis, 2008; Finn, 2004).  In addition, it allows branches to check any abuse of power by 
another branch (Mesonis, 2008).  The judiciary is one of the government branches included in this 
design (Ginsberg et al, 2011).  As such, judiciaries are subject to separation of powers and checks and 
balances (Ginsberg et al, 2011).  Thus, democracies intentionally construct the judiciary to have a level 
of independence less than complete independence (Finn, 2004).   
Therefore, the position in the judicial independence debate taken here is that a completely 
independent judiciary (i.e. one that is free from both the influence of other branches and personal bias) 
is neither necessary nor desirable for democracy and the protection of rights (Simmons, 2007; Finn, 
2004).  Two qualifications acknowledge the use of this position in the judicial independence debate.  
First is the use of the term “autonomous” judiciary as opposed to “independent” judiciary.  As used 
here, the definition of an autonomous judiciary combines the features advanced by Staton et al (2010), 
Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2009), and Finn (2004).  An autonomous judiciary makes decisions without 
influence by other branches and has the ability to enforce those decisions (Staton et al, 2010, Rios-
Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Finn, 2004).   
The second qualification is a distinction between constitutional courts and other national courts 
such as local, appellate, and civil courts.  There are two reasons for this distinction.  First, a nation’s 
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constitution defines the powers, composition, and jurisdiction of the constitutional court.12  This 
definition of constitutional courts is separate from the definition of other national courts.13  
Constitutions also place the constitutional court outside the hierarchy of other national courts.14  
Second, because of their definition in the constitution and specific jurisdiction, constitutional courts are 
both political actors and policymakers (Comella, 2004; Burbank, Friedman, and Goldberg, 2002; Lee, 
Knight, and Shvetsova, 2001).  Since they have a policy role, constitutional courts challenge the 
traditional democratic separation of powers between the judiciary and legislature.  Since the 
constitutional court is an unelected body,15 it also challenges majoritarian principles.  Despite 
challenging democracy, post-communist European countries adopted constitutional courts to protect 
democracy (Albi, 2009).  Therefore, constitutional courts have a unique position in democratic 
governments, one that prevents complete independence.   
In summary, an autonomous constitutional court makes enforceable decisions without influence 
from other branches.  Since membership on constitutional courts is by appointment rather than 
elections, personal bias of the members is similar to the appointing bodies (Popova, 2010; Solyom, 2003; 
Peretti, 2002).  This does not mean that the appointing body influences constitutional court decisions.   
Therefore, the design of constitutional courts prevents complete independence (Staton et al, 2010; Rios-
Figueroa and Staton, 2009) but not its autonomy as defined here.  The next section discusses autonomy 
and its application to both the judiciary and legislature.   
 
                                                          
12
 As examples across a broad spectrum of countries see the Constitution of Cambodia; Constitution of Croatia; 
Constitution of Czech Republic; Constitution of Poland; Constitution of Romania; Constitution of Slovakia, 
Constitution of South Africa; German Basic Law; New Fundamental Law of Hungary.   
13
 As examples across a broad spectrum of countries see the Constitution of Cambodia; Constitution of Croatia; 
Constitution of Czech Republic; Constitution of Poland; Constitution of Romania; Constitution of Slovakia, 
Constitution of South Africa; German Basic Law; New Fundamental Law of Hungary.   
14
 Please refer to the European Judicial Network at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/org_justice/org_justice_gen_en.htm  
15
 As examples across a broad spectrum of countries see the Constitution of Cambodia; Constitution of Croatia; 
Constitution of Czech Republic; Constitution of Poland; Constitution of Romania; Constitution of Slovakia, 
Constitution of South Africa; German Basic Law; New Fundamental Law of Hungary.   
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Judicial Autonomy, Legislative Autonomy and Limitations  
 
This definition of constitutional court autonomy allows comparison to Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) 
measure of legislative autonomy.  In their survey of legislative power, Fish and Kroenig (2009) determine 
legislative autonomy based on nine items.  These nine items assess the extent to which the legislature is 
able to act without interference from other areas, or branches, of government (Fish and Kroenig, 2009).  
This includes freedom of the legislature to set its own agenda and to act on that agenda (Fish and 
Kroenig, 2009).   
As an understanding of limitations on judicial independence was important, so is an 
understanding of limitations on autonomy.  Limitation of an institution’s autonomy occurs for two 
reasons, one seen as positive, and one seen as negative.  First, one institution will limit another 
institution’s autonomy to exert influence over, or control the actions of, the institution (O’Donnel, 
2003).  This occurs when one institution sees another as an impeding their goals (O’Donnell, 2003).  For 
example, the executive limited the autonomy of the Russian Constitutional Court in response to 
unfavorable decisions (Schwartz, 1998).  This is a negative limitation on autonomy because it is not 
according to established law (Schwartz, 1998). 
In addition, as mentioned above, measures to hold an institution accountable, or check their 
actions, limit institutional autonomy (Kenney, 2003; O’Donnel, 2003).  This type of limitation is legal 
(O’Donnell, 2003).  It protects both democracy and rights (O’Donnell, 2003).  For example, constitutional 
courts were encouraged in post-communist countries to protect the developing democracies from 
backsliding to authoritarianism (Solyom, 2003).  The establishment of constitutional courts was a check 
on the abuse of power by the other branches of government (Solyom, 2003).  Constitutional courts 
check the abuse of power when they review the constitutionality of laws and actions (Vanberg, 2001).  
This is a positive limitation on autonomy because it is according to established law. 
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In their measurement of legislative autonomy, Fish and Kroenig (2009) do not consider whether 
a limitation to autonomy is positive or negative.  For example, they consider judicial review a limitation 
to the legislature’s autonomy (Fish and Kroenig, 2009).  Judicial review might be a legally defined effort 
by the constitutional court to hold the legislature to the rules, including human rights, established in the 
constitution (Emmert, 2009; Carruba et al, 2008).  Conversely, judicial review might be an effort by the 
judiciary to establish, extend, or modify policy according to the judiciary’s preferences (Vanberg, 1998).  
This judicial review is beyond the legally established powers of the judiciary (Colon, 2003; Freejon and 
Wiengast, 1991).  Therefore, Fish and Kroenig (2009) view a valid check against the legislature in the 
same way as a usurpation of power by another branch.   
2.2.5 Judiciary in Authoritarian Regimes 
Because the post-communist countries of Central Eastern Europe transitioned from 
authoritarian to democratic governments, it is worth considering the politics of the judiciary in 
authoritarian governments.  This literature presents two noteworthy aspects to courts in authoritarian 
regimes; a typology of the courts (Solomon, 2007) and relationship between the courts and the 
authoritarian regime (Moustafa, 2008; Hilbink, 2007; Pereira, 2003).   
Solomon (2007) argues that courts in authoritarian regimes fall into four categories.  In the first 
category courts are politically dependent on the regime (Solomon, 2007).   The regime controls the 
judiciary through regular performance evaluations and legislation by the regime and its political party 
(Solomon, 2007).    Although the judiciary in this category lacks both de jure and de facto independence 
it is stable (Solomon, 2007).  In the second category the judiciary is fragmented across courts and 
tribunals (Solomon, 2007).  The ordinary judiciary has de jure independence although the regime limits 
its de facto independence through evaluations and a judicial bureaucracy designed to encourage 
decisions that support the regime without outside influence (Solomon, 2007).  In addition, the 
authoritarian regime uses special courts or tribunals for cases that are politically sensitive (Solomon, 
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2007).  As with the previous category, judiciaries are stable but lack independence (Solomon, 2007).  
Judiciaries in the third category are more independent and more strategic (Solomon, 2007).  
Authoritarian regimes endow these courts with politically meaningful jurisdiction which is removed 
should the court rule against regime interests (Solomon, 2007).  However, due to the threat of 
retaliation, the judiciary self-censors thus limiting its own de facto independence (Solomon, 2007).  The 
constant and real threat of retaliation also makes judiciaries in this category unstable (Solomon, 2007).  
Finally, judiciaries may have de jure independence and be free of threats of retaliation by the 
authoritarian regime yet choose to protect regime interests (Solomon, 2007).  While these judiciaries 
give the perception that they are independent and impartial, in reality they act as though they are 
controlled by the authoritarian regime (Solomon, 2007).  The difference between perception and reality 
results in a lack of confidence in the judiciary and a loss of judicial legitimacy (Solomon, 2007).  Although 
Solomon (2007) applied these categories to authoritarian regimes they are also applicable to 
democracies, particularly weak or unconsolidated democracies.  For example, the Russian Constitutional 
Court rules strategically to prevent further reduction of their jurisdiction (Schwartz, 1998). 
Underlying each of these categories, and attempting to explain why authoritarian regimes 
tolerate any judicial independence, are theories about the relationship between judicial power and 
authoritarian regimes (Moustafa, 2008; Hilbink, 2007; Pereira, 2003).  Pereira (2003) posits that the 
independence and power accorded the judiciary in authoritarian regimes depends on the past 
relationship between the courts and the military.  When the military has a history of working with and 
within the judicial system, the subsequent authoritarian regime continues to use the courts and they 
have some measure of power and independence (Pereira, 2003).  However, if the military historically 
worked outside the ordinary judicial or views the ordinary judicial system as weak the authoritarian 
regime continues to work outside the ordinary courts (Pereira, 2003).  Moustafa (2008) views the 
relationship between the judiciary and authoritarian regime through the lens of rational choice.  Based 
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on a case study of Egypt, he argues that authoritarian regimes value the judiciary for financial reasons 
(Moustafa, 2008).  An effective and relatively independent judiciary provides the legal protections 
necessary to attract foreign business and investment (Moustafa, 2008).  However, this comes with the 
risk that human rights advocates will also use the courts against the regime (Moustafa, 2008).  Should 
this happen the regime minimizes its risk by either altering the composition of the court to ensure its 
interests are protected or limiting access to the court (Moustafa, 2008).  To prevent the risk of an 
activist court, regimes can use international arbitration to encourage financial investment while limiting 
the independence of national courts (Massoud, 2014).  Also, this is consistent with research arguing that 
governments prioritize economic prosperity over human rights (Evans, 2001).  Hilbink (2007) argues that 
the history of judicial ideology prior to the authoritarian regime shapes the relationship between the 
two institutions.  Based on a study of the Chilean courts, she argues that courts in the civil law tradition 
with a history of distancing themselves from politics self-censor under authoritarian regimes (Hilbink, 
2007).  This is consistent with research finding that judges trained under communism are hesitant to 
overturn legislation (Tanasescu, 2012).  This can also be seen in democracies such as England’s where 
courts are hesitant to challenge parliament’s supremacy (Carnwath, 2004).  China illustrates the 
reciprocal relationship between courts and other aspects of the authoritarian regime (Stockmann and 
Gallager, 2011).  China’s state controlled media encourages use of the courts by reporting positive 
aspects and outcomes (Stockmann and Gallager, 2011).  Because the media presents a perspective that 
the courts protect worker’s rights, and because the authoritarian state prevents alternate reports, 
citizens believe in the legitimacy of the courts (Stockmann and Gallager, 2011). 
Transitioning from an authoritarian government requires changes to the judicial system.  The 
judicial system is seen as crucial to the transition process because of its ability to hold the new 
government to the new ‘rules of the game’ (Dallara, 2007).  During this process the press also plays an 
important role in educating citizens about the reformed legal system (Association of the Bar of the City 
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of New York, 1965).   Judicial history plays a role in this process as well because research shows that the 
success of the reforms depends on the position of the judiciary during the authoritarian regime (Pereira, 
2003) 
2.3 Constitutional Court, Legislative, and Supranational Interactions 
As previously mentioned, institutional interactions influence institutional autonomy (Simmons, 
2007; Finn, 2004).  Research on these interactions focuses on four types of institutional interactions: 
constitutional design, benefits derived from constitutional courts, and interactions with parties and 
interest groups.  
2.3.1 Constitutional Design  
Constitutions establish the legal parameters, institutional design, and political culture for a 
society (Pruess, 1991).  Consequently, some researchers study the constitutional design of institutions 
and the resulting impact on the balance of power between branches of government (Medes, 2011; 
Elkins et al, 2010; Krasner, 2005; Magalhaes, 2003).  The constitution contains rules that shape the 
balance of power, relationship, and interactions between the constitutional court and legislature (Elkins 
et al, 2010).   
However, some constitutional designs blur the lines between the legislature and judiciary 
(Colon, 2003).  This occurs when the judiciary, usually the constitutional court, involves itself in the 
policy process (Colon, 2003).  An example occurs in Hungary where constitutional court decisions have 
both economic and political impacts (Pataki, 1991).  Two factors combine to provide the constitutional 
court multiple openings into the policy process (Pataki, 1991).  First, the Hungarian constitution provides 
the constitutional court with multiple opportunities to review laws (Pataki, 1991).  Second, the 
Hungarian constitution lacks clarity (Pataki, 1991).  As Hungary’s constitutional court takes advantage of 
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these constitutional design openings into policy, it further blurs the boundaries with legislature (Colon, 
2003; Pataki, 1991). 
The relationship between the legislature and constitutional court established in the constitution 
is not always static.  A change to the constitutionally established relationship occurs in three ways.  First, 
interactions between constitutional courts and legislatures alter the structure of power within the 
government established by the constitution (Huster, 2003; Wiegandt, 1997; Pehe, 1991).  As 
constitutional courts review laws, they can define the duties of the legislature in their decisions (Huster, 
2003; Wiegandt, 1997).  Germany provides an example of this behavior (Huster, 2003).  While reviewing 
the constitutionality of a law the German Constitutional Court defined the legislature’s duties to monitor 
the effects of their regulations (Huster, 2003).  This decision established duties for the legislature that 
are not included in the German constitution (Huster, 2003).  It resulted in a perception that the German 
Constitutional Court is adjudicating its view of legislative responsibilities (Wiegandt, 1997).  The 
increased ability to monitor regulations gave the legislature an increased ability to enforce their desired 
outcomes (Huster, 2003).  Thus, an interaction between the constitutional court and legislature 
increased legislative autonomy (Staton, 2010; Cameron, 2002).   
Second, events within the country can complicate or alter the relationship between 
constitutional courts and legislatures (Krasner, 2005; Magalhaes, 2003).  For example, coalitions within 
the legislature complicate the pre-established interactions (Krasner, 2005).  A study of abstract review 
by the constitutional courts of Spain and Portugal illustrates this point (Magalhaes, 2003).  In this study, 
judges remained responsive to legislative majorities unless they were safe from retaliation (Magalhaes, 
2003).  In other words, fear of action by the legislature altered its relationship with the constitutional 
court (Magalhaes, 2003).   
Finally, legislatures strategically use the dispute resolution capability of the constitutional court 
to alter the balance of power between the two branches (Pehe, 1991).  This occurred in the Czech 
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Republic (Pehe, 1991).  The Czech Parliament created the constitutional court to increase checks and 
balances within the government and settle disputes between bodies of government (Pehe, 1991).  It 
gave up some autonomy to the constitutional court by giving the court the power of judicial review 
(Pehe, 1991).  This was a strategic action because it allows the legislature to protect its autonomy in 
relation to the executive (Pehe, 1991).   
In summary, the national constitution establishes the initial relationship between constitutional 
courts and legislatures (Elkins et al, 2010).  However, interactions between constitutional courts and 
legislatures alter their relationship as well as the balance of power between the two institutions 
(Krasner, 2005; Huster, 2003; Magalhaes, 2003; Pehe, 1991).  The next section reviews the benefits 
legislatures derive from constitutional courts.   
2.3.2 Constitutional Court Benefits  
A second area of research on constitutional court and legislative interactions focuses on the 
benefits legislatures derive from constitutional courts (Hunt, 2003; Peabody, 2001; Landfried, 1994; 
Stone, 1990).  Legislatures value constitutional courts for strategic (Landfried, 1994; Stone, 1990) and 
policy (Matthews, 2005; Santoni and Zucchini, 2004; Carbonell, 2003) reasons.   
By strategically bringing cases before the constitutional court, a group of legislators moves a 
political debate from the legislature to the constitutional courtroom, from the political to the legal 
(Hunt, 2003; Vanberg, 1998; Landfried, 1994; Stone, 1990).  For example, if a minority group cannot 
defeat a law in the legislature they can challenge the constitutionality of the law in the constitutional 
court (Landfried, 1994; Stone, 1990).  Sometimes legislators pass bad laws for electoral reasons 
(Peabody, 2001).  The constitutional court can subsequently find the law unconstitutional without 
electoral cost for the legislators (Peabody, 2001).  Electoral impunity offsets any loss of autonomy 
experienced by the legislature (Hunt, 2003; Peabody, 2001; Landfried, 1994; Stone, 1990).   
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The need to maintain policy status quo also shapes interactions between the constitutional 
court and legislature (Matthews, 2005; Santoni and Zucchini, 2004; Carbonell, 2003).  Italy provides an 
example.  The Italian Constitutional Court can stop or alter policy objectives of the Italian Parliament 
(Santoni and Zucchini, 2004).  When the party composition of the Italian Parliament discourages 
significant policy change, it allows the Constitutional Court more autonomy (Santoni and Zucchini, 
2004).  Without significant legislation to review, the constitutional court poses no threat to the 
objectives of the Parliament (Santoni and Zucchini, 2004).  However, when the composition of the Italian 
Parliament makes change possible, the Constitutional Court poses a threat to the Parliament because it 
could overturn policy (Santoni and Zucchini, 2004).  Under these circumstances, the Italian Parliament 
undertakes efforts to limit the autonomy of the Constitutional Court (Santoni and Zucchini, 2004).   
Sometimes constitutional courts and legislatures must work together to achieve policy goals, 
particularly social issues (Matthews, 2005).  Carbonell (2003) shows that policy success depends on the 
relative strength of the legislature compared to the court.  When the balance of power between the two 
institutions discourages cooperation, legal remedies for social issues are ineffective (Carbonell, 2003).  In 
these cases, the legislature is willing to sacrifice autonomy for a desired social policy outcome 
(Matthews, 2005; Carbonell, 2003).   
As this discussion illustrates, the legislature uses the constitutional court to help achieve policy 
goals (Matthews, 2005; Carbonell, 2003; Solyom 2003; Shipan 2000) and avoid political costs associated 
with policies ((Hunt, 2003; Alter, 1998; Vanberg, 1998; Landfried, 1994; Stone, 1990).  Since parties and 
interest groups attempt to influence both legislatures and courts ((Helms, 2006; Navia and Rios-
Figueroa, 2005; Alter, 1998), the next section discusses the interactions between these groups.    
2.3.3 Parties and Interest Groups  
The final area of research concerns interactions between parties, interest groups, constitutional 
courts, and legislatures (Helms, 2006; Navia and Rios-Figueroa, 2005; Alter, 1998).  Political parties 
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interact with constitutional courts and legislatures through the policymaking function of the legislature 
(Alter, 1998; Vanberg, 1998; Landfried, 1994; Stone, 1990).  These interactions can take two forms.  
First, political parties use the constitutional to prevent electoral repercussions (Alter, 1998; Vanberg, 
1998).  Political parties are sensitive to elections (Alter, 1998).  Conversely, constitutional courts operate 
without regard to electoral schedules (Alter, 1998).  Therefore, it is unlikely that the electorate will 
penalize political parties when the constitutional court declares a law unconstitutional (Alter, 1998).  By 
the time, the constitutional court makes its decision the electorate will no longer associate the political 
party with the law (Alter, 1998).  This allows the political party to pass policy through the legislature 
while deferring constitutional issues to the constitutional court (Alter, 1998).   
  A second type of interaction involves the use of the constitutional court by minority parties to 
achieve their agendas despite the legislature (Vanberg, 1998; Landfried, 1994; Stone, 1990).  In Europe, 
the use of constitutional courts increased as bipolarization of party politics increased (Helms, 2006).  
Parties that were in the minority in the legislature turned to constitutional courts when they were 
unsuccessful on the floor of the legislature (Helms, 2006).  However, use of the constitutional court to 
achieve party goals comes with a risk (Miller, 1993).  A constitutional court victory by a minority party 
might be framed as a political loss for a majority party or majority coalition (Miller, 1993).   
Similarly, minorities and interest groups use constitutional courts to protect their rights from 
legislative actions (Navia and Rios-Figueroa, 2005; Alter, 1998; Landfried, 1994; Miller, 1993; Garber, 
1992).  By using the constitutional court, minorities and interest groups change the argument from 
political to legal and increase their chances of success (Navia and Rios-Figueroa, 2005).  In these cases, 
interest groups and minorities shape the interaction between constitutional courts and legislatures by 
instigating the legal challenge (Navia and Rios-Figueroa, 2005; Alter, 1998; Landfried, 1994; Miller, 1993; 
Garber 1992).   
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These research efforts explain the importance of institutional design and the behaviors of the 
institutions.  Not addressed is whether interactions strengthen or weaken the national legislature.  Nor 
does this research address the impact of these interactions on human rights.  However, before exploring 
the impact of these interactions on human rights it is important to understand the relationship between 
constitutional courts and international human rights laws and norms.  The next section discusses the 
research on human rights and constitutional courts. 
2.4 Constitutional Courts and International Human Rights  
Constitutional courts are in a position to use international human rights laws and norms to 
protect human rights at the national level (Waters, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 2006).  Research examines 
the relationship between constitutional courts and international human rights laws and norms in two 
ways (Waters, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 2006).  First, research focuses on legal interpretation (Waters, 
2007).  This research argues that the use of international human rights law by national courts is evidence 
of “creeping monism” (Waters, 2007).  National courts interpret international law in one of two ways 
(Waters, 2007).  A monistic view treats international law as part of national law (Waters, 2007).  
Conversely, a dualist view treats international law as separate from national law (Waters, 2007).  
Dualists require incorporation, or legislative enactment, of international laws into national law (Waters, 
2007).  “Creeping monism” argues that courts in common law countries are moving away from the 
dualist view of international law (Waters, 2007).  As a result, constitutional courts that follow a monistic 
view of international law afford citizens international human rights protections without legislative 
actions (Waters, 2007).   
Waters’ (2007) work follows the judicial legitimacy (Gubbay, 1997; Caldeira and Gibson, 1995; 
Gibson, Caldeira, Baird, 1998) and perceived judicial role (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004) research when 
explaining why judges choose to include international laws and norms in their decisions.  Judges cite 
international laws and norms in their decisions to increase the legitimacy and political acceptance of 
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their interpretation of domestic legal texts (Waters, 2007).  Furthermore, judges see themselves 
involved in discussion with judges in other countries (Slaughter, 2010; Waters, 2007; Barak-Erez, 2004; 
Slaughter, 2003).  Their decisions use international human rights law and norms to further the 
discussions (Slaughter, 2010; Waters, 2007; Barak-Erez, 2004; Slaughter, 2003).  When constitutional 
court judges choose to use international law, their decisions force an international perspective on the 
national legislature (Slaughter, 2010; Waters, 2007; Slaughter, 2003).   
Second, research examines constitutional court use of international law to strategically protect 
or increase their position of authority vis-à-vis other institutions (Schimmelfennig, 2006; Schmidt, 2005; 
Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004; Solyom, 2003; Nichol, 1999; Rodin, 1999; Schwartz, 1998; Jacob et al, 
1996).  Constitutional courts strategically build legitimacy and jurisdiction by demonstrating their ability 
to provide a higher level of protection of rights than other courts (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  This includes 
using international human rights law as justification for judicial review (Peters, 2009).  When a case 
arguing violation of a constitutional right comes before the constitutional court, they have the 
opportunity to protect rights through their interpretation of the national constitution (Schimmelfennig, 
2006).  In these cases, the decisions of constitutional courts refer to international human rights and 
norms to broaden the interpretation of constitutionally defined rights (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  For 
example, in both South Africa (Pieterse, 2004) and Germany (Feinberg, 2005) the constitutional courts 
overturned politically popular laws to protect human rights.  In these cases, the constitutional courts 
based their interpretation of rights on evolving international human rights laws and norms (Heywood, 
2009; Gubbay, 1997).  Research demonstrates that constitutional courts use international laws and 
norms to support claims by both civic (Ssenyonjo, 2007) and political (Ozel, 2008) groups.  In other 
words, cases brought by civic or political groups allow the constitutional court to use international law 
to expand rights while increasing their legitimacy (Peters, 2009; Ozel, 2008; Ssenyonjo, 2007; 
Schimmelfennig, 2006).  
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In addition to the interactions between constitutional courts and international human rights 
law, research considers the context of the interactions (Alter, 2009; Claes, 2007; Jacobsohn, 2006; 
McCann, 2006).  Constitutional courts are both legal and political institutions (Staton et al, 2010; Finn, 
2004; Lee, Knight, and Shvetsova, 2001).  As such, legal arguments concerning constitutional courts must 
be sensitive to the political context (Alter, 2009; Claes, 2007; Jacobsohn, 2006).  Political context affects 
the use of national and international sources in court decisions (Alter, 2009; Claes, 2007; Jacobsohn, 
2006).  In addition, the political context affects the relationship between the constitutional court and 
legislature (Vanberg, 2001).  Legal arguments concerning constitutional courts must be sensitive to the 
legal culture as well (McCann, 2006).  Both political context and legal culture vary within and across 
countries (McCann, 2006).   
As this illustrates existing research indicates ways in which constitutional courts use 
international human rights law (Peters, 2009; Ozel, 2008; Ssenyonjo, 2007; Waters, 2007; 
Schimmelfennig, 2006).  It also indicates the importance of both legal and political context (Alter, 2009; 
Claes, 2007; Jacobsohn, 2006; McCann, 2006).  However, existing research does not consider the 
political and legal context of constitutional court use of international human rights law.   
To understand the political and legal context in which constitutional courts work requires 
consideration of the European Union influences.  The next section addresses this topic.   
2.5 European Union Factors Impacting Autonomy  
Constitutional courts and legislatures in European Union member countries operate under the 
influence of the European Union legal system (Alter, 1998, Volcansek, 1990, 1989).  Existing research 
examines interactions between supranational courts, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), on 
national courts and legislatures (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001; Alter, 1998, 
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Volcansek, 1990, 1989).16  Some researchers focus on the relationship between ECJ decisions and 
European Union integration (Carruba, 2003; Rasmussen, 1986).  They argue the ECJ promotes unification 
when popular unification efforts stall (Rasmussen, 1986).  This is possible because the ECJ holds member 
countries to EU law (Carruba, 2003).  For example, a decision of the ECJ established EU law as 
transnational and directly applicable to member states (Eleftheriadis, 1998).  The ECJ encourages 
enforcement of its decisions by enlisting the assistance of national courts (Eleftheriadis, 1998).  By 
making EU law directly applicable to member states the ECJ encourages national courts to enforce both 
its decisions and EU law (Eleftheriadis, 1998).   
Other researchers argue that the ECJ established itself in the hierarchical role of a supranational 
constitutional court (McCown, 2003; Alter, 1998; Eleftheriadis, 1998, Garrett et al 1998; Volcansek, 
1990, 1989).  The ECJ did this by giving EU treaties and laws the status of a constitution superior to 
national laws (McCown, 2003; Alter, 1998; Eleftheriadis, 1998, Garrett et al 1998; Volcansek, 1990, 
1989).   
Despite arguments that the influence of the ECJ is not always consistent (Tsebelis and Garrett, 
2001), evidence indicates that it complicates the balance of power between national institutions 
(Georgopoulos, 2003).  For example, the Croatian Constitutional Court is bound to enforce national 
treaties and has the power to strike inconsistent legislation (Rodin, 1999).  As a result, the Croatian 
Constitutional Court has the potential to limit both legislative and executive policy initiatives (Rodin, 
1999).   
Complications between national institutions occur in the more established Western European 
countries as well (Schmidt, 2005; Nichol, 1999; Jacob et al, 1996).  In England, courts can now challenge 
acts of Parliament thus changing the relationship between the courts and Parliament (Nichol, 1999).  In 
                                                          
16
 Additional research efforts are included in this section: Krikorian, 2005; Schmidt, 2005; Carruba, 2003; 
Georgopoulos, 2003; McCown, 2003; Nichol, 1999; Rodin, 1999; Garrett et al 1998; Eleftheriadis, 1998; Jacob et 
al, 1996; Rasmussen, 1986.  
43 
the past, acts of Parliament were considered the supreme law of the land and unchallengeable by courts 
(Nichol, 1999).  Similarly, in France, the constitution establishes an extremely limited role for the 
Constitutional Council (the French constitutional court) (Schmidt, 2005; Jacob et al, 1996).  However, the 
Constitutional Council adjudicates broadly in matters associated with the European Union (Schmidt, 
2005; Jacob et al, 1996).   
Yet this does not mean that national courts give the ECJ carte blanche (Kwiecien, 2005; Rodin, 
1999).  National courts remain reluctant to recognize the supremacy of supranational laws when they 
are not consistent with the national constitution (Kwiecien, 2005; Rodin, 1999).  One explanation 
offered is that supranational national courts to educate the national legislature on international norms 
(Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).   
This research creates two opposing theories about the influence of the ECJ on national courts 
(Schimmelfennig, 2006; Alter, 2001; Conant, 2001).  Alter argues that the ECJ empowered individuals 
and national judges to overturn national policies (Alter, 2001).  Conant (2001) builds on this argument 
emphasizing that the ECJ empowered lower national courts over the higher national courts by limiting 
the ability of the higher court so overturn lower court ruling.  Furthermore, Conant (2001) points out 
that the national constitutional courts have the most to lose and least to gain from EU legal integration.  
Therefore, they will be less likely to use ECJ case law to foster changes in national policy (Conant, 2001).   
This contrasts with Schimmelfennig’s (2006) view.  Schimmelfennig (2006) argues that national 
constitutional courts use the empowerment by the ECJ strategically.  By using EU laws, constitutional 
courts interpret national constitutional rights more broadly (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  This allows them to 
increase the protection of rights as well as their power vis-à-vis other national courts (Schimmelfennig, 
2006),   
EU influence on the balance of power between the branches of government is not limited to the 
judiciary (Rizzuto, 2004; Capano and Giuliani, 2003; Capano and Giuliani, 2003).  There is evidence in 
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Western European countries that the role of national legislatures is strengthened because they have the 
power to delay or block EU measures (Rizzuto, 2004; Capano and Giuliani, 2003; Capano and Giuliani, 
2003).  An example is the French Parliament (Rizzuto, 2004).  The French Parliament used integration 
into the European Union to justify passing legislation that increased its powers to review government 
actions (Rizzuto, 2004).  This legislation gave the French Parliament the ability to block or delay EU 
actions (Rizzuto, 2004).  Similarly, an analysis of the Italian Parliament showed that the laws it drafted to 
accomplish integration with the European Union redefined its duties (Capano and Giuliani, 2003).  As a 
result, the Italian Parliament increased its role in policy (Capano and Giuliani, 2003).   
Evidence suggests that political institutions, and their relationships, might be subject to different 
influences in the developing democracies of post-communist Europe versus the established democracies 
of Western Europe (Raik, 2004; Rizzuto, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2004; Sissenich, 2004; Beichelt, 2003; 
Pigenko, 2001; Oquaye, 2000; Sajo, 1995).  As newly democratic institutions develop, experiences with 
institutional rules shape legislative attitudes (Pigenko, 2001).  The EU influenced institutional rules in 
post-communist countries through support they provided to these countries (Raik, 2004; Rizzuto, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig, 2004; Sissenich, 2004; Beichelt, 2003).  In some countries the EU influence is negative 
(Raik, 2004; Rizzuto, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2004; Sissenich, 2004; Beichelt, 2003).  For example, the EU 
integration process in Estonia limited political participation to elites focused on a speedy accession 
(Raik, 2004).  A study of EU policy adoption in Poland and Hungary found that the EU focus on state 
building without social learning resulted in a technocratic government and caused EU rule adoption to 
be problematic (Sissenich, 2004).  One explanation offered for this is that the EU focused on structural 
changes without changing the underlying society or culture (Emmert, 2009).  Another study found that 
the EU contributed to the consolidation of democracy but at the expense of political competition 
(Schimmelfennig, 2004).  Several studies found that the EU participation is tilting the 
executive/legislative balance of power toward the executive thus weakening the legislature (Rizzuto, 
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2004; Schimmelfennig, 2004; Beichelt, 2003).  This change results from the creation of additional parties 
such as anti-EU parties (Rizzuto, 2004; Schimmelfennig, 2004; Beichelt, 2003).  
These research efforts fail to address the supranational impact on the autonomy of the 
institutions and the consolidation of democracy.  For example, existing research does not address 
whether a constitutional court empowered by the European Court of Justice can offset the weaknesses 
imposed on the national legislature by the European Union.         
2.6 Supranational and National Legal Impacts on Legislatures  
Five strains of existing research offer insight into the weaknesses presented above.  First, 
Schimmelfennig (2006) demonstrated that national constitutional courts use the protection of human 
rights to establish and defend their jurisdiction.  This research demonstrates that constitutional courts 
build human rights rhetoric defending their policy preferences into the legal reasoning of their decisions 
(Schimmelfennig, 2006).  This is important to the research question because it provides insight into how 
and why constitutional courts expand their autonomy.  Further, it provides insight into why legislatures 
are willing to accept increased constitutional court autonomy. 
Second, Maveety and Grosskopf (2004) demonstrated that constitutional courts operate at both 
the national and international level.  This allows constitutional courts to facilitate democratic reform by 
identifying ways to incorporate internationally expected, but nationally unpopular, reforms into national 
legislation (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  This research is consistent with Schimmelfennig’s work 
because it sees constitutional courts as expanding their autonomy through international law 
(Schimmelfennig, 2006; Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  It addresses how constitutional courts could 
increase the protection of human rights, even when some of these rights (such as minority rights) are 
nationally unpopular. 
Third, Stone (1990) demonstrated that national constitutional courts altered the legislative 
process through past and present decisions as well as the threat of constitutional court review.  Abstract 
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review effectively facilitated this change (Stone, 1990).  Stone’s research is applicable to the research 
question because it illustrates how constitutional courts can increase their autonomy in relation to 
legislatures.  As legislatures increasingly consider constitutional courts while they create legislation, their 
autonomy in relation to constitutional courts decreases. 
Fourth, Finnemore’s (2003) work on changes in patterns of military intervention provides insight 
on the interaction of national constitutional courts and legislatures.  Finnemore argues that the 
increased legalization of issues, increased norms of human rights and equality, and changes in values 
held by the states explain changes in the patterns of military intervention (Finnemore, 2003).  Military 
intervention decreased as legal resolution of disputes increased (Finnemore, 2003).  This research  
addresses how opportunities for constitutional courts to increase their autonomy occur.  As 
parliamentarians learn to use constitutional courts and international law to alter legislative action, they 
change the legislative patterns.  Legislative policy losers begin framing debates in legal and human rights 
terms so they are appropriate for the constitutional court. 
Finally, Fish and Kroenig (2009) developed a measure of legislative autonomy.  A similar 
methodology can create a measure of constitutional court autonomy.  The two measures facilitate 
comparison across countries.  A quantitative use of these measures can assess the relationship between 
legislative and constitutional court autonomy and the protection of human rights.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the effect of combining these research efforts to address the research 
question.  Legislatures produce laws.  Constitutional courts review these laws.  While reviewing the law 
the constitutional court can choose to use international law, particularly international human rights law.  
International attention (for example, pre-accession review by the European Union) and national interest 
influence the constitutional court’s decision on the use of international law.  The constitutional court’s 
decision influences current and future legislation.  As this cycle is repeated the constitutional court gains 
autonomy by increasing its jurisdiction over legislative acts.  Since the legislature must consider the 
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constitutional court when constructing and debating legislation, there is a reduction in legislative 
autonomy.   
Figure 2.1 also illustrates the argument, presented here, that national constitutional courts 
reduce national legislative autonomy as they protect human rights and democracy.  A measure of 
constitutional court autonomy created following the methodology of Fish and Kroenig (2009) allows 
testing of this argument.17   Finnemore’s argument sets the expectation that the constitutional court’s 
impact on legislative autonomy increases over time.  Finnemore, Stone, and Maveety and Grosskopf’s 
research efforts lead to an expectation that international human rights arguments before the 
constitutional court increased the impact on the legislature’s autonomy.  The next section presents 
hypotheses built on these research efforts. 
                                                          
17
 Fish and Kroenig’s Handbook of National Legislatures compared attributes of national legislatures across a wide 
range of countries.  This comparison includes survey results received from three national legislative experts in each 
country.  Questions solicited information on the structure and actions of the legislature and the independence of the 
legislature from other branches of government.   
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Figure 2.1 Constitutional Court Interactions 
2.7 Hypotheses  
Three hypotheses derive from the five research efforts described immediately above. 
Increasing constitutional court autonomy increases the protection of human rights.  This 
hypothesis follows from the arguments of Schimmelfennig, Stone, and Maveety and Grosskopf.  It tests 
whether the constitutional court uses human rights to protect its niche by looking at the role of 
institutional autonomy.  It tests the impact of constitutional courts on legislative autonomy.  It also tests 
whether or not that impact has an effect on the protection of human rights.  This requires the 
development of a measurement of constitutional court autonomy following the methodology used by 
Fish and Kroenig (2009) in their evaluation of national legislatures.  Acceptance of this hypothesis 
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requires demonstration that both constitutional court autonomy and protection of human rights 
increase. 
As supranational constraints intended to increase the consolidation of democracy and protection 
of human  rights increase, national constitutional courts increase constraints on national legislatures This 
hypothesis builds on a combination of Stone (1990) and Finnemore’s (2003) research.  It evaluates the 
ability of supranational legal institutions to alter the interaction between national constitutional courts 
and legislatures.  Current research posits that constitutional courts increase their autonomy because of 
supranational factors, such as the use of international human rights law (Waters, 2007; Schimmelfennig, 
2006) or empowerment by supranational courts (Schimmelfennig, 2006; Alter, 2001; Conant, 2001).  
This hypothesis extends that research to examine how constitutional courts alter behavior within the 
country.  Acceptance of this hypothesis requires demonstration of supranational (either regional or 
international in origin) constraints in the forms of laws and/or norms used by national constitutional 
courts to constrain the actions of the national legislation.  This requires comparing the interactions of 
constitutional courts and national legislatures across time and countries with varying levels of 
supranational constraints (such as regional and international monitoring or regional and international 
legal action).   
Constitutional courts in countries with a negotiated transition to democracy will use 
international human rights law in their decisions more than constitutional courts in countries where the 
transition to democracy was unilateral.  The third hypothesis looks at the ability of international law to 
further the national protection of human rights and democracy.  It builds on Finnemore’s (2003) belief in 
the power of international human rights law to legalize political debates. This hypothesis is important 
because it will contribute to the understanding of what factors contribute to the ability of constitutional 
courts to protect human rights and democracy.  It improves our understanding of why legislatures would 
be willing to accept the constraining decisions of constitutional courts.  Acceptance of this hypothesis 
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requires evidence that constitutional courts in a country that experienced a negotiated transition are 
more likely to use international human rights law in their decision. 
2.8 Conclusion  
This chapter began with four objectives.  First, it presented the current debates surrounding 
judicial independence and its relationship to judicial autonomy.  The definition of judicial autonomy 
used here is a judiciary that makes decisions without influence by other branches and can enforce those 
decisions.  This definition allows a comparison of judicial autonomy with Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) 
legislative autonomy.   
Second, this chapter reviewed existing research concerning factors affecting legislative and 
constitutional court autonomy.  Review of this research indicates that, although it explains particular 
examples or issues, it does not allow a comparative assessment across a broad range of issues.  Nor 
does the research fully account for the influence of supranational law and institutions.  Consequently, 
the research question requires an explanation of both national and supranational impacts on legislative 
and constitutional court autonomy.  In addition, consideration of the constitutional court’s impact on 
human rights is required. 
Third, was a discussion of five research efforts which, when combined, address the research 
question.  Each of the research efforts addresses a particular aspect of the research question.  In 
combination, this research sets expectations that assist in answering the research question.   
Finally, was the presentation of three hypotheses that to assess the research question.  The first 
hypothesis assesses the national interactions between the constitutional court and the legislature and 
their impact on each institution’s autonomy.  The second hypothesis assesses supranational influences 
on the autonomy of the legislature and constitutional court.  The third hypothesis assesses the increased 
use of international human rights law.  The results of these hypotheses contribute to an assessment of 
the research question. 
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The next chapter explains the methodology that used in tests of these hypotheses. 
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3    METHODOLOGY 
To test these hypotheses this dissertation uses a comparative approach.  The tests combine 
quantitative (objective and numeric) and qualitative (subjective, usually non-numeric) techniques.  
Quantitative methods allow testing of the hypotheses in a manner approaching scientific rigor.  They 
identify the statistical likelihood that outcomes result from test conditions rather than random 
circumstances.  Their accuracy, however, depends on the definitions and equations used by the 
researcher (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005).  In addition, qualitative results improve as the number of 
cases and observations increase (Salkind, 2000).  Quantitative methods indicate whether conditions are 
related but not whether one condition causes another (Johnson and Reynolds, 2005).  Nor do they 
consider the political and legal context in which the conditions occur.   
Qualitative methods address context and explanations.  They analyze the influence of such 
things as history and social relations (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2006).  They allow consideration of 
the underlying political and social contexts.  Qualitative methods focus on a small number of cases 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2006).  While qualitative methods look for statistically significant 
patterns applicable to the universe of cases, quantitative methods look for insight into specific cases and 
situations (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2006).  This is useful both to explain observations specific to a 
case or situation and to refine the focus of qualitative methods (Mahoney, 2006).  Furthermore, 
subjective analysis of quantitative results explains the underlying causation behind the correlation.  
However, this method also reflects the personal bias and interpretation of the researcher.  Used in 
combination, qualitative methods provide context to, and allow interpretation of, quantitative results.  
The result is a thorough answer to the research question.   
When testing a hypothesis it is important to vary conditions to determine the effects of the test.  
A single case approach examines variances that occur within one country.  A comparative approach 
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examines variances that occur across countries.  When choosing cases the researcher has two options.  
He or she can use cases that are similar in as many respects as possible, also called the most similar case 
approach, or very different, also called the most different case approach (Lim, 2006).  A most similar 
case approach provides inherent controls on data through the similarities across countries (Lim, 2006).  
Since countries are not identical, the controls assumed in a most similar case design are not perfect 
(Lim, 2006).  Conversely, a most different case approach ensures variance in the conditions studied 
(Lim,, 2006).  Although this allows identification of relationships, underlying, or serendipitous, 
relationships are masked (Lim, 2006).  
This chapter contains two sections.  The first section reviews the hypotheses, identifies 
variables, presents the data used to operationalize the variables, and states the outcome required for 
acceptance of the hypotheses.  The second section presents and justifies the cases used.  An explanation 
of the quantitative and qualitative methodologies used occurs in each chapter.  Detailed information 
about the qualitative and quantitative methods is included in subsequent chapters. 
3.1 Hypotheses, Variables, and Data 
The last chapter presented three hypotheses to test possible answers to the research question.  
This section identifies and explains the variables in each hypothesis.  Each hypothesis contains two types 
of variables: one dependent variable or the expected result, and independent variables or the conditions 
that change.  In addition, a standard is set for the acceptance of each hypothesis.   
 
 Increasing constitutional court autonomy increases the protection of human rights.   
 
The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the protection of human rights.  The international 
community sees human rights abuses as the result of state action (Gready and Phillips, 2009; De 
Schutter, 2009; Rodley, 2009).  If a state believes it can act with impunity, it will violate the human rights 
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of its citizens (Gready and Phillips, 2009; De Schutter, 2009; Rodley, 2009).  Human rights violations 
range from non-violent, such as discrimination, to violent, such as torture or enforced disappearance 
(Gready and Phillips, 2009).  Any state actor can violate human rights including, but not limited to, the 
executive, legislators, the military, and police forces (Gready and Phillips, 2009).  To protect human 
rights actors, including but not limited to victims, use legislation, litigation, and advocacy (Gready and 
Phillips, 2009).  The ability to enforce protections depends on national laws, the national constitution, 
and international treaties to which the state is a party.  Similarly, actual protections vary with litigation 
and advocacy efforts as well as legal interpretations (Gready and Phillips, 2009).  Consequently, 
protections are as varied as the abuses.   
The political and legal context of each country prioritizes human rights and their protection 
(Klug, 2007; Pieterse, 2007).  The variance between human rights protected in South Africa’s 
constitution and those protected in the constitutions of most Western countries illustrates this point 
(Klug, 2007).  There is variance in constitutional rights even among Western Democracies.  For example, 
the rights protected in the constitution of France’s Fifth Republic18 differ from those in Ireland’s 
constitution.19  There is a basic set of human rights in international law as defined in international 
treaties.20  
This hypothesis tests the ability of constitutional courts to adjudicate protections for human 
rights.  It is possible to define ‘protection of human rights’ as actions by the constitutional court that 
check human rights abuses by the legislature.  However, this definition is problematic for three reasons.  
First, to act constitutional courts require a case.  Legislatures violate human rights by passing laws that 
harms citizens.  For example, a legislature passes a law prohibiting free speech, a right protected by 
                                                          
18
 Available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/fr00000_.html   accessed October 15, 2012 
19
 Available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ei00000_.html   accessed October 15, 2012. 
20
 See the International Covenant for the Protection of Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant for the 
Protection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
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international law,21 European treaties,22 and national constitutions.23  The constitutional court protects 
human rights by invalidating such laws.  Conversely, the constitutional court fails to protect human 
rights by upholding such laws.  However, the constitutional court only takes these actions when 
presented with a case.  Without a challenge to the law before the constitutional court, it cannot protect 
human rights.   
Second, as described above, the political and legal context of a country influences the priority 
placed on various human rights (Klug, 2007; Pieterse, 2007).  For example, former communist countries 
valued social rights over individual rights such as freedom of speech (Roth, 2004).  Unless and until the 
society values individual rights, successful constitutional court challenges to these rights are unlikely.  
A third problem with this definition is that one constitutional court decision may affect several 
human rights, limiting some while protecting others.  For example, a decision framed as protecting 
freedom of speech might limit freedom of religion.  Similarly, a law appearing to violate freedom of 
association may actually protect minorities from discrimination in the workplace.  Even more concerning 
is the case where, on the surface, a constitutional court decision appears to protect human rights but 
the implementation of the decision allows further violations.  A clear example of this is the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Plessey v. Ferguson (Epstein and Walker, 2004).24  On the surface the decision 
ensures equal services for minorities but implementation justified segregation (Epstein and Walker, 
2004).  In these examples, a constitutional court decision seen as protecting human rights may actually 
sanction government abuses.   
                                                          
21
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art. 19 
22
 European Convention on Human Rights Art. 10 
23
 Constitution of Poland Art. 54; Constitution of Romania Art. 30; Constitution of the Slovak Republic Art. 26.  
Freedom of speech or expression is not explicitly included in the Constitution of the Czech Republic.  However, Art. 
10 of the Czech Constitution incorporates human rights from ratified Human Rights Treaties.  The Czech Republic 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1993 
(http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en).   
24
 The United States’ Supreme Court does not meet the qualifications for a constitutional court as defined in this 
dissertation.  However, Supreme Court does determine the constitutionality of laws thus is being used as an 
example.  
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Therefore, a rigorous assessment of the protection of human rights must look beyond 
constitutional court actions.  to one premised on the ‘protection of human rights’ using established 
measures.  Multiple independent, international organizations provide assessments of human rights 
across countries.  Organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International provide 
qualitative assessments.  Organizations such as Freedom House and the World Bank provide 
quantitative measures.  Countries, in particular the United States, also provide assessments of human 
rights in other countries.  These measures provide several benefits.  Because each assessment covers a 
broad range of countries, they facilitate cross-country comparisons.  Since the groups update these 
assessments annually, they allow comparisons across time.  The qualitative assessments cover a broad 
range of human rights.  Quantitative measures focus on a subset of rights.   
To ensure an unbiased assessment of human rights protections operationalization of this 
variable use these data from an international assessment of human rights.  This has three advantages.  
First, it assesses the overall protection of human rights in the country.  This overcomes the problems 
indicated above with basing the assessment on constitutional court actions.  Second, it allows cross-
national and time span comparison of data.  Third, the organizations have the resources, rigor, and 
experience to ensure accuracy of the data.   
The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project provides an existing measure that 
uses these data for the protection of human rights variable.25  CIRI provides several measures of human 
rights including physically harmful violations (torture, enforced disappearance), civil and political rights 
(freedom of speech and religion), and social rights (workers’ rights) (CIRI Human Rights Project).  This 
allows assessment of the protection of several different kinds of rights.  As explained above, there is 
variation in the priority countries put on rights.  For example, the former communist countries valued 
                                                          
25
Data are available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ (Accessed February 20, 2012)  
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social rights above civil and political rights (Roth, 2004).  CIRI assesses all rights without considering 
national context (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).   
The value of this variable is a combination of several CIRI measures.  First, the Physical Integrity 
Rights Index (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual) measures protection of the most physically 
harmful human rights (killing, torture, imprisonment, disappearance).  This measure includes rights in 
the Convention Against Torture, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons From 
Enforced Disappearance, and some of the rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.  The value for this variable ranges from 0 (indicating that the acts have occurred frequently 
during the year) to 8 (indicating that the acts have not occurred during the year) (CIRI Human Rights 
Project Coding Manual).   
Second, the CIRI measures Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Foreign Movement, Freedom of 
Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, and Freedom of Electoral Self-
Determination (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual) assess civil and political rights.  These 
measures assess rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  The value of each of 
these variables ranges from 0 (the right was severely limited or denied) to 2 (the right was relatively 
unrestricted) and is measured yearly (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).   
Finally, the CIRI measures Workers’ Rights, Women’s Political Rights, and Women’s Economic 
Rights (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual) assess economic rights.  These rights approximate the 
rights included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  The Workers’ Rights 
variable measures the ability of workers to associate in the workplace and collectively bargain with their 
employers (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  This variable ranges from 0 (severely limited or 
denied rights) to 2 (relatively unrestricted rights) (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  The 
Women’s Economic Rights variable measures the rights women enjoy in the economy, including 
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workplace discrimination and right to hold jobs (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  This 
variable ranges from 0 (women are afforded no legal economic protections) to 3 (women have a wide 
range of protections and the protections are enforced) (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  The 
Women’s Political Rights variable measures political rights specifically associated with women (CIRI 
Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  The values for this variable are 0 (no legal guarantees for 
women’s political rights), 1 (women’s political rights are legally guaranteed but severely limited in 
practice), 2 (women’s rights are legally guaranteed but somewhat limited in practice), and 3 (women’s 
rights are guaranteed legally and practiced) (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).   
The key independent variable, the variable that changes, is constitutional court autonomy.  As 
discussed in the last chapter, the definition used here for an autonomous constitutional court is a court 
that makes decisions without influence by other branches and it decisions is enforced.  This definition 
has two parts.  First, the constitutional court must be able to make decisions without influence by other 
branches.  Second, the constitutional court must have the ability to enforce the decisions.  In addition, 
both the de jure (according to the law) and de facto (according to reality) factors of constitutional court 
autonomy must be considered (Diaz and Fix, 2012; Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009).  This variable, 
therefore, combines information from several different sources. 
First, the nation’s constitution provides data for the de jure assessment of this variable.  
Contained in the constitution is information on the constitutional court’s jurisdiction, composition, and 
powers.  Protection from dissolution, protection from removal, control over budget, and control over 
procedures affect the ability of the constitutional court to make decisions without influence.  Finality of 
constitutional court decisions affects the ability of the court to enforce their decisions. Each factor has a 
value of 0 (no protection) or 1 (protected in the constitution).   
Access to the constitutional court affects decision-making and enforcement.  A court only 
decides cases brought before it.  Thus, limits on who can bring a case affect the types of cases the court 
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hears.  Furthermore, limitations on jurisdiction limit visibility of court actions.  If only political elites 
access the constitutional court, the average citizen has little knowledge of its actions.  This provides 
political elites little electoral incentive to abide by the court’s decisions.  Thus, the greater the access to 
the constitutional court the greater its decision-making and enforcement capabilities.  This factor has a 
value of 0 (limited access) or 1 (all citizens have access to the court).   
Access to the constitutional court also includes when challenges to laws occur.  Constitutional 
challenges to a law occur a priori (before the law is promulgated), a posteriori (after the law is 
promulgated), or both.  If the constitutional court hears only a priori cases, it prevents addressing 
human rights violations resulting from implementation of the law.  If the constitutional court hears only 
a posteriori cases, human rights violations occur before challenges come to the court.  A posteriori 
review also limits the constitutional court to the facts presented in the case.  Thus, a constitutional court 
with both a priori and a posteriori review has the greatest access.  This factor has a value of 0 (only a 
priori or a posteriori review) or 1 (no limit on the timing of cases).   
Finally, as discussed in the previous chapter, the group appointing judges influences the court.  
Appointments by the legislative and executive branches are inherently political.  Appointments by a 
legal organization, such as a bar association, are removed from national politics.  This factor has a value 
of 0 (all constitutional court judges appointed by another branch), 1 (some judges appointed by another 
branch), or 2 (no judges appointed by another branch).   
The measure of de facto constitutional court autonomy follows the work of Howard and Carey 
(2003).  The best measurement of de facto autonomy is information directly from people involved in the 
process.  A proxy measure replaces obtaining direct information from judges, lawyers, and legislators.26  
Following the work of Howard and Carey (2003), this factor uses information from the United States 
Department of State Country Reports.  This factor has a value of 0 (reports indicate an effective judiciary 
                                                          
26
 Former constitutional court judges, academics, and lawyers in the countries included in this dissertation received 
surveys.  However, there was no response.   
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with few reports of undue influence), 1 (reports indicate problems with the effectiveness of the judiciary 
or undue judicial influence), and 2 (reports indicate an ineffective judiciary and undue judicial influence).   
Coding the de facto factors from the information in the United States Department of State 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices requires qualitative analysis concerning the impact on the 
constitutional court.  These reports include information on both the judiciary and courts in general.  
Interpretation is required to ensure that coding includes only the information relevant to the 
constitutional courts.  The employment of three guidelines in this analysis minimizes the risk of arbitrary 
interpretation.  The basis for these guidelines is existing research on factors that influence constitutional 
courts. 
The basis for the first guideline is research indicating the political roots of constitutional court 
judges (Kühn, Zdenĕk, 2007).  This becomes particularly important when juxtaposed with research 
indicating constitutional courts willingness to support issues such as minority rights in the face of 
political resistance (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  Therefore, according to the first guideline, if the 
constitutional court upholds laws that limit minority rights it is evidence that the constitutional court 
lacks de facto autonomy.  
The second guideline derives from research on judicial behaviors.  This research indicates that 
judges with limited qualifications or training make restrained decisions (Bugaric, 2001).  This is 
particularly important when emerging from a communist law system where law was a tool for the state 
to achieve its objectives (Reichel, 1999).  Applying this research to the post-communist situation, a judge 
constitutional court judge trained under communist law would be personally hesitant to overturn 
legislation (Tanasescu, 2012).  Poor training might also limit the willingness or ability of a judge to refer 
to international law thus limiting protections for human rights (Alter, 2009).  Although poor 
qualifications or training affect judicial decisions at any level, it is particularly impactful at the 
constitutional court level where decisions can be more complex (Cossman and Schneiderman, 2007).  
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Therefore, according to this guideline, reports of a poorly trained judiciary are evidence that the 
constitutional court lacks de facto autonomy. 
Finally, some of the reports indicate that the judiciary is subject to political influence.  However, 
the process for appointing constitutional court judges is not always the same as appointing other 
members of the judiciary.  For example, appointment to the constitutional court may require legislative 
approval whilst a single body appoints other members of the judiciary.  Therefore, assessment of 
reports of judicial influence occurs in the context of constitutional court appointments. 
Constitutional court autonomy is a summation of these factors.  The values range from 0 to 11.   
Acceptance of this hypothesis requires a statistically significant correlation between 
constitutional court autonomy and protection of human rights.  In addition, the two variables must co-
vary.  Countries with higher levels of constitutional court autonomy must have higher protection of 
human rights. 
 
As supranational constraints intended to increase the consolidation of democracy and protection 
of human  rights increase, national constitutional courts increase constraints on national legislatures  
 
The dependent variable, or measured outcome, is constraints placed on the legislature by the 
constitutional court.  Constitutional courts constrain the legislature in several ways (Vanberg, 1998).  
Constraints include, but are not limited to, limitations on legislative actions, annulment of laws, 
instructions on drafting of laws, or the threat of constitutional court review of legislation by legislatures 
during debates (Vanberg, 1998).   
This variable is a modified version of Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) measure of legislative autonomy.  
Fish and Kroenig (2009) measure legislative autonomy based on 32 items (2009).  The modification used 
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here limits the measurement to constitutional court constraints on the legislature.  Values are 0 (judicial 
review of legislation is not allows) or 1 (judicial review of legislation is allowed).   
The above represent de jure constitutional court constraint of the legislature.  De facto 
constraints are equally important.  References to the constitutional court in legislative debates indicate 
de facto constraints.  These are comments during the debate that indicate the legislators consider 
constitutional court action.  They might write legislation following instructions in past constitutional 
court decisions.  They might write legislation to prevent future constitutional court action.  Alternatively, 
one group of legislators might threaten future constitutional court action to gain concessions in the 
legislation.  Values for this factor are 0 (constitutional court is not referenced in parliamentary debates), 
1 (references to constitutional court involve decisions only), or 2 (references to constitutional court 
include both decisions and threats to challenge laws being debated).  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the national political context influences relations between the constitutional court and 
legislature.  Assessment of this value occurs yearly.     
The total value of this variable sums the values for each factor.  Values range from 0 to 3.   
The independent variable, or manipulated condition, is supranational constraints related to 
democracy and the protection of human rights.  These supranational constraints take various forms.  De 
jure constraints are international and regional treaties which, when signed and ratified, require state 
compliance.27  Since the research question is concerned with human rights, only international human 
rights treaties are considered.  Each of the following treaties values are 0 (not signed or ratified), 1 
(signed not ratified), or 2 (signed and ratified):  
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, and the Convention on the 
                                                          
27
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969).   
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European Social Charter, Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities.  Values change as the status of the treaty change. 
Pre-accession requirements and agreements impose constraints on states seeking to join the 
European Union (Albi, 2009; Emmert, 2009; Kühn, 2004).  European Union membership offers economic 
and other benefits (Albi, 2009).  Scrutiny, therefore constraints, varies with European Union status (Albi, 
2009).  As countries approach accession, the amount of scrutiny, and incentive to comply, increases 
(Albi, 2009).  Once the country is a member the amount of scrutiny, and incentive to comply, decreases 
(Albi, 2009).  Coding for European Union pre-accession constraints is 0 (member or not applicable), 1 
(under consideration), and 2 (accession decision within a year).  Evaluation of this variable occurs yearly.   
The independent variable’s value is a sum of the above factors.  Values range from 0 to 18.   
Acceptance of this hypothesis requires a statistically significant positive correlation between 
supranational constraints and legislative constraints.  Countries with higher levels of supranational 
constraints must also have higher level of legislative constraints imposed by the constitutional courts.  
Conversely, countries with lower levels of supranational constraints must have few legislative 
constraints imposed by the constitutional court. 
 
Courts in countries with a negotiated transition to democracy will use international human rights 
law in their decisions more than constitutional courts in countries where the transition to democracy was 
unilateral.   
 
The use of international human rights law in constitutional court decisions is the dependent 
variable or outcome.  Constitutional court decisions may not explicitly state the use of international 
human rights law (Emmert, 2009; Powell and Staton, 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2006).  The court may 
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consider international human rights law as they arrive at the decision.  However, the court is not 
required to include these documents in the written decision (Powell and Staton, 2009).  Some legal 
cultures do not consider it appropriate to use international law (Emmert, 2009).  Conversely, some 
constitutional courts see the use of international law as a way to increase the legitimacy of their 
decisions (Schimmelfennig, 2006).   
There is no accurate way to fully understand and accommodate all the reasons a constitutional 
court may or may not use international human rights law in their decisions.  However, the only definitive 
proof that the constitutional court considered international human rights law is inclusion in the written 
decision.  References to international human rights law can include, but are not limited to, international 
treaties (including but not limited to United Nations treaties and International Labor Organization 
treaties), regional treaties (such as European Union treaties), and regional court decisions (European 
Court of Justice, and European Court of Human Rights).  Each constitutional court decision is coded as 0 
(no reference) or 1 (international human rights law is referenced).   
Type of transition to democracy is the independent, or manipulated, variable.  Transitions to 
democracy can occur in a variety of ways, some peaceful while others are violent.  Negotiated 
transitions involve all groups in the development of the rules of the new government.  A non-negotiated 
transition occurs when a single group or party decides the rules of the new government.  Coding of this 
variable is 0 (the transition resulted in a constitution dictated by a single group or excluding members of 
the prior regime), 1 (there was a peaceful and agreed upon transition of power but the prior regime was 
excluded from creation of the constitution), or 2 (there was a peaceful and agreed upon transition and 
both the current and prior regime were involved in negotiations of the constitution). 
Acceptance of this hypothesis requires evidence of a positive statistical correlation between a 
negotiated transition to democracy and the use of international human rights law in constitutional court 
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decisions.  The less negotiated the transition to democracy and construction of the new constitution the 
less the constitutional court must use international human rights law in their decisions. 
3.2 Cases 
This dissertation uses several criteria for case selection.  First, the cases must be subject to 
supranational constraints.  This requires a supranational legal system specifically imposed to ensure the 
consolidation of democracy and protection of rights.  Supranational legal systems include the 
Organization of American States, the African Union, and the European Union.  In addition, this research 
requires that the supranational legal system’s influence must vary.  The European Union satisfies these 
requirements.  It has a strong supranational legal system (Alter, 2003; Baudenbacher, 2003; Jacobs, 
2003) and several binding human rights treaties (Buergenthal, Shelton, and Stewart, 2002).28  In 
addition, the European Union establishes strict guidelines for accession (Magnette and Nicolaidis, 2004).   
Second, the cases must have both a legislature and a constitutional court.  Constitutional courts 
are specifically required for two reasons. First, constitutions specifically grant the power of judicial 
review to constitutional courts.  Further, judicial review is the primary function of constitutional courts.  
Judicial review is the power to determine the constitutionality of legislative actions (Ginsberg et al, 
2011).  Therefore, constitutional courts have a specific jurisdiction.  Second, as explained in the previous 
chapter, constitutions define the power, structure, and jurisdiction of constitutional courts.  This 
facilitates comparison across cases.   
Finally, variance is required in the transition to democracy, consolidation of democracy, 
protection of human rights, and autonomy of institutions. Variance in these features across established 
democracies is subtle but does exist.  The variances are more noticeable in countries transitioning to 
democracy (Mendes, 2011).   
                                                          
28
 European Convention on Human Rights, European Social Charter, European Convention Against Torture, 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National  l Minorities 
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The post-communist countries of Central Eastern Europe meet these criteria.  First, the 
European Union strongly influenced these countries since their independence (Piana, 2009).  EU 
influence varies during the membership accession process.  Granting or delaying membership causes 
additional variances in influence.  Second, these countries have both a legislature and constitutional 
court with variances in the powers of both institutions across countries.  Third, variance exists in the 
transition to democracy, consolidation of democracy, and protection of human rights.29  Therefore, 
cases are post-communist countries from Central Eastern Europe.   
The selected cases are post-communist countries admitted to the European Union on or before 
2007.  Cases are the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania.  Two points justify selection of 
these countries.  First, the transition to democracy varies across the countries.  Romania transitioned 
through a violent coup.  Poland’s transition was relatively peaceful   Furthermore, Poland’s communist 
party returned to power after the first election.  Czechoslovakia had a non-violent revolution.  The 
Slovak Republic transitioned peacefully from the Czech Republic.  Second, for these countries both 
constitutional court decisions and parliamentary debates are available on-line.  Some of the information 
is only available in the native language.  However, it is in a format conducive to text translation.   
Testing of the hypotheses uses data from 1990 through 2009.  This allows assessment of the 
European Union impact both before and after accession.  All available constitutional court decisions are 
included.  Most studies limit court decisions to specific topics or cases.  The inclusion of all decisions 
here occurs for two reasons.  First, any constitutional court decision affects human rights or democracy.  
Constitutional courts adjudicate compliance with the constitution.  In a democracy, a constitution 
defines the country’s rules.  Constitutions protect rights.  Thus, constitutional courts protect rights and 
democracy.  Second, the research question considers the relationship between constitutional courts and 
legislatures.  Potentially, any constitutional court case affects this relationship.   
                                                          
29
 Based on Freedom House and CIRI data. 
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This case selection includes inherent controls.  For example including only constitutional courts 
limits the cases, law, and interactions.  Lower courts are increasingly active in the protection of the 
constitution and human rights (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  However, their inclusion increases complexity 
because of the variations in legal and national court systems.  Lower courts adjudicate cases based on 
specific national and local laws.  These laws vary within and across countries.  There is further variance 
in the structure and function of lower courts.  A constitutional court focus minimizes legal differences.  
Additionally, constitutional courts have direct impact on the national legislature.   
Second, supranational influence is limited to the European Union.  European Union laws and 
treaties are clearly documented and binding.  EU members sign and ratify a common set of treaties.  
This eliminates variance in regional treaties.  In addition, European Union membership imposes an 
expectation of democratization and respect for human rights.  This subsequently imposes constraints on 
countries.  EU constraints increase in the period prior to accession.  This creates variance across 
countries and over time 
3.3 Conclusion  
This chapter provided an overview of the methods to test the research question.  It started by 
defining variables associated with each hypothesis.  Explanations included an operationalization of the 
variables.  Each of the variables is an aggregate of several scalar measures.  Thus, variables reflect a 
variety of possible conditions.  The protection of human rights variable in the first hypothesis uses data 
from an independent source.  All other variables rely on data collected as part of this research.   
Five sources provide data for this research.  The human rights measures are from the CIRI 
Human Rights Data Project.  Second, national constitutions provide information on legislative and 
constitutional court autonomy.  Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) research provides additional information on 
legislative autonomy.  Fourth, international treaties provide information on supranational constraints.  
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Finally, constitutional court decisions and parliamentary debates provide information on legislative 
constraints and the use of international sources.   
Four countries are cases.  All four countries are in Central Eastern Europe.  They are all currently 
members of the European Union.  They are all post-communist transitions to democracy.  They all have 
constitutional courts.  However, there is variance in their transitions to democracy, supranational 
constraints, and human rights protections. 
As mentioned, an explanation of the quantitative and qualitative methods used occurs with the 
actual tests.  The next chapter tests the first hypothesis. 
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4 FIRST HYPOHTESIS 
This chapter tests the first of the dissertation’s three hypotheses.  The first hypothesis asks 
whether constitutional courts effectively protect human rights as evidenced by an independent, 
comparative measure of human rights.  Existing research posits that human rights litigation allows 
courts to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis the other political institutions (Koopmans, 2003).  This is 
particularly important for constitutional courts in the European Union who feel trapped between 
supranational courts and lower national courts (Alter, 2001; Conant, 2001).  However, for this strategy 
to work long term the courts must deliver on the protection of human rights.  This hypothesis tests 
whether this strategy is working.   
4.1 Variables 
As described in Chapter 3, the first hypothesis, increasing constitutional court autonomy 
increases the protection of human rights, has two variables.  The dependent variable, the expected 
result, is the protection of human rights.  The key independent variable is the autonomy of the 
constitutional court.  Chapter 3 presented the definition of these variables.  This section presents the 
data associated with these variables. 
 
4.1.1 Protection of human rights 
As explained in Chapter 3, he protection of human rights variable uses data from the Cingranelli-
Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project.30  To ensure inclusion of all the various types of human rights 
this variable combines several CIRI measures.  Combined into this variable are Physical Integrity Rights, 
Freedom of Assembly, Freedom of Foreign Movement, Freedom of Domestic Movement, Freedom of 
Speech, Freedom of Religious, Freedom of Electoral Self-Determination, Workers’ Rights, and Women’s 
                                                          
30
 Data is available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/  (Accessed December 28, 2012) 
70 
Economic Rights.  All these variables except Physical Integrity Rights, Women’s Political Rights, and 
Women’s Economic Rights range in value from 0 (the right was severely limited) to 2 (the right is 
relatively unrestricted) (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  The value of Women’s Economic 
Rights and Women’s Political Rights range from 0 (no legal protections) to 3 (legal protections are 
enforced) (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  Physical Integrity Rights is a combination of 
several variables that measure torture, political imprisonment, and enforced disappearance (CIRI Human 
Rights Project Coding Manual).  The value for this variable ranges from 0 (frequent occurrence of all 
acts) to 8 (no occurrence of the acts) (CIRI Human Rights Project Coding Manual).  The Protection of 
Human Rights variable in this hypothesis is a summation of these various CIRI measures.  Values for the 
Protection of Human Rights range from 0 (no protections) to 28 (all rights protected).   
Table 4.1 shows the CIRI values for the cases selected for this study.31  (Dryzek and Holmes, 
2002).  A perusal of the raw data indicates that values change both within and across countries.  It 
further indicates that all of the countries have some level of human rights violations as demonstrated by 
the lack of any country reaching the maximum score of 25. 
 
Table 4.1 CIRI Data for Cases from 1990 Through 2010 
Country Year Phy Assn Forei
gn 
Dom
est 
Spee
ch 
Elec
t 
Religion Wor
ker 
Wome
n 
Tota
l 
Czechoslovak
ia 
1990 8 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 20 
Czechoslovak
ia 
1991 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 23 
Czechoslovak
ia 
1992 8 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 22 
            
Czech 
Republic 
1993 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 23 
Czech 
Republic 
1994 6 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 20 
                                                          
31 That Czechoslovakia has values for 1990 through 1992 while the Czech and Slovak Republics have no values for 
these years.  This is because the Czech and Slovak Republics did not become separate countries until 1993 
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Country Year Phy Assn Forei
gn 
Dom
est 
Spee
ch 
Elec
t 
Religion Wor
ker 
Wome
n 
Tota
l 
Czech 
Republic 
1995 5 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 19 
Czech 
Republic 
1996 8 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 23 
Czech 
Republic 
1997 8 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 22 
Czech 
Republic 
1998 7 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Czech 
Republic 
1999 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 24 
Czech 
Republic 
2000 7 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Czech 
Republic 
2001 8 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 22 
Czech 
Republic 
2002 8 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 21 
Czech 
Republic 
2003 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 21 
Czech 
Republic 
2004 6 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 20 
Czech 
Republic 
2005 7 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 18 
Czech 
Republic 
2006 7 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 19 
Czech 
Republic 
2007 7 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 21 
Czech 
Republic 
2008 7 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Czech 
Republic 
2009 7 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Czech 
Republic 
2010 8 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 21 
            
Poland 1990 6 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 20 
Poland 1991 6 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 21 
Poland 1992 6 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 19 
Poland 1993 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 20 
Poland 1994 8 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 20 
Poland 1995 7 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 19 
Poland 1996 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 20 
Poland 1997 8 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 22 
Poland 1998 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 22 
Poland 1999 8 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 22 
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Country Year Phy Assn Forei
gn 
Dom
est 
Spee
ch 
Elec
t 
Religion Wor
ker 
Wome
n 
Tota
l 
Poland 2000 6 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 20 
Poland 2001 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 19 
Poland 2002 8 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 21 
Poland 2003 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 19 
Poland 2004 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 19 
Poland 2005 7 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 18 
Poland 2006 7 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 18 
Poland 2007 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 20 
Poland 2008 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 19 
Poland 2009 6 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 18 
Poland 2010 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 20 
            
Romania 1990 4 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 16 
Romania 1991 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 19 
Romania 1992 6 1 2 2 1 1 2 0 1 16 
Romania 1993 7 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 20 
Romania 1994 6 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 16 
Romania 1995 6 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 16 
Romania 1996 7 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 18 
Romania 1997 6 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 15 
Romania 1998 7 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 18 
Romania 1999 6 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 17 
Romania 2000 5 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 16 
Romania 2001 6 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 17 
Romania 2002 6 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 17 
Romania 2003 6 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 2 18 
Romania 2004 5 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 15 
Romania 2005 6 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 14 
Romania 2006 5 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 14 
Romania 2007 5 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 14 
Romania 2008 5 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 13 
Romania 2009 5 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 15 
Romania 2010 5 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 2 14 
            
Slovakia  1993 6 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 21 
Slovakia 1994 8 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 22 
Slovakia 1995 7 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 18 
Slovakia 1996 6 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 19 
Slovakia 1997 7 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 19 
73 
Country Year Phy Assn Forei
gn 
Dom
est 
Spee
ch 
Elec
t 
Religion Wor
ker 
Wome
n 
Tota
l 
Slovakia 1998 7 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 22 
Slovakia 1999 7 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 21 
Slovakia 2000 6 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 18 
Slovakia 2001 7 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 18 
Slovakia 2002 7 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 20 
Slovakia 2003 6 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 19 
Slovakia 2004 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 22 
Slovakia 2005 8 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 22 
Slovakia 2006 7 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 20 
Slovakia 2007 7 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 21 
Slovakia 2008 7 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 17 
Slovakia 2009 7 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 18 
Slovakia 2010 7 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 19 
Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 
2012 
Phy = Physical Integrity 
Assn = Freedom of association 
Foreign = Freedom to move outside the country 
Domest = Freedom of movement within the country 
Speech = Freedom of speech 
Elect = Electoral freedom 
Religion = Freedom of religion 
Worker = Freedom for workers to associate and collectively bargain 
Women = Protection of women’s economic rights 
Total = Summation of variables 
 
Figure 4.1 presents the total values for the Czech Republic for 1990 through 2010.  Although the 
summed value varied through the years, it remained constant at 21 since 2008.  The raw data for the 
Czech Republic in Table 4.1 shows that the steady total value belies the changes in individual measures.  
For example, between 2009 and 2010 the Czech Republic’s physical integrity score increased while 
women’s economic rights decreased.   
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Figure 4.1 Summation of CIRI Values for Czech Republic 1990-2010 
Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 
2012 
Total = Summation of CIRI measures of physical integrity, freedom of association freedom to move 
outside the country, freedom of movement within the country, freedom of speech, electoral 
freedom, freedom of religion, freedom for workers to associate and collectively bargain, 
protection of women’s economic rights for the Czech Republic 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates that Poland’s total CIRI score peaked between 1997 and 1999 the 
fluctuated never returning to that high score.  The detail data in Table 4.1 shows that, with the 
exception of six years, four of which were 1997 through 2000, Poland limited worker’s rights.  This is 
interesting because the worker’s movement ultimately resulted in the fall of communism in Poland 
(Kesselman et al, 2009).  In fact, the raw data shows that worker’s rights were severely limited in the 
years 2001 through 2008.   
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Figure 4.2 Summation of CIRI Values for Poland 1990-2010 
Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 
2012 
Total = Summation of CIRI measures of physical integrity, freedom of association freedom to move 
outside the country, freedom of movement within the country, freedom of speech, electoral 
freedom, freedom of religion, freedom for workers to associate and collectively bargain, 
protection of women’s economic rights for the Czech Republic 
 
Romania’s CIRI scores have been trending downward since a high in 1993 as illustrated in Figure 
4.3.  The only rights consistently well protected are freedom of foreign and domestic movement.  Both 
physical integrity and worker’s rights were restricted through the entire period reported.     
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Figure 4.3 Summation of CIRI Values for Romania 1990-2010 
Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 
2012 
Total = Summation of CIRI measures of physical integrity, freedom of association freedom to move 
outside the country, freedom of movement within the country, freedom of speech, electoral 
freedom, freedom of religion, freedom for workers to associate and collectively bargain, 
protection of women’s economic rights for the Czech Republic 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the Slovak Republic is steadily improving after its lowest score in 2008.  The 
Slovak Republic fully protected each human right measured by CIRI at least once during the period 1993 
through 2010.  Only electoral rights and religious freedom went one year without some level of 
protection.     
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Figure 4.4 Summartion of CIRI Values for Slovak Republic 1990-2010 
Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 
2012 
Total = Summation of CIRI measures of physical integrity, freedom of association freedom to move 
outside the country, freedom of movement within the country, freedom of speech, electoral 
freedom, freedom of religion, freedom for workers to associate and collectively bargain, 
protection of women’s economic rights for the Czech Republic 
 
Figure 4.5 compares all four cases.  This Figure illustrates that protection of rights, as measured 
by CIRI, in Romania is lower than the other cases.  It also illustrates that the Czech and Slovak Republics 
tend to have greater protection of CIRI measured rights.  Based on this comparison the first hypothesis, 
increasing constitutional court autonomy increases the protection of human rights, expects Romania to 
have less constitutional court autonomy than the other cases.  The Figures also illustrate that over time 
protections of human rights vary within the country.  Therefore, the first hypothesis also expects a 
variance in constitutional court autonomy. 
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Figure 4.5 CIRI Values for Czech Republic, Poland, Romanai, Slovak Republic 1990-2010 
Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 
2012 
Summation of CIRI measures of physical integrity, freedom of association freedom to move outside the 
country, freedom of movement within the country, freedom of speech, electoral freedom, 
freedom of religion, freedom for workers to associate and collectively bargain, protection of 
women’s economic rights for the Czech Republic 
 
4.1.2 Constitutional Court Autonomy  
As explained in Chapter 3, the measure of constitutional court autonomy used here is a 
combination of de jure and de facto factors.  The de jure factors derive from the constitution.  The de 
facto factors derive from the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices.  Chapter 3 identified the components used here.  This section explains the assigning of values 
to each factor. 
Several events occurred that influence the data.  Czech and Slovak Republics separated in 1993 
(Dryzek and Holmes, 2002).  Constitutional courts in Romania, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic came 
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into existence in 199232 , 199333 , and 199234  respectively.  Poland established a Constitutional Tribunal 
in 1985 (Kuhn, 2007) based on a 1982 constitutional amendment (Brzezonski, 1993).  Therefore, only 
Poland has data for the years 1990 through 1993. 
Table 4.2 presents the de jure and de facto data for the constitutional courts.  Since the United 
States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are available only for the years 
1993 through 201135  only these years are shown.  Since only Poland had a constitutional court prior to 
1992 this limitation has minimal impact on this study.  Note that data for 1993 for the Czech Republic is 
not available.  Although established in 1993 the Czech Constitutional was not fully functional until 
December 1993.36   Consequently, if 1993 were included for the Czech Republic the result would be 
comparing human rights data for a full year against constitutional court influence of one month.  
Therefore, 1993 is not included in this study. 
Table 4.2 De Facto and De Jure Constitutional Court Autonomy 
Country Year Dissolve Remove Budget Proc Final Access Review Appoint DeFacto 
Czech 
Republic 1994 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Czech 
Republic 1995 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Czech 
Republic 1996 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Czech 
Republic 1997 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Czech 
Republic 1998 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
                                                          
32
 Based on information in the U S. Department of State Romanian  Human Rights Practices, 1993 available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_eur/Romania.html  Accessed December 31, 
2012 
33
 Based on information in the U. S Department of State Czech Republic Human Rights Practices, 1993 available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_eur/CzechRepublic.html  Accessed 
December 31, 2012 
34
 Based on information in the U. S. Department of State Slovak Republic Human Rights Practices, 1993 available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_eur/SlovakRepublic.html   Accessed 
December 31, 2012 
35
 Based on information in the U. S. Department of State Slovak Republic Human Rights Practices, 1993 available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_eur/SlovakRepublic.html   Accessed 
December 31, 2012 
36
 Based on information in the U. S Department of State Czech Republic Human Rights Practices, 1993 available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_eur/CzechRepublic.html  Accessed 
December 31, 2012 
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Country Year Dissolve Remove Budget Proc Final Access Review Appoint DeFacto 
Czech 
Republic 1999 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2000 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2001 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2002 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2003 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2004 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2005 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2006 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2007 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2008 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2009 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Czech 
Republic 2010 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Poland 1993 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Poland 1994 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Poland 1995 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Poland 1996 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Poland 1997 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Poland 1998 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Poland 1999 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
Poland 2000 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
Poland 2001 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
Poland 2002 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
Poland 2003 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
Poland 2004 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 
Poland 2005 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Poland 2006 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Poland 2007 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Poland 2008 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Poland 2009 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Poland 2010 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Romania 1993 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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Country Year Dissolve Remove Budget Proc Final Access Review Appoint DeFacto 
Romania 1994 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Romania 1995 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Romania 1996 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Romania 1997 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Romania 1998 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Romania 1999 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Romania 2000 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Romania 2001 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Romania 2002 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Romania 2003 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Romania 2004 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Romania 2005 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Romania 2006 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Romania 2007 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Romania 2008 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Romania 2009 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Romania 2010 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Slovak  
Republic 1993 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Slovak  
Republic 1994 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 
Slovak  
Republic 1995 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 1996 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Slovak  
Republic 1997 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Slovak  
Republic 1998 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 
Slovak  
Republic 1999 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Slovak  
Republic 2000 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2001 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2002 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2003 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2004 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Slovak  
Republic 2005 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
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Country Year Dissolve Remove Budget Proc Final Access Review Appoint DeFacto 
Slovak  
Republic 2006 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2007 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2008 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2009 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Slovak  
Republic 2010 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Source: National Constitutions and United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 
Dissolve = Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court.  0 = no protection in 
the constitution.  1 = protection against this action provided in the constitution. 
Remove = Constitutional protection against the removal of constitutional court judges.  0 = no 
protection in the constitution.  1 = protection against this action provided in the constitution. 
Budget = Constitutional protection allowing the constitutional court to determine its own budget. 0 = no 
protection in the constitution.  1 = protection against this action provided in the constitution. 
Proc = Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court has control over its procedures.  0 = 
no protection in the constitution.  1 = protection against this action provided in the constitution. 
Final = Constitutional protection preventing the override of constitutional court decisions.  0 = no 
protection in the constitution.  1 = protection against this action provided in the constitution. 
Access = Access to the constitutional court.  0 = access to constitutional court limited.  1 = all citizens 
have access to the constitutional court. 
Review = Ability of the constitutional review legislation.  0 = limited review (either a posteriori or a 
priori).  1 = ability to review legislation at any time. 
Appoint = Appointment of constitutional court judges.  0 = all constitutional court judges appointed by 
another branch.  1 = some constitutional court judges appointed by another branch.  2 = all 
constitutional court judges appointed by an independent body. 
DeFacto = Autonomy of the constitutional court in action.  0 = constitutional court is ineffective or 
influenced by another branch.  1 = some limitations on the autonomy of the constitutional court 
reported.  2 = constitutional court is effective or no problems reported. 
 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the total autonomy scores for the cases (Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, 
and Slovak Republic) from 1993 through 2010.  Although this variable ranges from 0 (no autonomy) to 
11 (full autonomy) the values for the cases range from 3 through 6.  Thus, each of the constitutional 
courts demonstrates some degree of autonomy.  Furthermore, the values fluctuate over time.  The 
fluctuation results from changes in the constitutions as well as changes in the de facto assessment of 
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autonomy.  The chart indicates that the Romanian Constitutional Court has the highest degree of 
autonomy while the Czech Constitutional Court has the least autonomy.   
 
 
Figure 4.6 Constitutional Court Autonomy 
Source: National Constitutions and United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices 
Summation of de jure (based on the national constitution) and de facto (based on the human rights 
reports) factors 
Autonomy is the sum of the individual autonomy factors. 
 
4.2 Analysis  
With the variables defined, analysis of the first hypothesis, that increasing constitutional court 
autonomy increases the protection of human rights, can proceed.  Table 4.3 presents the scores for 
constitutional court autonomy and CIRI human rights.     
Table 4.3 Total CIRI and Autonomy Scores 
Country Year CIRI Autonomy 
Czech Republic 1994 20 4 
Czech Republic 1995 19 4 
Czech Republic 1996 23 4 
Czech Republic 1997 22 4 
Czech Republic 1998 21 4 
Czech
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Constitutional Court Autonomy 
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Country Year CIRI Autonomy 
Czech Republic 1999 24 3 
Czech Republic 2000 21 3 
Czech Republic 2001 22 3 
Czech Republic 2002 21 3 
Czech Republic 2003 21 3 
Czech Republic 2004 20 3 
Czech Republic 2005 18 3 
Czech Republic 2006 19 3 
Czech Republic 2007 21 3 
Czech Republic 2008 21 3 
Czech Republic 2009 21 3 
Czech Republic 2010 21 3 
    
Poland 1993 20 3 
Poland 1994 20 3 
Poland 1995 19 4 
Poland 1996 20 4 
Poland 1997 22 4 
Poland 1998 22 4 
Poland 1999 22 5 
Poland 2000 20 5 
Poland 2001 19 5 
Poland 2002 21 5 
Poland 2003 19 5 
Poland 2004 19 5 
Poland 2005 18 4 
Poland 2006 18 4 
Poland 2007 20 4 
Poland 2008 19 4 
Poland 2009 18 4 
Poland 2010 20 4 
    
Romania 1993 20 4 
Romania 1994 16 4 
Romania 1995 16 4 
Romania 1996 18 5 
Romania 1997 15 5 
Romania 1998 18 5 
Romania 1999 17 4 
Romania 2000 16 4 
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Country Year CIRI Autonomy 
Romania 2001 17 4 
Romania 2002 17 4 
Romania 2003 18 6 
Romania 2004 15 6 
Romania 2005 14 6 
Romania 2006 14 6 
Romania 2007 14 6 
Romania 2008 13 6 
Romania 2009 15 6 
Romania 2010 14 6 
    
Slovak Republic 1993 21 4 
Slovak Republic 1994 22 5 
Slovak Republic 1995 18 3 
Slovak Republic 1996 19 4 
Slovak Republic 1997 19 4 
Slovak Republic 1998 22 5 
Slovak Republic 1999 21 4 
Slovak Republic 2000 18 3 
Slovak Republic 2001 18 3 
Slovak Republic 2002 20 3 
Slovak Republic 2003 19 3 
Slovak Republic 2004 22 4 
Slovak Republic 2005 22 3 
Slovak Republic 2006 20 3 
Slovak Republic 2007 21 3 
Slovak Republic 2008 17 3 
Slovak Republic 2009 18 3 
Slovak Republic 2010 19 3 
CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Autonomy Source: National Constitutions and United States Department of State Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices 
 
This hypothesis  
The variables used in this hypothesis are ordinal variables.  The numeric assessment of 
constitutional court autonomy and human rights protections allow identification of whether there is 
more or less of the characteristic, but there is no way to determine how much more or less.  
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Consequently, the statistic must be appropriate for ordinal measures.  In addition, there are only two 
variables, constitutional court autonomy, and protection of human rights.  Therefore, the statistic used 
must also be appropriate for a binomial hypothesis.   
A commonly used statistical measure is a correlation coefficient, such as Pearson r.  Although 
correlation coefficients measure the strength of the relationship between two variables, they are best 
suited to assessments of interval data with more than two variables (Hill and Lewicki, 2005).  Statics 
such as Kendall’s tau, gamma, and Somer’s d are appropriate for binomial equations using ordinal 
variables (Johnson et al, 2001).  Since this hypothesis is binomial, contains a clearly identified dependent 
variable, and the values are at least ordinal Somer’s d is an appropriate measure (Johnson et al, 2001; 
Hill and Lewicki, 2005).   
The Somer’s d statistic, calculated on the dependent variable of protection of human rights, is  -
.340 with a significance of .002.  Somer’s d values range from – 1.000, indicating a perfect negative 
relationship, to 1.000, indicating a perfect positive relationship (Johnson et al, 2001).  A Somer’s d value 
of 0 indicates no relationship (Johnson et al, 2001).  Consequently, a value of -.340 indicates that the 
relationship between constitutional court autonomy and protection of human rights is weak and 
negative.  In other words, as constitutional court autonomy decreases the protection of human rights 
increases.   
This finding is directly opposite the expected result in the hypothesis.  The hypothesis posits a 
positive relationship between constitutional court autonomy and protection of human rights.  More 
information about the relationship between the two variables is necessary to understand the 
unexpected results.  Since constitutional court autonomy is comprised of multiple factors, unpacking 
this variable provides insight into the aspects of constitutional court autonomy affecting the protection 
of human rights. 
87 
Looking at the data in Table 4.2 several differences between countries are seen which impact 
the findings.  First, only Romania has clear constitutional protections against the dissolution of the 
Constitutional Court and removal of the judges.  Second, Romania is also the only country a clear 
constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budge.  Third, the Slovak 
Republic is the only country with constitutional protections ensuring the constitutional court sets its 
own procedures.  Fourth, Romania is the only country with constitutional limits on access to the 
constitutional courts.  Finally, Romania and Poland both had periods when constitutional court decisions 
could be overturned.  Yet these are the only countries that allow constitutional court review at any time.  
In addition, these conditions either remain constant through the period under review or change once 
during the period.  A review of the de facto autonomy values indicate that they change infrequently as 
well.   
Collapsing the records into occurrences where there is a change in the independent variables 
results in a small number of occurrences.  Table 4.4 below displays the condensed cases.  Combining the 
cases illustrates several key points in the data.  The highest average CIRI scores occur with the greatest 
amount of de facto constitutional court autonomy.  When the de facto score is 2 (reports indicate the 
constitutional court was effective and there were no incidences of its being influenced by other 
branches) the average CIRI score is above 20.  When the de facto score is 0 (reports indicate the 
constitutional court was ineffective or influenced by other branches) the average CIRI score is below 20.  
However, a de facto score of 1 (reports indicate concerns with constitutional court autonomy) returns 
mixed results.  Consequently, other factors influence the CIRI score. 
 
Table 4.4 Condensed Cases 
Country Year Org Proc Access Review Final DeFacto Avg CIRI 
Czech 
Republic 1998 0 0 1 0 1 2 21 
Czech 2010 0 0 1 0 1 1 20.83333 
88 
Country Year Org Proc Access Review Final DeFacto Avg CIRI 
Republic 
                  
Poland 1994 0 0 1 1 0 1 20 
Poland 1998 0 0 1 1 0 2 20.5 
Poland 2004 0 0 1 1 1 2 20.27273 
Poland 2010 0 0 1 1 1 1 18.85714 
                  
Romania 1995 1 0 0 1 0 0 18 
Romania 1998 1 0 0 1 0 1 16.75 
Romania 2002 1 0 0 1 0 0 17 
Romania 2010 1 0 0 1 1 1 15.94444 
                  
Slovak 
Republic 1993 0 1 1 0 1 1 21 
Slovak 
Republic 1994 0 1 1 0 1 2 22 
Slovak 
Republic 1997 0 1 1 0 1 1 18.66667 
Slovak 
Republic 1998 0 1 1 0 1 2 22 
Slovak 
Republic 2010 0 1 1 0 1 0 19.58333 
Org: Ability to dissolve the Constitutional Court, Remove Judges, and Budget. 
Proc: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Access: Access to the Constitutional Court 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
De Facto: De Facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
Avg. CIRI: Average CIRI score 
 
Four of the cases (Poland 2010, Romania 2010, Slovak 1997, and Slovak 2010 have average CIRI 
scores below 20 and the lowest for the country.  In the cases of Poland and Romania, the low average 
CIRI scores occur with a low de facto autonomy although the same de facto autonomy scores are 
associated with higher average CIRI scores in other years.  The constitutions in both Poland and Romania 
changed to ensure the finality of constitutional court decisions.  The average CIRI scores in both 
countries declined after this change irrespective of de facto autonomy.  In the case of the Slovak 
Republic, both average CIRI scores under 20 are associated with low de facto autonomy, although the 
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higher of the two scores occurs with the poorest de facto autonomy score.  The Slovak Republic is also 
the only country with protections in the constitution ensure the constitutional court’s ability to set its 
own processes.  Finally, Romania has the lowest average CIRI scores of all cases.  This is also the only 
country with clear constitutional protections against the dissolution of the constitutional court, removal 
of constitutional court judges, and the ability of the constitutional court to set its own budget.   
Reviewing the impact of these individual factors provides more insight into the influence 
different aspects of judicial autonomy have on the relationship between human rights protections and 
the constitutional court.  However, consideration of one additional factor is required; the economy.  The 
relationship between the economy and judicial protections of human rights in these cases is unclear.  
Research indicates a statistically significant relationship between de facto judicial independence and 
gross domestic product (GDP) (Howard and Carey, 2004).  Yet post-communist countries had different 
experiences with liberal democracy, including individual rights, and the associated economy (Dryzek and 
Holmes, 2002).  For example, although the Czech Republic was familiar with liberal democracy and 
economy, the Romanian economy struggled and the citizens were less committed to democratic values 
(Dryzek and Holmes, 2002).  In addition, an informal economy and reluctance to pursue legal protection 
of rights, including economic rights, prevailed in many post-communist countries (Sajo, 1995). Judicial 
reforms, necessary in the post-communist transition, were more successful in an economy that 
benefitted all classes (Stanton, Reenock, and Radean, 2010).  Research indicates that this resulted from 
the realization of the benefits provided by judicial protections (Hirschl, 2004).  As the reforms became 
entrenched, and the economy improved, governments realized the benefits and saw increasing costs to 
violating judicial independence (Stanton, Reenock, and Radean, 2010).  Further, research argues that 
governments prioritize economic development over human rights (Evans, 2001).  Consequently, it is 
possible that the economy influences both constitutional court autonomy and human rights in different 
ways.  For example, it is plausible that the economy’s impact on judicial autonomy and human rights 
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fluctuates as cases transition to a liberal democracy, develop a market economy, and reform their 
judiciary.   
Table 4.5 presents the compressed results with the corresponding average GDP.  Romania, with 
the lowest human right scores, also has the lowest average GDPs.  However, in 2010 both the GDP and 
de facto constitutional court autonomy scores are highest while the human rights score is the lowest.  A 
similar situation occurs in Poland.  In the Czech Republic, both de facto constitutional court autonomy 
and human rights decrease although GDP increases.  Consequently, although the economy appears have 
an impact on constitutional court autonomy and human rights other factors are also important.   
 
 
Table 4.5 Constitutional Court Autonomy, GDP, and Human Rights 
Country Year Org Proc Access Review Final DeFacto Avg CIRI GDP 
Czech 
Republic 1998 0 0 1 0 1 2 21 15202.14 
Czech 
Republic 2010 0 0 1 0 1 1 20.83333 19741.26 
                    
Poland 1994 0 0 1 1 0 1 20 8037.679 
Poland 1998 0 0 1 1 0 2 20.5 9676.241 
Poland 2004 0 0 1 1 1 2 20.27273 11864.67 
Poland 2010 0 0 1 1 1 1 18.85714 15324.61 
                    
Romania 1995 1 0 0 1 0 0 18 6465.084 
Romania 1998 1 0 0 1 0 1 16.75 6895.211 
Romania 2002 1 0 0 1 0 0 17 7106.304 
Romania 2010 1 0 0 1 1 1 15.94444 9927.918 
                    
Slovak 
Republic 1993 0 1 1 0 1 1 21 9147.799 
Slovak 
Republic 1994 0 1 1 0 1 2 22 9682.354 
Slovak 
Republic 1997 0 1 1 0 1 1 18.66667 10831.08 
Slovak 
Republic 1998 0 1 1 0 1 2 22 11850.75 
Slovak 
Republic 2010 0 1 1 0 1 0 19.58333 15005.91 
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Org: Ability to dissolve the Constitutional Court, Remove Judges, and Budget. 
Proc: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Access: Access to the Constitutional Court 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
Avg. CIRI: Average CIRI score . 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
 
These observations, while not conclusive on their own, allow further testing of the hypothesis to 
focus on conditions that vary with human rights protections.  These are GDP, de fact autonomy, finality 
of constitutional court decisions, constitutional protections against constitutional court dissolution, and 
constitutional protections against judge removal, and constitutional protections to ensure the 
constitutional court can set its own budget and processes.  The next step is to include these conditions 
in a more rigorous statistical test of the hypothesis. 
The statistical method must accommodate two conditions in the data: the data is ordinal and 
measured yearly.  The exception to the ordinal data is GDP.  To ensure consistency in data types the GDP 
is converted to categories based on the following scale: 0 is under 5000, 1 is 5000 to 10000, 2 is 10000 
to 15000, 3 is 15000 to 20000, and 4 is over 20000.  Due to the yearly observances of the data, a change 
one year could also reflect in a future year (Studenmund, 2010).  Both de facto autonomy and the CIRI 
measures reflect events that occur during a particularly year (Cingranelli and Richards, 2008).  The GDP 
also reflects the activity of the year indicated.  With the exception of the variable indicating the finality 
of constitutional court decisions, there is no change to the variables during the time studied.  However, 
it is possible that when the finality of constitutional court decisions changes the impact occurs a year in 
the future.  Consequently, the calculation of this variable accommodates a one-year lag.   
To accommodate both the yearly measures and ordinal nature of the data the statistical method 
used in panel ordered logit regression.  The reason this data is panel data as opposed to time series data 
is that the observances occur yearly but are not a yearly pattern (Torres-Reyna).  This data consists of 
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individual observations recorded on a yearly basis.  There is no inherent cyclical information.  Time 
series data, on the other hand, anticipates cyclical information that allows forecasting (Torres-Reyna).   
The results of the panel ordered logit regression appear in table 4.6.  This illustrates that all 
variables except the GDP and Process (i.e. constitutional protections to ensure that the constitutional 
court controls its process) are statistically significant that the p<.005 levels.  In this model with the 
limited data, neither GDP nor constitutional process protections are statistically significant nor do 
changes in their values have significant impacts.  In both cases, a change in the value of the independent 
variable has less than a one point change in the CIRI human rights value.  The statistically significant 
impact of de jure constitutional court autonomy is expected.  Interpreting the coefficient indicates that 
improving de facto constitutional court autonomy increases the CIRI human right measures by 
approximately 1.5 points.  The remaining three variables have a greater, albeit reversed, impact on 
human rights.  Greater ability of the constitutional court to review data decreases the CIRI human rights 
value by more than 2.6 points.  Increasing constitutional protections for the finality of constitutional 
court decisions decreases the CIRI human rights value by 3.7 points.  Providing increased constitutional 
protections against the removal of constitutional court judges and the dissolution of the court decreases 
CIRI human rights by almost 5 points.  In other words, for these cases increased constitutional 
protections for the autonomy of the constitutional court does not result in increased human rights 
protections.   
 
Table 4.6 Results of Ordinal Logit Regression 
 Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP 0.492 0.472212 0.298 
Org -4.922 1.164702 0.000 
Process 0.202 0.982849 0.837 
Finality (lagged) -3.711 0.822199 0.000 
Review -2.643 0.843558 0.002 
De Facto  1.481 0.492877 0.003 
    
Chi-Square 50.590  0.000 
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Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Org: Ability to dissolve the Constitutional Court, Remove Judges, and Budget. 
Process: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Finality: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
 
 
This regression uses the overall GDP, which measures a county’s wealth but not the actual 
wealth of the citizens.  A more accurate measure is the GDP per capita, which divides the overall wealth 
by the number of citizens.37  Research determined that human rights violations, particularly those 
impacting physical integrity, occur more frequently in cases of poverty (Ahnen, 2007).  Table 4.7 displays 
the results, which are the same as the results in Table 4.6.  This is not surprising given the close 
proximity and similar history of the countries involved. 
 
Table 4.7 Results of Ordinal Logit Regression with GDP per capita 
 Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP per capita 0.492 0.472212 0.298 
Org -4.922 1.164702 0.000 
Process 0.202 0.982849 0.837 
Finality (lagged) -3.711 0.822199 0.000 
Review -2.643 0.843558 0.002 
De Facto  1.481 0.492877 0.003 
    
Chi-Square 50.590  0.000 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Org: Ability to dissolve the Constitutional Court, Remove Judges, and Budget. 
Process: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Finality: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
N = 71 
 
                                                          
37
 Based on the World Bank definition of GDP per capita available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD  accessed February 27, 2014 
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One other way of looking at the data is the odds ratio as reported in Table 4.8.  This tells us that 
de facto judicial independence has the biggest impact.  The country’s human rights score is almost 4.4 
times more likely to improve as de facto constitutional court independence improves.  Per capita GDP 
and judicial process increase the odds of country’s human rights score improving by 1.635 and 1.224 
respectively.  Having small impacts are the finality of constitutional court decision and the timing of the 
constitutional court’s review of legislation since the odds of them improving human rights are less than 
0.01.  The smallest odds of improvement are in the ORG variable, which considers the constitutional 
court’s control over its budget and ability to remove judges, and protection against dissolution of the 
constitutional court. 
Table 4.8 Odds Ratio Results of Ordinal Logit Regression with GDP per capita 
 Odds Ratio Error Significance 
GDP per capita 1.635 0.7719756 0.298 
Org 0.007 0.0084862 0.000 
Process 1.224 1.202545 0.837 
Finality (lagged) 0.024 0.0203794 0.000 
Review 0.071 0.0599885 0.002 
De Facto  4.398 2.167496 0.003 
    
Chi-Square 50.590  0.000 
Org: Ability to dissolve the Constitutional Court, Remove Judges, and Budget. 
Process: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Finality: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
N = 71 
A Hausman-Taylor estimation, presented in Table 4.9 below, provides further insight into this 
data.  This estimation illustrates that the ability to dissolve the constitutional court, remove judges, and 
constitutional court control of its budget are time invariant exogenous.  In other words, there is no point 
in the time period included in the study where this variable has a causal link to any other variable in the 
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model.38   The variable Final, measuring the finality of constitutional court decisions, is time varying 
exogenous.  GDP, on the other hand, has a time varying causal link to other variable in the model.  Using 
this estimation also changes the significance and impact of the variables.  GDP is less statistically 
significant and has a small negative impact.  The Org variable remains statistically significant at the 
p<.001 level but has a slightly smaller impact.  Process, while still not statistically significant, is slightly 
more significant but in an opposition direction.  Finality remains statistically significant but at the slightly 
lower p<.01 level.  Furthermore, the impact is less than the original model.  Review is slightly more 
significant at the p<.001 level and has almost the same impact.  De facto independence is no longer 
statistically significant and has a smaller impact. 
 
Table 4.9 Hausman-Taylor Estimation 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Time Varying 
Exogenous 
Final -1.626 0.6275359 0.007 
Time Varying 
Endogenous 
GDP 0.000 0.0000852 0.444 
De Facto 0.575 0.3816007 0.132 
Time Invariant 
Exogenous Org -3.918 0.7179719 0.000 
Process -0.955 0.7877457 0.225 
Review -2.228 0.6325352 0.000 
    Chi-Square 141.060 
 
0.000 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Org: Ability to dissolve the Constitutional Court, Remove Judges, and Budget. 
Process: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Finality: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
N = 71 
                                                          
38
 See discussion of exogenous variable at http://www-
personal.umd.umich.edu/~delittle/Encyclopedia%20entries/exogenous%20variable.pdf  accessed April 17, 2014. 
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Although this information is helpful in assessing the hypothesis, that increasing constitutional 
court autonomy increases the protection of human rights, these are a limited number of cases that are, 
in many ways, homogenous.  A better assessment of this hypothesis requires additional cases. 
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4.3 Expanded Assessment 
When identifying additional cases several conditions limit the cases and data.  To ensure 
consistency with the cases already discussed the period under consideration is 1994 through 2010.  
Similarly, the countries included must have constitutional courts.  As mentioned above, many levels of 
national courts adjudicate human rights and constitutional issues.  The primary focus of constitutional 
courts, however, is constitutional issues.  Furthermore, to ensure a consistent measurement of human 
rights the country must have CIRI human rights data for the period assessed.  Similarly, GDP data must 
be available from the Penn World Tables for the period to ensure consistency. 
Although this limits data to some extent, it also greatly expands the range of cases.  The data 
now includes cases from all areas of the world.  It includes countries outside the influence of the 
European Union.  It encompasses various political systems since Cambodia, Thailand, and the United 
Arab Emirates are included.  It also includes established and newly formed constitutional courts.  For 
example, the constitutional court of Germany predates 1994 but the constitutional court of Georgia 
began in 1996 and Indonesia’s began in 2002.  Finally, the data includes countries with a reputation for 
human rights protections, such as Germany and Belgium, as well as countries reputed to violate human 
rights, such as Egypt and Syria.   
The methods used to compile this additional data followed the procedures used for the original 
four cases.  A review of constitutions for each country in the CIRI dataset identified those countries with 
constitutional courts.  These constitutions also provided the information to populate the constitutional 
measures of constitutional court autonomy.  If the constitution changed, due to either amendment or 
creation of a new constitution, the values assigned to the measures changed when appropriate.  Reports 
from the United States Department of State provided the measures for de facto autonomy.  GDP values 
are from the Penn World table. 
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As noted above, the individual autonomy variables differed in their relationship with the 
protection of human rights.  Consequently, this test of the hypothesis uses the individual measures of de 
jure constitutional court autonomy rather than the composite score.  In addition, the polity score is also 
included as an additional control measure.  Unlike previous tests of the hypothesis, not all of the 
countries included are democracies under the influence of the European Union, an institution known for 
protection of human rights (Koopmans, 2003) and pre-accession monitoring (Albi, 2009).  Furthermore, 
research demonstrates a link between protection of human rights and regime type (Poe and Tate, 1994).  
Since the polity score measures the regime type the model uses it to control for variance in regime 
introduced with the increased number of cases.  Once again, the statistical calculation used is panel 
ordered logistic regression.  
The first panel ordered logistic regression uses the combined constitutional autonomy (i.e. de 
jure autonomy) scored lagged one year.  The lag accommodates the fact that constitutional changes 
affect future years.  Table 4.10 displays the results of this regression.  All variables except the 
constitutional protections (i.e. de jure autonomy) are statistically significant at the p<.001 level.  
However, the impact of each variable is minimal with a change altering the CIRI human rights score by 
less than a point.  Of interest is the fact that the GDP and constitutional protection variables display a 
negative relationship with human rights.   
 
Table 4.10 Results of Ordinal Logit Regression with Expanded Cases 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP -0.474 0.1348783 0.000 
Polity 0.032 0.0060576 0.000 
De Facto 0.997 0.1404048 0.000 
Constitutional -0.102 0.0060576 0.385 
 
   
Chi-Square 92.20  0.000 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
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Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
Constitutional: De jure constitutional court autonomy  
N = 1019 
 
Once again, a measure of the economy that better reflects individuals requires consideration.  
Table 4.11 presents the regression using GDP per capita rather than overall GDP.  In this case, the results 
are different.  Although GDP per capita retains the negative relationship, it is no longer statistically 
significant.  De jure constitutional court autonomy (the Constitutional variable) remains negatively 
related to human rights.  Although its statistical significance increased, it is still not statistically 
significant.  Polity and de facto constitutional court autonomy remain statistically significant.  De facto 
constitutional court autonomy has the largest impact on human rights with a one-point change resulting 
in a one-point change in human rights.  A one-point change in the other variables results in less than two 
tenths of a change in human rights. 
 
Table 4.11 Results of Ordinal Logit Regression with Expanded Cases with GDP per capita 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP per capita -0.105 0.1733242 0.544 
Polity 0.031 0.006069 0.000 
De Facto 1.019 0.1402994 0.000 
Constitutional -0.173 0.1159656 0.136 
 
   
Chi-Square 80.350  0.000 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014  
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
Constitutional: De jure constitutional court autonomy  
N = 1019 
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Once again, it is also informative to look at the odds ration calculations displayed in Table 4.12.  
The odds ratios reflect the impact of both de facto constitutional court autonomy and polity.  As the 
country’s de facto constitutional court autonomy increases, it is almost 3 times more likely to have 
improved human rights.  Similarly, countries with strong democracies are more likely to have improved 
human rights.  Constitutional protections for constitutional courts and GDP per capita increase the 
likelihood of improved human rights by less than one.   
 
Table 4.12 Odds Ratio with Expanded Cases with GDP per capita 
 
Odds Ratio Error Significance 
GDP per capita 0.900 0.156024 0.544 
Polity 1.031 0.0062593 0.000 
De Facto 2.771 0.3887336 0.000 
Constitutional 0.841 0.0975453 0.136 
 
   
Chi-Square 80.35  0.000 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014  
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
Constitutional: De jure constitutional court autonomy  
N = 1019 
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Based on the analysis it appears that there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
constitutional protections ensuring the autonomy of the constitutional court and the protection of 
human rights at a statistically significant level.  However, as mentioned above, with the expansion of 
cases there is more variation in the individual components of the independent variable.  Consequently, 
although the total package of constitutional protections are not statistically significant, it is possible that 
one or more of the components has a statistically significant influence.  Based on the first regression 
above, the model does not include the Appoint and Access variables since they are, at least in some 
cases, collinear.  Running a panel ordered logistical regression with each of the variables, lagged to 
accommodate a delayed influence, indicates that this is the case.  The results appear in Table 4.13.  As 
with the last regression, GDP, Polity, and De Facto autonomy are statistically significant and the 
relationship between GDP and human rights is negative.  Of the three variables, de jure autonomy has 
the largest impact; one point increase in de jure autonomy increases human rights by over 1 point.  
Constitutional protections against dissolution of the constitutional court, the court’s budget autonomy, 
the finality of decisions, and the timing of the court’s review of legislation are not statistically significant.  
There is a negative relationship between constitutional protections against the removal of constitutional 
court judges and CIRI human rights.  An increase in constitutional protections decreases CIRI human 
rights by 1.181 points.  This is statistically significant at the p<.05 level.  Conversely, the relationship 
between constitutional protections ensuring the court’s autonomy over its processes is positive and 
statistically significant at the p<.005 level.  An increase in these protections increases the CIRI human 
rights score by1.67 points. 
 
Table 4.13 Results of Ordinal Logit Regression with Expanded Cases and Variables 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP -0.498 0.134432 0.000 
Polity 0.032 0.006101 0.000 
De Facto 1.024 0.141385 0.000 
Dissolve 0.850 1.041037 0.414 
Removal -1.181 0.547777 0.031 
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Budget -1.094 0.681088 0.108 
Process 1.672 0.607109 0.006 
Final 0.332 0.307649 0.280 
Review -0.286 0.331982 0.388 
    Chi-Square 104.940 
 
0.000 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn- 
world-table accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court 
Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges 
Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget 
Process: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
N = 1019 
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Table 4.14 tests the data with GDP per capita as opposed to overall GDP.  With the expanded 
number of cases, and expanded range of experiences and economies, there is a change in the results.  
The negative relationship between human rights, lack of protections against removing constitutional 
court judges (Removal), lack of protections for the constitutional court to control its own budget 
(Budget), timing of judicial review (Review), and GDP per capita remain.  Two variables, GDP per capital 
and the constitutional protections that the constitutional court controls its own procedures (Process), 
are less significant in this model.  While the Process variable remains statistically significant at the p<.05 
level, GDP per capita is not statistically significant.  The statistical significance of the timing for 
constitutional court review (Review), finality of constitutional court decisions (Final), constitutional 
protections for the court to control its budget (Budget), and constitutional protections against the 
dissolution of the constitutional court (Dissolve) increase in this model although none are statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level.  The Polity score, de facto constitutional court autonomy, and 
constitutional protections against removal of constitutional court judges (Remove) remain statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level.  The impact of the Polity score, constitutional protections ensuring the 
court controls its own budget (Budget), constitutional protections ensure the court controls its own 
procedures (Process), and timing of constitutional court review (Review) is less in this model.  However, 
the impact of the other variables increases. 
Table 4.14 Ordinal Logit Regression with Expanded Cases and Variables using GDP per capita 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP per capita -0.190 0.1765207 0.281 
Polity 0.030 0.0060973 0.000 
De Facto 1.045 0.14155 0.000 
Dissolve 1.093 1.045963 0.296 
Removal -1.166 0.5402945 0.031 
Budget -1.141 0.6747988 0.091 
Process 1.504 0.6019878 0.012 
Final 0.372 0.3088771 0.229 
Review -0.453 0.3290194 0.168 
 
   
Chi-Square 92.860  0.000 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn- 
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world-table accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court 
Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges 
Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget 
Process: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
N = 1019 
 
Finally, the odds ratios provide further insight into the impact of the variables.  Table 4.15 shows 
that constitutional protections ensuring the constitutional court controls its own procedures (Process) 
has greatest odds of increase human rights protections.  Both de facto constitutional court autonomy 
and constitutional protections against dissolution of the constitutional court (Dissolve) have the next 
greatest odds of increase human rights protections.  Constitutional protections against removal of 
constitutional court judges (Removal) and ensuring the constitutional court controls its own budget 
(Budget) have the smallest odds of increasing human rights protections.   
 
Table 4.15 Odds Ratio with Expanded Cases and Variables using GDP per capita 
 
Odds Ratio Error Significance 
GDP per capita 0.827 0.1459126 0.281 
Polity 1.031 0.0062854 0.000 
De Facto 2.844 0.4026148 0.000 
Dissolve 2.982 3.118796 0.296 
Removal 0.312 0.1684302 0.031 
Budget 0.319 0.2154902 0.091 
Process 4.499 2.708595 0.012 
Final 1.450 0.4479106 0.229 
Review 0.635 0.2090792 0.168 
 
   
Chi-Square 92.860  0.000 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn- 
world-table accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
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Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court 
Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges 
Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget 
Process: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
N = 1019 
 
4.4 Corollaries 
The above regressions indicate a negative relationship between human rights and GDP as well 
as GDP per capita.  However, this finding is inconsistent with existing research (Howard and Carey, 
2004).  Consequently, three corollaries test the interrelationship of the data.  The first is that the higher 
the GDP the greater de jure constitutional court autonomy.  This builds on Sweet’s work (2005) arguing 
that markets value the autonomy of courts to protect their rights.  Since this is measuring GDP rather 
than an ordinal representation thereof, a regression with panel-corrected standard errors is used.  Since 
this method accommodates heteroscedasticity or the unequal variability inherent in comparing 
economics and constitutions.39  Table 4.16 presents the results from the regression.  Although the 
attempt to compare GDP and de facto constitutional court autonomy results in large coefficients, it does 
indicate a statistically significant relationship for all variables.  Both constitutional protections against 
the dissolution of the court and the finality of decisions have a negative relationship with GDP.  As the R 
square value indicates this regression has little explanatory power since it accounts for only 4% of the 
variance. 
                                                          
39
 Based on definitions and examples at Confusing Stats Terms Explained: Heteroscedasticity (Heteroskedasticity) 
available at http://www.statsmakemecry.com/smmctheblog/confusing-stats-terms-explained-heteroscedasticity-
heteroske.html  accessed February, 27, 2014. 
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Table 4.16 Results of Regression of De Facto Constitutional Court Autonomy and GDP 
 Coefficient Error Significance 
Dissolve -401656.0 54342.28 0.000 
Remove 208356.3 18468.5 0.000 
Budget 213936.9 32757.7 0.000 
Procedures 17938.4 189196.17 0.015 
Final -149699.5 18196.17 0.000 
Access 29412.0 7865.737 0.000 
Review 2959.8 10351.33 0.005 
Constant 272624.3 16700.12 0.000 
    
R Square  0.0487  
    
Dependent Variable: GDP source: Penn World Table available at 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn- 
world-table accessed January 14, 2014 
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court 
Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges 
Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget 
Procedures: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
N = 1019 
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The second corollary is that as democracy increases de facto constitutional court autonomy 
increases.  This corollary tests the relationship between democracy and constitutional court autonomy.  
Table 4.17 presents the results of the regression.  Three variables, protections against the removal of 
constitutional court judges (Remove), protections ensure that the constitutional court sets its own 
budget (Budget), and the finality of constitutional court decisions (Final) are not statistically significant.  
All other variables are significant at the p<.05 level.  Two variables, the finality of constitutional court 
decisions (Final) and the timing of the court’s review (Review) have a negative relationship with Polity.  
The largest impact is protections against the dissolution of the constitutional court (Dissolve) where a 
one-point change in the variable’s value changes the polity score by almost 10 points.  Broad access to 
the constitutional court (Access) also has a large impact where a one-point change increases the polity 
score by almost 7 points.  The smallest impact is protection against removal of constitutional court 
judges (Remove) since a one-point change alters the polity score by less than on point.  This model also 
has a limited impact since it explains only 5% of the variance. 
 
Table 4.17 Results of Regression of De Facto Constitutional Court Autonomy 
 Coefficient Error Significance 
Dissolve 9.916 1.284509 0.000 
Remove 0.527 0.4905154 0.283 
Budget 1.337 0.7221524 0.064 
Procedures 3.305 0.5934971 0.000 
Final -0.921 0.6379584 0.149 
Access 6.873 0.7063744 0.000 
Review -4.247 0.8213191 0.000 
Constant 1.399 0.6295852 0.026 
    
R Square  0.0504  
Dependent Variable: Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   
accessed January 14, 2014 
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court 
Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges 
Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget 
Procedures: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
N = 1019 
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The third corollary is that as de jure constitutional court autonomy increases de facto 
constitutional court autonomy increases.  This corollary looks at the relationship between de facto and 
de jure autonomy.  Table 4.18 presents the results. Neither protections against dissolution of the 
constitutional court (Dissolve) nor the ability of the constitutional court to set its own procedures 
(Procedures) are statistically significant.  All other variables are statistically significant at the p<.01 level.  
Only broad access to the constitutional court (Access) and the ability of the constitutional court to set its 
own budget (Budget) have a positive relationship with de facto constitutional court autonomy.  All other 
variables have a negative relationship meaning the greater de facto constitutional court autonomy the 
less de jure constitutional court autonomy.  However, none of the variables have a large impact since a 
one value change in any of the results in less than a one value change in de facto constitutional court 
autonomy.  This model does have a modest contribution since it explains 12% of the total variance. 
Table 4.18  Regression of De Facto and De Jure Constitutional Court Autonomy 
 Coefficient Error Significance 
Dissolve -0.086 0.1479495 0.560 
Remove -0.092 0.0288185 0.001 
Budget 0.421 0.058319 0.000 
Procedures -0.014 0.0338358 0.687 
Final -0.321 0.0394463 0.000 
Access 0.582 0.0422848 0.000 
Review -0.234 0.0248155 0.000 
Constant 0.907 0.0287633 0.000 
    
R Square  0.1281  
Dependent Variable: De facto constitutional court autonomy 
Dissolve: Constitutional protection against dissolution of the constitutional court 
Removal: Constitutional protection against removal of constitutional court judges 
Budget: Constitutional protection ensuring the constitutional court sets its own budget 
Procedures: Ability of Constitutional Court to set its own processes 
Review: Timing of Constitutional Court Review 
Final: Finality of Constitutional Court Decisions 
N = 1019 
 
4.5 Discussion  
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The tests of the first hypothesis, that increasing constitutional court autonomy increases the 
protection of human rights, demonstrate that the relationship between the two variables is complicated.  
The three corollaries indicate a close relationship between the variables.  Although the expanded data 
set provides more variance on all variables, the small data set of post-communist countries provides 
insight as well.  While the tests revealed statistically significant relationships, the results prevent 
acceptance of the hypothesis.  Four findings from these tests are relevant to the research question.   
First, increased access to the constitutional court is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for 
the protection of human rights.  This finding is consistent with the experience of the Constitutional 
Council in France (Koopmans, 2003).  The French Constitutional Council protected human rights despite 
significant constitutional limitations on their jurisdiction (Koopmans, 2003).   
Second, both de jure and de fact autonomy of the constitutional court are important to the 
protection of human rights.  Testing of the third corollary indicated the close relationship between these 
features.  This is consistent with the expectations of a constitutional court under the separation of 
powers model of government.  Where government separates power across branches, there is an 
expectation that each branch will check the powers of the other branches thus preventing a usurpation 
of power (Federalist 51).  Logically this cannot occur if the branches are not autonomous from one 
another.  De jure constitutional court autonomy, in this study, measures the constitutional protections 
to ensure the autonomy of the constitutional court.  De facto constitutional court autonomy is a 
measure of the actual freedom of the constitutional court to act without interference from the 
executive and legislative branches.  Both are important to the protection of human rights.  The more 
autonomous a constitutional court is the more it willing to overturn laws and government actions that 
violate human rights. 
Third, there is a negative relationship between the timing of judicial review by the constitutional 
court and the protection of human rights.  Constitutional courts can review laws either before 
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promulgation (a priori), after promulgation (a posteriori), or both.  The national constitution controls the 
limits, if any, placed on the constitutional court’s review.  Although a priori review limits the ability of 
the constitutional court to correct problems once the law is in effect, it prevents laws that violate 
human rights from going into effect.  The findings here indicate that constitutional courts limited to 
either a priori or a posteriori review are better able to protect human rights than constitutional courts 
with the ability to assess laws both before and after enactment.  This is evident in the four cases.  Both 
the Czech and Slovak Republics have limited review by the constitutional courts and higher human rights 
scores than Romania and Poland with unlimited constitutional court review. 
Finally, there is a negative relationship between the constitutional protections against removal 
of constitutional court judges, as well as protection for the constitutional court to control its budget, and 
the protection of human rights.  This indicates that the ability of a legislature or executive to have some 
leverage over the constitutional court provides a check on the constitutional court’s ability to protect 
human rights.  On its face, this finding seems to jeopardize the autonomy of the constitutional court.  
However, from a checks and balance perspective this finding seems logical.  Constitutional courts check 
the powers of the executive and legislative branches (Solyom, 2003; Federalist 51).  The power of the 
constitutional court purse strings provides a similar check on the constitutional court.   
4.6 Conclusion  
Testing of the first hypothesis, that increasing constitutional court autonomy increases the 
protection of human rights, results in less than full acceptance.  However, the statistical assessment 
demonstrated factors associated with constitutional court autonomy that increases protections of 
human rights.  The statistical assessment also identified factors where increased autonomy increase 
human rights protections as well as those where reduced autonomy increase human rights protections.   
The next step is to assess the supranational influence on constitutional court.  Therefore, the 
next chapter tests the second hypothesis, that as supranational constraints intended to increase the 
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consolidation of democracy and protection of human rights increase, national constitutional courts 
increase constraints on national legislatures 
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5 SECOND HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter tests the second hypothesis, which looks at the impact of the supranational human 
rights efforts on the constitutional court’s ability to affect legislative autonomy.  Building on the work of 
Stone (1990) and Finnemore (2003), this hypothesis states that as supranational constraints intended to 
increase the consolidation of democracy and protection of human rights increase, national constitutional 
courts increase constraints on national legislatures.   
Stone (1990) posits that constitutional courts in Europe have both a direct and indirect impact 
on legislatures (Stone, 1990).  The direct influence of constitutional courts occurs when they overturn a 
law (Stone, 1990).  However, when a legislature considers the potential of a constitutional court ruling 
when drafting a bill it is an indirect influence by the constitutional court (Stone, 1990).  Indirect 
influence by the constitutional court over the legislature occurs in two ways.  Legislatures can write 
legislation in a way to avoid having the constitutional court annulling the law.  Alternately, the 
legislature may alter the intended legislation to prevent a challenge by a particular group.   
Finnemore found an increasing legalization of international relations disputes (Finnemore, 
2003).  As a result, countries now adjudicate international disputes that previously resulted in armed 
conflict (Finnemore, 2003).  A similar legalization is occurring in human rights, where there is a 
preference for legal over political solutions (Gearty, 2006).  This allows an international legal 
conversation and activism about human rights (Gearty, 2006).  The result is that human rights laws 
increase the scope and authority of courts at both the national and international level (Koopmans, 2003; 
Gearty, 2006).   
Combing this research with the research on the increasing role of constitutional courts 
presented in Chapter 4 this dissertation posits that international constraints empower constitutional 
courts to constrain the majority tendencies of the legislature.  Minorities facilitate this empowerment by 
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seeking legal protections against human rights violations contained in majority-enacted legislation 
(Koopmans, 2003).    
5.1 Variables  
The dependent variable is constitutional court constraints on national legislatures.  The key 
independent variable is supranational constraints.  Chapter 3 presents the definition of these variables.  
This section presents the operationalization of, or association of data with, the variables.  Data collection 
includes the years 1994 through 2010 to ensure consistency throughout the dissertation.  
5.1.1 Constitutional Court Constraints on National Legislatures  
As described in Chapter 3 constitutional court constraints on national legislatures can include 
limitations on legislative actions, annulment of all or part of a law, instructions on the drafting of laws, 
and the threat of the constitutional court reviewing a law (Vanberg, 1998).  The basis of measurement 
for this variable is Fish and Kroenig’s (2009) measure of legislative autonomy.  However, rather than the 
32 items used by Fish and Kroenig (2009), this dissertation uses only the ability to overturn a 
constitutional court decision coded 1 if the legislature is not allowed to overturn constitutional court 
decisions and 0 otherwise.   
Another measure of legislative autonomy is the ability of the constitutional court to exercise 
judicial review of legislation.  However, for all four cases in this study the constitutional court has the 
power of judicial review.  Therefore, since there is no variation on this variable it is not included here.   
As with constitutional court autonomy, legislative autonomy has a de jure and de facto 
component.  The de jure component, described above, is whether, the national constitution authorizes 
the legislature to overturn constitutional court decisions.  The de facto component measures the ability 
of the constitutional court to influence the actual workings of the legislature.  Legislative debates 
provide evidence of the constitutional court’s influence in the legislature’s primary function, the drafting 
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of legislation.  Five types of comments during legislative debates indicate the constitutional court’s de 
facto influence over the legislature.  First are comments indicating consideration of past constitutional 
court decisions in the drafting of a law.  These comments indicate that the legislature is confining itself 
to the rules established in past constitutional court decisions.  A second type of comment indicates a 
consideration of future constitutional court review of legislation.  Such comments indicate that the 
legislature is constraining its actions to protect the legislation against future constitutional court action.  
A third type of comment indicates the legislature is changing laws to conform to a constitutional court 
decision.  Although these comments are similar to the first type, they indicate a more direct constraint 
since the legislature is responding to the instructions of the constitutional court.  The fourth type of 
comment indicates that the legislature is seeking constitutional court advice on drafting legislation.  
Finally are comments that a group or party plans to challenge the law at the constitutional court.  This is 
not a direct impact on the legislature by the constitutional court.  However, it is an indirect limit on the 
legislature’s autonomy since the legislature must at least weigh the consequences of the threat of 
constitutional court action.   
These five types of comments indicate different amounts of constitutional court influence over 
the legislature.  Changing existing laws to conform to constitutional court decisions is the most direct 
influence.  Consideration of past decisions when drafting new legislation and consulting the 
constitutional court when drafting legislation also indicate direct influence of the constitutional court.  
All three situations indicate that the legislature considering, if not following, guidelines the 
constitutional court included in its decisions.  The other two types of comments are more indirect since 
their basis is a threat of future action.  In these situations, the legislature can choose to ignore the threat 
of constitutional court review.  However, even if they choose to ignore the threat, the need to consider 
the threat limits the legislature’s autonomy.   
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Some references to the constitutional court in legislative debates are outside these categories.  
For example, discussions on nominations to the constitutional court or comments on the number of 
constitutional court cases for a particular year do not involve the legislature’s lawmaking activities.  
Therefore, comments during such debates are not included in the data.  Coding only occurs for 
comments directly related to the lawmaking activities of the legislature.  Furthermore, some debates 
have multiple comments related to the constitutional court.  In these cases, the assigned code reflects 
the greatest degree of influence.  For example, if a debate includes comments about past decisions and 
a threat to take the law to the constitutional court the code for the debate reflects the consideration of 
past decisions.   
The value for the de facto component recognizes the difference in impact on the legislature’s 
autonomy.  If there are no comments about the constitutional court in a debate the debate is not 
included.  When a group threatens to take action at the constitutional court, the debate has a value of 1.  
When the comments indicate that the legislature seeks advice from the constitutional court, the debate 
has a value of 2.  The value of 3 indicates consideration of constitutional court decisions as legislation is 
debated.  When the comments indicate concern for potential constitutional court cases, the value is 4.  
Finally, the value is 5 when the comments indicate legislation is changed to conform with constitutional 
court decisions.   
Figure 5.1 shows the values for de facto component of constitutional court constraints on the 
national legislature by country by year.  This figure illustrates the significant variance within and across 
countries.  The one commonality across countries it the low values prior to 1998.  All countries except 
Poland saw an increase between 1998 and 2001.  Poland saw an increase beginning in 2003.   
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Figure 5.1 De Facto Constitutional Court Constraints on the Legislature by Country by Year 
 
The calculation of these values occurs yearly.  The debates represent a summation of the values 
for debates during the year.  Therefore, for each year the values range from 0 (no de facto impacts of 
the constitutional court on the legislature’s autonomy) upward.  Table 5.1 presents the values for each 
country by year.  This table illustrates the variance in references to the constitutional court within and 
across countries. 
Table 5.1 Values for Constitutional Court Constraints by Country by Year 
Country Year Jud Rev Debate Total 
Czech Republic 1994 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 1995 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 1996 1 13 14 
Czech Republic 1997 1 15 16 
Czech Republic 1998 1 5 6 
Czech Republic 1999 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 2000 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 2001 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 2002 1 2 3 
Czech Republic 2003 1 1 2 
Czech Republic 2004 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 2005 1 1 2 
Czech Republic 2006 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 2007 1 0 1 
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Country Year Jud Rev Debate Total 
Czech Republic 2008 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 2009 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 2010 1 0 1 
          
Poland 1993 1 0 1 
Poland 1994 1 0 1 
Poland 1995 1 0 1 
Poland 1996 1 0 1 
Poland 1997 1 0 1 
Poland 1998 1 0 1 
Poland 1999 1 0 1 
Poland 2000 1 0 1 
Poland 2001 1 0 1 
Poland 2002 1 0 1 
Poland 2003 1 0 1 
Poland 2004 1 0 1 
Poland 2005 1 0 1 
Poland 2006 1 0 1 
Poland 2007 1 0 1 
Poland 2008 1 0 1 
Poland 2009 1 0 1 
Poland 2010 1 0 1 
          
Romania 1993 0 0 0 
Romania 1994 0 0 0 
Romania 1995 0 0 0 
Romania 1996 0 0 0 
Romania 1997 0 0 0 
Romania 1998 0 0 0 
Romania 1999 0 0 0 
Romania 2000 0 0 0 
Romania 2001 0 0 0 
Romania 2002 0 0 0 
Romania 2003 0 0 0 
Romania 2004 1 0 1 
Romania 2005 1 0 1 
Romania 2006 1 0 1 
Romania 2007 1 0 1 
Romania 2008 1 0 1 
Romania 2009 1 0 1 
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Country Year Jud Rev Debate Total 
Romania 2010 1 0 1 
          
Slovak Republic 1993 1 29 30 
Slovak Republic 1994 1 14 15 
Slovak Republic 1995 1 10 11 
Slovak Republic 1996 1 19 20 
Slovak Republic 1997 1 16 17 
Slovak Republic 1998 1 34 35 
Slovak Republic 1999 1 41 42 
Slovak Republic 2000 1 50 51 
Slovak Republic 2001 1 33 34 
Slovak Republic 2002 1 28 29 
Slovak Republic 2003 1 30 31 
Slovak Republic 2004 1 21 22 
Slovak Republic 2005 1 28 29 
Slovak Republic 2006 1 41 42 
Slovak Republic 2007 1 13 14 
Slovak Republic 2008 1   1 
Slovak Republic 2009 1 
 
1 
Slovak Republic 2010 1   1 
Source: National Constitution and Parliament Websites 
JudRev: Whether judicial review of legislative actions is allowed 
Debate: References to constitutional court in Parliamentary debates 
 
5.1.2 Supranational Constraints  
As explained in Chapter 3 supranational constraints take several forms.  Treaties are legally 
binding constraints on the state’s actions.  A multitude of treaties exists and a state is party to some or 
all of them.  However, since this dissertation focuses on human rights it considers only human rights 
treaties.  Furthermore, treaties exist at the international and regional levels.  Only European regional 
treaties are included since the case studies are all European.  Each level is a separate component of this 
variable.  A value of 0 (not signed or ratified), 1 (signed but not ratified) or 2 (signed and ratified) is 
assigned for each treaty.  Thus, for international treaties this variable will range from 0 (none signed) to 
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10 (all signed and ratified).  The value of this variable for regional treaties ranges from 0 (none signed 
and ratified) to 6 (all signed and ratified).   
An additional component of supranational constraint is European Union accession.  The 
European Union established democracy and human rights standards for the post-communist countries 
before access (Albi, 2009).  Although the European Union closely monitored the post-communist 
countries for compliance before accession, the scrutiny dropped off after accession (Albi, 2009).  
Therefore, this component is coded 0 if the country is already a member, 1 if the country is pre-
accession, or 2 if the country is within a year of access.  The total supranational constraint variable 
ranges from 0 (no human rights treaties signed and already a member of the European Union) to 18 (all 
human rights treaties signed and ratified within a year of European Union accession).   
Table 5.2 presents the values for each country.  All the countries signed all the included 
international treaties and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms prior to beginning of this study. 
Table 5.2 International Constraints by Country by Year 
Country Year IntlTreaty RegTreaty EU Total 
Czech Republic 1994 5 11 1 17 
Czech Republic 1995 5 11 1 17 
Czech Republic 1996 5 11 1 17 
Czech Republic 1997 5 11 1 17 
Czech Republic 1998 5 12 1 18 
Czech Republic 1999 5 13 1 19 
Czech Republic 2000 5 13 1 19 
Czech Republic 2001 5 13 1 19 
Czech Republic 2002 5 13 2 20 
Czech Republic 2003 5 13 2 20 
Czech Republic 2004 5 13 0 18 
Czech Republic 2005 5 13 0 18 
Czech Republic 2006 5 13 0 18 
Czech Republic 2007 5 13 0 18 
Czech Republic 2008 5 13 0 18 
Czech Republic 2009 5 13 0 18 
Czech Republic 2010 5 13 0 18 
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Country Year IntlTreaty RegTreaty EU Total 
            
Poland 1993 5 11 1 17 
Poland 1994 5 11 1 17 
Poland 1995 5 11 1 17 
Poland 1996 5 11 1 17 
Poland 1997 5 12 1 18 
Poland 1998 5 12 1 18 
Poland 1999 5 12 1 18 
Poland 2000 5 12 1 18 
Poland 2001 5 13 1 19 
Poland 2002 5 13 1 19 
Poland 2003 5 13 2 20 
Poland 2004 5 13 2 20 
Poland 2005 5 13 0 18 
Poland 2006 5 13 0 18 
Poland 2007 5 13 0 18 
Poland 2008 5 13 0 18 
Poland 2009 5 13 0 18 
Poland 2010 5 13 0 18 
            
Romania 1993 5 11 1 17 
Romania 1994 5 11 1 17 
Romania 1995 5 11 1 17 
Romania 1996 5 12 1 18 
Romania 1997 5 12 1 18 
Romania 1998 5 12 1 18 
Romania 1999 5 13 1 19 
Romania 2000 5 13 1 19 
Romania 2001 5 13 1 19 
Romania 2002 5 13 1 19 
Romania 2003 5 13 1 19 
Romania 2004 5 13 1 19 
Romania 2005 5 13 1 19 
Romania 2006 5 13 2 20 
Romania 2007 5 13 2 20 
Romania 2008 5 13 0 18 
Romania 2009 5 13 0 18 
Romania 2010 5 13 0 18 
            
Slovak Republic 1993 5 11 1 17 
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Country Year IntlTreaty RegTreaty EU Total 
Slovak Republic 1994 5 11 1 17 
Slovak Republic 1995 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 1996 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 1997 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 1998 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 1999 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 2000 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 2001 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 2002 5 12 1 18 
Slovak Republic 2003 5 12 2 19 
Slovak Republic 2004 5 12 2 19 
Slovak Republic 2005 5 12 0 17 
Slovak Republic 2006 5 12 0 17 
Slovak Republic 2007 5 12 0 17 
Slovak Republic 2008 5 12 0 17 
Slovak Republic 2009 5 13 0 18 
Slovak Republic 2010 5 13 0 18 
IntlTreaty: Number of international human rights treaties signed and ratified 
Regtreaty: Number of EU human rights treaties signed and ratified 
EU: Membership in EU 
 
This table presents the values for each country.  All the countries signed all the included 
international treaties and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms prior to beginning of this study. 
5.2 Analysis 
As described above the dependent variable is a summation of constitutional court constraints 
on the legislature during each year.  The key independent variable is a count of supranational 
constraints.  In other words, the variables are counts of occurrences.  This data is also panel data 
because the measures of the variables occur yearly.  Consequently, the statistical test of this hypothesis 
uses the Panel Poisson Regression.  The results appear in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Poisson Regression of International Influences on Constitutional Court Constraints 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Supra -2.945 0.037266 0.000 
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EU 0.175 0.048642 0.000 
Constant -13.309 0.686781 0.000 
    Chi-Square 382.270 
 
0.000 
Dependent Variable: Constitutional Court constraints on the legislature 
Supra: International human rights treaties 
EU: Pre-accession status with the European Union 
N = 49 
 
Both variables are statistically significant at the p<.001 level.  The impact of the European Union 
pre-accession constraints is positive but small.  Changing the pre-accession constraints alters the 
constitutional court constraints on the legislature by less than one point.  International human rights 
treaties have a greater impact although it is negative.  Becoming party to an international human rights 
treaty decreases constitutional court constraints on the legislature by 2 points.  Due to the negative 
relationship between supranational constraints and constitutional court constraints on the legislature, 
the hypothesis requires further analysis.   
Since the independent variable, supranational constraints, has three components, a more 
detailed analysis is possible using the three components.  However, inspection indicates that the first 
component, international treaties, has no variance within or across cases.  Therefore, the regression 
does not include this variable.  It does include the regional treaty and European Union accession 
components.   
Table 5.4 displays the results of the regression analysis.  As can be seen, both variables are 
statistically significant at the p<.001 level.  These variables also have a greater impact than in the last 
regression.  A change in EU accession status increases constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
by half a point.  Conversely, a change in the regional treaty status decreases constitutional court 
constraints on the legislature by over 4 points.  Once again, the negative relationship prevents 
acceptance of the hypothesis as worded. 
Table 5.4 Poisson Regression of Regional Influences on Constitutional Court Constraints 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Regional -4.015 0.036205 0.000 
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EU 0.585 .0377.98 0.000 
Constant -1948.150 0.833489 0.000 
    Chi-Square 12369.160 
 
0.000 
Dependent Variable: Constitutional Court constraints on the legislature 
Regional: European human rights treaties 
EU: Pre-accession status with the European Union 
N = 49 
 
Two corollaries to this second hypothesis are relevant.  The first corollary posits that as 
constitutional court constraints on the legislature increase human rights protections increase.  This 
corollary tests the effectiveness of the constitutional court’s judicial review of legislation for the 
protection of human rights.  The dependent variable is the CIRI measure of human rights as defined and 
operationalized in Chapter 4.  The independent variable is constitutional court constraints on legislative 
autonomy.  Legislative influence on human rights does not necessarily present itself immediately.  
Therefore, the calculation for this variable includes a one-year lag.  Since this involves human rights, a 
control for GDP is necessary.  Table 5.5 displays the results of the regression.   
There is a positive relationship between the GDP variable and human rights.  However, the 
impact is very small and not statistically significant.  Constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
are negatively correlated with human rights at the statistically significant p<.05 level.  Again, the impact 
is very small.  For both variables, each change has less than a one-point impact in human rights 
protections.  Overall, based on the R-square value, the model explains 34% of the variance.  
Table 5.5 Panel Regression of Constitutional Court Constraints and Human Rights 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Autonomy -0.015 0.006669 0.028 
GDP 0.000 0.000116 0.721 
Constant 19.446 1.525833 0.000 
    R-square 0.3427  
    Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Autonomy: Constitutional Court constraints on legislature 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
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N = 49 
 
As discussed in the last chapter, a more specific measure of the country’s economy is GDP per 
capita.  Table 5.6 presents the regression using GDP per capita in place of overall GDP.  As indicated by 
the R-square value this model accounts for less of the variance, 28%, than the overall GDP model.  
Furthermore, both variables have less impact on the dependent variable than in the previous model.  
However, autonomy retains a negative relationship with human rights and remains statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level.  GDP per capita has a positive relationship with human rights but is not 
statistically significant.  Consequently, the first corollary requires rejecting in favor of its reverse that as 
constitutional court constraints on the legislature increase human rights protections decrease. 
Table 5.6 Constitutional Court Constraints and Human Rights with GDP per capita 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Autonomy -0.014 0.006629 0.034 
GDP per capita  0.000 0.0000567 0.084 
Constant 19.755 1.078443 0.000 
 
   
R-square  0.2772   
    Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Autonomy: Constitutional Court constraints on legislature 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
N = 49 
 
 
The second corollary posits that as supranational constraints increase human rights protections 
increase.  This corollary tests the impact of supranational constraints, such as regional treaties and the 
European Union, on the protection of human rights.  The dependent variable is the CIRI measure of 
human rights as defined and operationalized in Chapter 4.  The independent variable is supranational 
constraints as defined in this chapter.  Controls include both GDP and the Polity score.  Table 5.7 
presents the results of the panel ordered logistic regression. 
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Again, the relationship between supranational constraints for the protection of human rights 
and human rights is negative.  This is statistically significant at the p<.01 level.  An increase in 
supranational protections decreases human rights by 1 point.  GDP is statistically significant at the p<.05 
level.  However, this is a positive relationship where an increase in GDP increases human rights by one 
and a half points.  The relationship between human rights and polity is neither statistically significant nor 
notable.  A one-point change in polity increases human rights by less than one point. 
Table 5.7 Regression of Supranational Constraints  and Human Rights Protections 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Supra -1.029 0.399072 0.010 
GDP 1.598 0.72907 0.028 
Polity 0.359 0.383265 0.349 
    Chi-Square 8.130 
 
0.044 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Supra: International human rights constraints 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
N = 49 
 
Table 5.8 presents the results of the regression using per capita GDP.  In this model none of the 
variables are statistically significant at the p<.05 level.  Furthermore, they have a smaller impact.  All of 
the variables have less than a one-point impact on the human rights variable.  While human rights still 
have a negative relationship with supranational constraints, they now also have a negative relationship 
with GDP per capita. 
Table 5.8 Regression of Supranational Constraints and Human Rights  with GDP per capita 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Supra -0.272 0.3687319 0.121 
GDP per capita -0.087 0.3416611 0.800 
Polity 0.358 0.3962913 0.366 
 
   
Chi-Square 2.430  0.489 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Supra: International human rights constraints 
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GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
N = 49 
 
As noted above, European constraints displayed a greater impact than the combined 
supranational constraints.  Table 5.9 displays the statistical assessment of European specific constraints.  
Of the control variables GDP and Polity only GDP is statistically significant at the p<.05 level.  Polity also 
has a minimal impact on human rights as a one level improvement alters the human rights score by less 
than one point.  GDP has the largest impact of all variables since an improvement in GDP increases 
human rights protections by over one and a half points.  EU accession constraints are not statistically 
significant and have a minimal impact.  An increase in European Union accession constraints increases 
human rights protections by just over half a point.  The impact of regional treaties is statistically 
significant at the p<.01 level but displays a negative relationship.  An increase in regional treaties 
decreases human rights protections by more than one point.  Consequently, tests of this corollary 
indicate the complicated nature of the relationship between supranational constraints and human 
rights. 
Table 5.9 Regression of Supranational Constraints and Human Rights  
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Regional -1.272 0.470312 0.007 
EU 0.593 0.568587 0.297 
GDP 1.662 0.650026 0.011 
Polity 0.311 0.384798 0.419 
    Chi-
Square 11.160 
 
0.025 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Regional: European specific treaties 
EU: Pre-accession influence of the European Union 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
N = 49 
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Finally, Table 5.10 presents the above model using GDP per capita.  As in the prior model, 
changing from GDP to GDP per capita causes the relationship with human rights to become negative.  In 
addition, no variable is statistically significant and the impact of a one-point change in any of the 
variables changes the human rights variable less than one point. 
Table 5.10 Regression of Supranational Constraints and Human Rights using GDP per capita 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
Regional -0.653 0.4501608 0.147 
EU 0.366 0.5779876 0.527 
GDP per capita -0.088 0.3467115 0.799 
Polity 0.319 0.4048133 0.431 
 
   
Chi-Square 2.410  0.661 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
Regional: European specific treaties 
EU: Pre-accession influence of the European Union 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
N = 49 
 
5.3 Discussion 
Testing of the second hypothesis and corollaries illustrates several important features in the 
relationship between constitutional court, legislatures, and human rights.  First, partial acceptance of 
the second hypothesis, that as supranational constraints intended to increase the consolidation of 
democracy and protection of human rights increase, national constitutional courts increase constraints 
on national legislatures, demonstrates that supranational constraints affect the dynamics between 
national institutions. The test of this hypothesis demonstrates a relationship between supranational 
constraints and increased limits on the legislature’s freedom to act by the constitutional court.  Although 
relationship does not mean causation, it does indicate that supranational influences result in a change of 
behavior by the legislature.   
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However, the impact is mixed.  International and regional treaties indicated a negative 
relationship with human rights while EU accession indicated a positive relationship.  One possible 
explanation for this mixed effect is the different direct impact of these two constraints.  Existing 
research posits that countries join international and regional human rights treaties for reasons other 
than the protection of human rights, such as international legitimacy (Hirschl, 2004).  Although many of 
these treaties have monitoring provisions there is little incentive for adherence to, or punishment for 
violation of, the treaty (Hirschl, 2004).  Conversely, pre-accession monitoring by the EU attaches 
significant costs and benefits.   
Second, the first corollary indicates that constitutional court constraints on the legislature have 
a negative relationship with human rights protections.  An effect of constitutional court constraints on 
the legislature is that it creates a self-censoring legislature.  While the intent is to increase human rights 
protections, there is the possibility of unintended consequences such as delayed legislation or lacking 
legislation.  Consequently, there is a delay in correcting human rights issues.  Another possibility is that 
increased constitutional court actions increase the perceptions, and reports, of human rights violations.  
This is particularly possible in post-communist countries where there is a lack of familiarity with 
individual rights (Sajo, 1995).  
Third, taken together these results urge caution in actions to protect human rights.  Although 
human rights protections frequently involve constraining majority interests (Hirschl, 2004), it is not a 
direct relationship.  Based on the findings presented here, monitoring with valued carrots and sticks 
more effectively protect human rights than treaties or constitutional court actions. 
Yet the major finding in this chapter is the simple evidence of constitutional court constraints on 
the legislatures.  Legislative debates from the cases demonstrate several different constraints.  
Legislators clearly stated concern regarding the constitutional court’s potential rejection of the wording 
of legislation.  They also chose to defer some concerns allowing the constitutional court to handle them.  
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Minorities also threatened constitutional court action when they objected to prospective legislation.  
This evidence supports existing research positing the political relationship between constitutional courts 
and legislatures (Hirschl, 2004). 
5.4 Conclusion 
The results presented in this chapter provide additional insight into the research question.  The 
research question asks if the constitutional court limits the autonomy of the legislature to protect 
human rights.  By looking at the supranational influence of both international and regional human rights 
treaties, as well as the related relationship between supranational constraints and human rights, this 
chapter explored the ability of international legal requirements to empower national constitutional 
courts.  Two significant insights into the research question emerged. 
The statistically significant results of the hypothesis test indicate that supranational constraints 
alter the influence of the constitutional court on the legislature.  In other words, supranational 
constraints correlate with changes in legislative autonomy vis-à-vis the constitutional court.  This does 
not mean that supranational constraints cause legislatures to loose autonomy to the constitutional 
courts.  However, even a relationship indicates that supranational constraints make a difference.  Since 
there is an increased focus on regional and international human rights treaties this is an encouraging 
finding. 
Second, the negative relationship between constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
and the increased protection of human rights begins to answer the research question.  Once again, the 
results indicate relationship, which is different from causation.  The results of the tests in this chapter do 
not indicate that constitutional court constraints on the legislature cause decreased human rights 
protections.  They do indicate, however, a relationship.  In that sense, they indicate that both 
constitutional court and legislative autonomy are important to the protection of human rights.   
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However, one overreaching explanation deserves consideration.  The national legal and political 
system may see international and regional constraints as political rather than legal impacts (Van Galhn 
and Taulbee, 2013).  Courts focus on law and, as far as possible, distance themselves from the political.  
Responsibility for international relations falls to the executive and legislative branches (Van Galhn and 
Taulbee, 2013).  Consequently, constitutional courts may not perceive any need to ensure compliance 
with international constraints.  As a result, any impact of supranational constraints on the relationship 
between constitutional courts and the legislature may be serendipitous.  
Similarly, national legislatures may cede autonomy to constitutional courts for purely political 
reasons.  Comments made during the legislative debates support this interpretation.  For example, the 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies referred to the constitutional court as a political court.40  Similarly, the 
Polish Sejm indicated that a decision of the constitutional court was politically motivated.41  There were 
also comments where the opposition party threatened to challenge the law at the constitutional court.42  
Such comments indicate that a political relationship between institutions exists and political actors 
recognize its use.  Consequently, constitutional court decisions, and choices by the legislature to follow 
them, may result from political motivations unrelated to human rights protections.  Although this 
relegates increased human rights protections to an unintended consequence of political actions, it does 
not minimize the benefit to citizens. 
The next chapter further explores the relationship of the political climate to constitutional court 
constraints resulting in increased human rights protections.  Chapter 6 explores the relationship 
between the political climates at the transition to democracy. 
  
                                                          
40
 Debate in the Chamber of Deputies on June 4, 2004 available at 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/steno/steno.stenograma?ids=5687&idm=3&idl=1 accessed March 27, 2013 
41
 Debate in the Sejm on April 24, 1997 available at http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata3.nsf  accessed March 27, 2013 
42
 See Romanian Chamber of Deputies comments by Predescu on Sept 4, 1996, Polish Sejm comments by Grabicka 
on June 12, 2003, Czech Joint Session of January 20, 1998, Slovak National Council comments by Mikloško on 
March 16, 1993 as examples. 
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6 THIRD HYPOTHESIS 
This chapter tests the third and final hypothesis, that constitutional courts in countries with a 
negotiated transition to democracy will use international human rights law in their decisions more than 
constitutional courts in countries where the transition to democracy was unilateral.   
This chapter builds on the earlier findings by investigating the relationship between 
constitutional courts and the transition to democracy.  Central Eastern European countries had unique 
experiences during their transitions to democracy.  Some were smooth and negotiated while others 
were bumpy and divisive (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  The constructing of new constitutions reflected these 
varying experiences (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  Since constitutions contain the rules governing the political 
and legal systems, including the structure and functioning of the constitutional court (Zeisberg, 2004), it 
is possible that the transition experiences influence the constitutional court’s ability to protect human 
rights.   
6.1 Variables 
 The dependent variable is the use of international law in constitutional court decisions.  The key 
independent variable is the transition to democracy.    
6.1.1 Use of International Law in Constitutional Court Decisions  
The operationalization of this variable is whether the constitutional court references 
international law in their written decisions.  Constitutional courts may directly reference international 
law in their decisions.  Schimmelfennig (2006) argues that courts reference international law in their 
written decisions, particularly international human rights law, to increase their legitimacy.  However, it is 
possible that constitutional court judges consider international law while arriving at the decision but do 
not reference it in their written decisions.  Such use of international law is not included in this 
dissertation for two reasons.  First, the deliberations of the constitutional court are not available.  
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Therefore, there is no documented method to confirm the consideration of international law.  Second, 
considering only the specific references to international law in the written decisions prevents 
overestimating the results and accepting the hypothesis in error.  While this may result in rejecting the 
hypothesis in error, it will ensure that testing the hypothesis occurs under stringent conditions. 
Since the focus of this dissertation is human rights protections, the definition of international 
law is international human rights treaties.  This includes both international and supranational human 
rights treaties.  A second source of international law is rulings by international courts or regional courts.  
Decisions by international courts, for example the International Court of Justice and the International 
Criminal Court, are binding only on the countries involved in the case (Shaw, 2008).  However, they are a 
recognized source of international law according to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (Shaw, 2008).  Regional courts, for the countries of post-communist Europe these are the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, are both binding on the members 
of the European Union and a source of law (Shaw, 2008; Buergenthal and Murphy, 2007).  Therefore, 
the constitutional court also references international law when it references the decisions of 
international court.   
Another possible source of international law is customary international law (Shaw, 2008).  
Customary international law develops when countries act as if they are legally bound but there is no 
written law (Shaw, 2008).  In other words, customary international law results from state action and 
state belief (Shaw, 2008).  This dissertation uses two sources to identify customary international law.  
First, constitutional courts might identify customary international law through the decisions of other 
national courts.  Second, a constitutional court might view a binding norm as customary international 
law.  Customary international law is much debated, however, this dissertation includes this source of 
international law to ensure inclusion of all possible sources.  
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A value of 0 is assigned to the constitutional court decision if there is no reference to any of the 
above international treaties, international courts, or regional courts.  If the decision contains a reference 
to any of the above treaties, international courts, or regional courts, it is assigned a value of 1.  
Therefore, the minimum value for this variable is 0 while the maximum value depends on the number of 
constitutional court decisions. 
Table 6.1 shows the decisions and use of international law.  This table illustrates the variance in 
usage of international law across countries.    
Table 6.1 Use of International Law in Constituitonal Court Decisions by Country 
Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Romania 4/1992 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 1/1993 No No No No No 0 
Romania 22/1993 No No No No No 0 
Romania 35/1993 No No No No No 0 
Romania 47/1994 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 49/1994 No No No No No 0 
Romania 139/1994 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 45/1994 No No No No No 0 
Romania 46/1994 No No No No No 0 
Romania 87/1994 No No No No No 0 
Romania 32/1994 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 59/1994 No No No No No 0 
Romania 1/1994 No No No No No 0 
Romania 19/1995 No No No Yes No 1 
Romania 62/1995 No No No No No 0 
Romania 72/1995 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 1/1995 No No No No No 0 
Romania 66/1995 No No No No No 0 
Romania 91/1995 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 3/1995 No No No No No 0 
Romania 35/1996 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 71/1996 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 96/1996 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 392/1997 No No No No No 0 
Romania 97/1997 No No No No No 0 
Romania 279/1997 No No No No No 0 
Romania 95/1998 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 22/1998 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 25/1998 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 45/1998 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 81/1998 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Romania 83/1998 No No No No No 0 
Romania 177/1998 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 70/1999 No No No No No 0 
Romania 24/1999 No No No No No 0 
Romania 28/1999 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 47/1999 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 143/1999 No No No No No 0 
Romania 234/1999 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 192/2002 No No No No No 0 
Romania 7/2002 No No No No No 0 
Romania 98/2002 No No No No No 0 
Romania 223/2002 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 259/2002 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 294/2002 No No No No No 0 
Romania 308/2002 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 312/2002 No No No No No 0 
Romania 333/2002 No No No No No 0 
Romania 148/2003 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 300/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 67/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 86/2003 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 89/2003 No No No Yes No 1 
Romania 127/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 176/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 187/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 193/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 217/2003 Yes No No Yes No 1 
Romania 233/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 259/2003 No No No Yes No 1 
Romania 388/2003 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 463/2003 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 196/2004 No No No No No 0 
Romania 39/2004 No No No No No 0 
Romania 40/2004 No No No Yes No 1 
Romania 100/2004 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 194/2004 Yes No No Yes No 1 
Romania 293/2004 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 408/2004 No No No No No 0 
Romania 433/2004 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 482/2004 No No No No No 0 
Romania 217/2005 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Romania 235/2005 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 255/2005 No No No No No 0 
Romania 375/2005 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 418/2005 No No No No No 0 
Romania 16 No No No No No 0 
Romania 147 No No No No No 0 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Romania 230 No No No No No 0 
Romania 355 No No No No No 0 
Romania 421 No No No No No 0 
Romania 666 No No No No No 0 
Romania 970 No No No No No 0 
Romania 971 No No No No No 0 
Romania 972 No No No No No 0 
Romania 1177 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 148 No No No No No 0 
Romania 266 No No No No No 0 
Romania 61 No No No Yes No 1 
Romania 62 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 65 No No No No No 0 
Romania 227 No No No No No 0 
Romania 228 No No No No No 0 
Romania 264 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 347 No No No No No 0 
Romania 392 No No No No No 0 
Romania 610 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 660 No No No No No 0 
Romania 661 No No No No No 0 
Romania 665 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 691 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 797 No No No Yes No 1 
Romania 870 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 871 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 969 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 1058 No No No No No 0 
Romania 1059 No No No No No 0 
Romania 1086 No No No No No 0 
Romania 1133 No No No No No 0 
Romania 1137 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 1219 No No No No No 0 
Romania 356 No No No No No 0 
Romania 20/2000 No No No No No 0 
Romania 199/1999 No No No No No 0 
Romania 282/2002 No No No No No 0 
Romania 38/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 307/2003 No No No No No 0 
Romania 123/1996 Yes No No Yes No 1 
Romania 211/2000 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Romania 23/1996 Yes No No Yes No 1 
Romania 73/1996 No Yes No No No 1 
Romania 91/1996 No Yes No No No 1 
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Poland K39/07 No No No Yes No 1 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Poland SK7/06 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Poland P10/07 No No No No No 0 
Poland K2/07 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Poland SK20/05 No Yes No Yes Yes 1 
Poland K8/07 No No No No No 0 
Poland K28/05 No Yes No No No 1 
Poland KP 3/08 No Yes Yes Yes No 1 
Poland K 44/07 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Poland K 51/07 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 8/04 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 42/07 No No No Yes No 1 
Poland SK 16/07 No No No Yes No 1 
Poland P 37/05 No Yes Yes No No 1 
Poland U 4/06 No Yes No No No 1 
Poland P 24/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland Ts 143/06 No No No No No 0 
Poland P 33/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland Ts 98/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 40/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland SK 25/06 No No No No No 0 
Poland SK 55/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland P 32/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 53/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 6/06 No No No No No 0 
Poland SK 57/04 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 11/04 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 4/06 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 17/05 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Poland P 8/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland Ts 198/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 48/04 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 9/05 No Yes No No No 1 
Poland SK 58/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 21/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland Ts 196/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Poland SK 30/05 No Yes No No No 1 
Poland K 32/04 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 22/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland P 3/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland Kp 2/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 31/04 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 31/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 37/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 38/04 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Poland Tw 23/05 No No No No No 0 
Poland K 42/04 No No No No No 0 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
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Czech 25/07 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 77/06 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 51/06 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 18/06 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 8/06 No No No No No 0 
Czech 4/06 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 693/06 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 516/06 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 568/06 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 768/06 No No No No No 0 
Czech 36/05 No Yes Yes No No 1 
Czech 20/05 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 13/05 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 6/05 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 1/05 No No No No No 0 
Czech 31/05 No No No Yes No 1 
Czech 37/04 No Yes Yes Yes No 1 
Czech 34/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 30/04 No No No No No 0 
Czech 28/04 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 15/04 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 73/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 69/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 66/04 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 1 
Czech 50/04 No Yes Yes Yes No 1 
Czech 45/04 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 42/04 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 21/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 20/04 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 11/04 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 606/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 252/04 No Yes Yes No No 1 
Czech 209/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 668/04 No No No No No 0 
Czech 601/04 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 554/04 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 167/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 85/04 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 23/04 No No No No No 0 
Czech 38/04 No No Yes Yes No 1 
Czech 52/03 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 42/03 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 38/03 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 31/03 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 12/03 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 10/03 No Yes No No No 1 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Czech 5/03 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 1/03 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 396/03 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 459/03 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 258/03 No No No No No 0 
Czech 150/03 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 453/03 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 367/03 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 44/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 42/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 41/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 40/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 39/02 No No No No No 0 
Czech 38/02 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 34/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 19/02 No No No No No 0 
Czech 17/02 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 16/02 No No No No No 0 
Czech 14/02 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 11/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 7/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 6/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 5/02 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 3/02 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 2/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 1/02 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 656/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 482/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 405/02 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Czech 752/02 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 153/02 No No No No No 0 
Czech 38/02 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 39/01 No Yes Yes Yes No 1 
Czech 36/01 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 33/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 24/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 21/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 18/01 No No No No No 0 
Czech 15/01 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 14/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 11/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 9/01 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 1 
Czech 5/01 No Yes Yes Yes No 1 
Czech 1/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 512/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 256/01 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 754/01 Yes Yes No No No 1 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Czech 663/01 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 213/2000 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 17/98 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 526/98 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 98/97 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Czech 34/97 Yes Yes No No Yes 1 
Czech 425/97 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 25/96 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 276/96 No No No No No 0 
Czech 275/96 No No No No No 0 
Czech 291/96 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 127/96 No No No No No 0 
Czech 5/96 No No No No No 0 
Czech 5/95 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Czech 81/95 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 98/95 No No No No No 0 
Czech 43/93 Yes Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 26/94 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 25/94 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Czech 20/94 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 14/94 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 9/94 Yes Yes No No Yes 1 
Czech 5/94 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 4/94 No Yes No Yes No 1 
Czech 3/94 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Czech 215/94 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 56/94 No No No No No 0 
Czech 19/93 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Czech 5/92 Yes Yes No No No 1 
Czech 1/92 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 53/04 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 23/05 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 56/05 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 69/06 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 72/06 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 2268/07 No No No No No 0 
Czech 12/07 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 24/07 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 26/07 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 1009/08 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 1/08 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 2/08 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 12/08 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 19/08 No Yes No No No 1 
Czech 35/08 No No No No No 0 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Slovak 1/93 (96/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 2/93 (83/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 3/93 (10/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 4/93 (9/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 5/93 (39/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 6/93 (1/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 7/93 (4/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 8/93 (12/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 9/93 (81/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 10/93 (26/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 11/93 (81/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 12/93 (87/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 13/93 (92/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 14/93 (6/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 15/93 (106/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 16/93 (109/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 17/93 (119/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 18/93 (74/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 19/93 (162/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 20/93 (168/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 21/93 (132/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 1/94  (8/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 2/94  (26/94) No No No No Yes 1 
Slovak 3/94  (76/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 4/94 (9/93) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 5/94 (6/94) Yes Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 6/94 (29/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 13/94 (7/94) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 14/94 (8/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 23/94 (5/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 24/94 (20/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 25/94 (98/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 26/94 (138/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 27/94 (16/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 28/94 (130/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 29/94 (1/940 No No No No No 0 
Slovak 30/94 (4/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 31/94 (6/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 32/94 (1/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 33/94 (103/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 34/94 (15/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 35/94 (23/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 36/94 (25/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 37/94 (49/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 38/94 (23/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 39/94 (5/93) Yes Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 40/94 (22/94) No No No No No 0 
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Intl 
Court Intl 
Slovak 41/94 (27/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 42/94 (31/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 43/94 (37/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 44/94 (50/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 45/94 (37/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 46/94 (47/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 47/94 (36/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 48/94 (48/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 49/94 (4/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 50/94 (11/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 51/94 (16/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 52/94 (17/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 53/94 (52/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 54/94 (15/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 55/94 (19/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 56/94 (54/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 57/94 (42/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 58/94 (126/93) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 59/94 (59/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 60/94 (46/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 61/94 (25/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 62/94 (31/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 63/94 (34/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 64/94 (62/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 1/95 (29/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 2/95 (7/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 3/95 (17/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 4/95 (8/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 5/95 (10/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 6/95 (16/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 7/95 (26/95) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 8/95 (29/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 9/95 (33/95) Yes No No Yes No 1 
Slovak 10/95 (94/95) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 11/95 (33/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 12/95 (37/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 13/95 (58/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 14/95 (14/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 15/95 (18/95) Yes No No No Yes 1 
Slovak 16/95 (23/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 17/95 (22/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 34/95 (1/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 35/95 (2/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 36/95 (38/94) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 37/95 (3/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 38/95 (10/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 39/95 (11/95) No No No No No 0 
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Intl 
Court Intl 
Slovak 40/95 (18/95) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 41/95 (18/95) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 42/95 (19/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 43/95 (36/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 44/95 (40/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 45/95 (110/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 46/95 (120/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 
47/95 
(121,122,123/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 48/95 (128/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 49/95 (71/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 50/95 (133/95) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 51/95 (130/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 52/95 (131/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 1/96 (128/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 2/96 (30/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 3/96 (36/95) Yes Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 4/96 (38/95) Yes No No Yes No 1 
Slovak 5/96 (42/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 6/96 (8/96) No Yes No Yes No 1 
Slovak 7/96 (43/95) Yes No No Yes Yes 1 
Slovak 8/96 (37/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 9/96 (22/96) Yes No No Yes No 1 
Slovak 10/96 (32/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 11/96 (1/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 12/96 (7/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 13/96 (51/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 14/96 (61/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 15/96 (2/96) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 16/96 (31/95) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 17/96 (40/95) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 18/96 (39/96) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 19/96 (41/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 20/96 (14/95) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 22/96 (9/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 23/96 (10/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 24/96 (11/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 25/96 (16/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 26/96 (50/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 27/96 (56/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 28/96 (55/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 29/96 (69/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 30/96 (1.96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 31/96 (3/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 32/96 (8/96) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 33/96 (19/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 34/96 (14/96) No No No No No 0 
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Court Intl 
Slovak 35/96 (15/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 36/96 (20/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 37/96 (21/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 38/96 (25/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 39/96 (32/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 40/96 (36/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 41/96 (37/96) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 42/96 (38/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 43/96 (52/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 44/96 (34/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 1/97 (45/96) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 2/97 (7/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 3/97 (47/96) No No No Yes No 1 
Slovak 4/97 ( 8/97) No Yes No Yes No 1 
Slovak 5/97 (75/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 6/97 (23/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 7/97 (28/96) No Yes No Yes No 1 
Slovak 8/97 (19/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 9/97 (20/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 10/97 (6/96) No Yes No Yes No 1 
Slovak 11/97 (48/96) No Yes No Yes No 1 
Slovak 12/97 (26/96) No Yes No Yes No 1 
Slovak 13/97 (8/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 14/97 (8/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 15/97 (12/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 16/97 (47/96) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 17/97 (40/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 18/97 (59/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 20/97 (47/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 21/97 (9/96) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 22/97 (60/96) No No No Yes No 1 
Slovak 23/97 (61/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 24/97 (61/96) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 25/97 (30/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 26/97 (31/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 27/97 (65/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 28/97 (4/96) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 29/97 (5/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 31/97 (39/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 32/97 (32/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 33/97 (35/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 34/97 (43/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 35/97 (59/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 36/97 (63/970 No No No No No 0 
Slovak 37/97 (1/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 38/97 (3/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 39/97 (6/97) No No No No No 0 
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Country CaseID Intl Juris Intl Norm ECJ ECHR 
Intl 
Court Intl 
Slovak 40/97 (18/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 41/97 (3/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 42/97 (18/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 43/97 (24/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 44/97 (29/97) Yes No No No No 1 
Slovak 45/97 (30/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 46/97 (36/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 47/97 (42/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 48/97 (46/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 49/97 (62/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 50/97 (64/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 51/97 (66/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 52/97 (67/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 53/97 (73/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 54/97 (75/97) No Yes No No No 1 
Slovak 55/97 (87/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 56/97 (87/97) No No No No No 0 
Slovak 57/97 (68/970 No No No No No 0 
Slovak 58/97 (98/97) No Yes No No No 1 
  Intl Law           46 
  Cases           206 
Total Intl 
Law             234 
Total Cases             513 
 
Table 6.2 summarizes the data by displaying the percent of decisions that referenced 
international law.  This table illustrates the variance in both number of decisions and use of international 
law across countries.   
Table 6.2 Percent of Constitutional Court Cases Referencing International Law by Country 
Country Total Decisions Total Intl Law Percent Intl Law 
Czech 
Republic 
138 118 85.5% 
Poland 47 16 34% 
Romania 122 54 42.2% 
Slovak 
Republic 
206 46 22.3% 
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6.1.2 Transition to Democracy 
Transition to democracy, refers to the events involved in the creation of a new constitution.  
Constitutions form the ‘rules of the game’ for the country under democracy (Pruess, 1991).  
Consequently, this period establishes the de jure relationship between the constitutional court and 
legislature.  The ‘rules of the game’ influences the de facto relationship between the constitutional court 
and legislature through entrenchment of the political power structure in force at that time (Pruess, 
1991).  In addition, other events may define the actual break with the previous regime, such as coup or 
peaceful change.  However, these events do not necessarily reflect the ultimate political power 
configuration during creation of the new constitution.  Therefore, they do not reflect whether the 
government, political, and legal structures are inclusive or exclusive.  Since research shows a 
relationship between inclusive government and protection of rights (Finkel, 2004) the political structure 
formed after the break is more important than the actual method of breaking with the prior regime.   
This section explains each country’s transition to democracy.  Each transition receives a rating of 
unilateral, mixed, or negotiated.  A unilateral transition occurred when one group dominated the 
creation of the constitution.  A mixed transition occurred when one group influenced the creation of the 
constitution more than other groups.  A negotiated transition occurred when the creation of the 
constitution actively involved multiple groups.   
Czech Republic:  The drafting of the Czech Republic’s post-communist constitution was a mix of 
both limited actors and a negotiated process.  Actual drafting of the constitution occurred when both 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia were a single entity and a single group was in power (Zielonka, 2001).  
At the time the Slovaks dominated the government (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  In addition, political elite from 
the prior regime could not participate in the current government (Hollis, 1999).  Consequently, 
participation in the drafting of the constitution was limited (Hollis, 1999; Fitzmaurice, 1998).  However, 
the goal was to produce a constitution that would be accepted and supported by both Czechs and 
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Slovaks (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  This desire to produce a broadly accepted basis for government inherently 
required negotiation and limited the actors’ ability to bias the rules in their favor (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  
Furthermore, the Czech Republic chose to revise, rather than draft a new, constitution (Fitzmaurice, 
1998).  This implies some level of negotiation with the prior regime even if it was in absentia 
(Fitzmaurice, 1998).  The Czech Republic process is mixed. 
Poland: In Poland the process of drafting a revised constitution is considered both negotiated 
and incremental (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  Poland’s independence from Soviet rule was a negotiated process, 
which then carried into subsequent actions to establish a democratic government including the drafting 
of the constitution (Zielonka, 2001).  Furthermore, because control of the government alternated while 
the constitution was changed the process was inherently participatory (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  Therefore, 
Poland is a case of a ‘negotiated’ transition. 
Romania: Romania is the case that is most clearly a unilateral transition.  A single group was in 
power during the creation of the post-communist constitution (Zielonka, 2001).  This avoided the need 
to include a variety of actors in the process and negotiate differences (Zielonka, 2001).  In addition, the 
political elite from the Soviet regime retained their political positions in the post-Soviet regime thus 
limiting the scope of changes included in the new constitutional order (Hollis, 1999).   
Slovak Republic:   Immediately after independence from Soviet control, Slovakia remained a part 
of Czechoslovakia until 1993 (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  When Slovakia became an independent state, they 
chose to draft a new constitution (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  Because Slovakia was ruled by a coalition, and 
one that was not considered stable, the process of drafting the new constitution by necessity involved 
broad participation and negotiation (Fitzmaurice, 1998).  Therefore, Slovakia is a ‘negotiated’ transition. 
Table 6.3 summarizes the transition and percent of cases referencing international law..  As this 
table shows, constitutional courts in the two countries with negotiated transitions have the least 
percent of references to international law in constitutional court decisions. This finding is consistent 
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with research positing that constitutional courts and their judicial review function are seen by those 
involved in a unilateral transition to ensure their protections in the future (Hirschl, 2004). 
Table 6.3 Transition, Constitutional Court Decisions Referencing International Law 
Country Transition Percent Intl Law 
Czech Republic  Mixed 85.5% 
Poland Negotiated 34% 
Romania Unilateral 42.2% 
Slovak Republic Negotiated 22.3% 
 
The qualitative rankings unilateral, mixed, and negotiated must be numeric to allow statistical 
comparison.  Therefore, unilateral becomes 0, mixed becomes 1, and negotiated becomes 2 
6.2 Analysis  
Observing  table 6.3 (above) it appears that negotiated transitions correlate with less use of 
international law. This would lead to the rejection of the third hypothesis.   However, the data requires 
more rigorous testing to ensure that the visually perceived relationship is accurate.   
As discussed in previous chapters, the type of relationship used depends on the characteristic of 
the variables.  The third hypothesis has a clearly identified dependent variable, transition to democracy.  
The Somer’s d statistics is appropriate for a binomial equation with a clearly defined dependent variable 
and variables that are at least ordinal (Hill and Lewicki, 2005; Johnson et al, 2001).  Somer’s d indicates 
the existence of a correlation between two variables (Hill and Lewicki, 2005; Johnson et al, 2001).  It also 
indicates if the correlation is positive or negative and the strength of the relationship (Hill and Lewicki, 
2005; Johnson et al, 2001).  A positive correlation indicates that dependent and independent variables 
vary in the same direction (Hill and Lewicki, 2005; Johnson et al, 2001).  When the relationship is 
negative the value of one variable increases while the other decreases (Hill and Lewicki, 2005; Johnson 
et al, 2001).  Somer’s d values range from 1.000 to -1.000 (Hill and Lewicki, 2005; Johnson et al, 2001).  A 
Somer’s d value of zero indicates that there is no correlation between the variables (Hill and Lewicki, 
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2005; Johnson et al, 2001).  The strength of the correlation increases as the Somer’s d value approaches 
1 or -1 (Hill and Lewicki, 2005; Johnson et al, 2001). 
The Somer’s d statistic is -.600 with a significance of .003.  This indicates a significant 
relationship (at the >.01 level).  The correlation is moderately strong since it is -.6 in a range of 0 to -1 
(Hill and Lewicki, 2005; Johnson et al, 2001).  However, the relationship is negative.  This means that use 
of international law in constitutional court decisions decreases as inclusion of additional groups 
increases during the transition to democracy.  Again, this is consistent with research positing that when 
the transition is unilateral the group in power values the future protections afforded by constitutional 
courts (Hirschl, 2004). 
Two corollaries to this hypothesis warrant testing.  However, a more effective test involves 
additional cases with greater variance in governance and supranational influence.  Table 6.4 presents 
the additional cases, the number of decisions, a count of cases referencing international law, and the 
corresponding percentage.  While the majority of additional countries are post-communist countries of 
Eastern Europe, two are outliers.  Peru is a democracy in Latin America.  Cambodia is an authoritarian 
country in Asia.  Both emerged from violent dictatorships.  Consequently, the one commonality is that 
all countries included implemented constitutional courts as they transitioned out of a dictatorship.   
Table 6.4 Constitutional Court Decisions Referencing Intl. Law with Additional Countries 
Country Decisions Intl Pct 
Azerbaijan 149 90 60.4% 
Belarus 184 83 45.1% 
Bulgaria 266 52 19.5% 
Cambodia 42 2 4.8% 
Croatia 3718 1477 39.7% 
Hungary 70 43 61.4% 
Peru 21 5 23.8% 
 
The first corollary is that as constitutional court autonomy increases references to international 
law in constitutional court decisions increase.  The dependent variable is the reference to international 
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law in constitutional court decisions.  The independent variable is constitutional court autonomy as 
measured in Chapter 4.  To accommodate the various types of government Polity is the control variable.  
Since the measurement frequency is yearly this is a panel dataset and analyzed using a paneled ordered 
logit regression.  Table 6.5 contains the results.  Polity is the only statistically significant variable at the 
p<.05 level.  It has a negative relationship with constitutional court decisions referencing international 
law.  The more consolidated a democracy the less likely the constitutional court cites international law 
in its decisions.  This is consistent with the theory constitutional courts strategically use international 
law to legitimize their decisions when their autonomy is limited (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  De facto 
constitutional court autonomy just misses statistical significance at the p<.05 level.  De jure 
constitutional court autonomy, constitutional protections for the court, is not statistically significant.  
However, none of the variables provide a strong impact with a one point change altering the occurrence 
of decisions with internal law by less than a point. 
Table 6.5 References to International Decisions 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
De Facto 0.781 0.409343 0.056 
Polity -0.043 0.01762 0.014 
De Jure 0.054 0.158564 0.737 
    Chi-Square 7.280 
 
0.064 
Dependent Variable: Decisions including references to international law 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
De Jure: Constitutional protections of constitutional court autonomy 
N = 112 
 
The second corollary is that increased reference to international law increases human rights 
protections.  This corollary builds on the hypothesis that constitutional courts use international human 
rights law to expand their ability to protect national human rights (Hirschl, 2004).  The dependent 
variable is the CIRI human rights measure as defined in Chapter 4.  The independent variable is percent 
of decisions referencing international law converted to an ordinal number (for example, 26% is 26).  
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Control variables are GDP, Polity, de facto constitutional court autonomy, and de jure constitutional 
court autonomy as defined in Chapter 4.  The statistic used is a panel ordered logit regression.  The 
results appear in Table 6.6.   
There is not a statistically significant relationship between constitutional court decisions 
referencing international law and human rights.  Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between 
the two variables.  Constitutional courts in countries with poor human rights are more likely to 
reference international law in their decisions.  As seen in Chapter 4, GDP is negatively correlated with 
human rights at a statistically significant p<.05 level.  Neither Polity nor de jure constitutional court 
autonomy display a statistically significant relationship with human rights.  Furthermore, these four 
variables have a minimal impact with a one point change altering human rights less than one point.  De 
facto constitutional court has the largest impact with a one-point change improving human rights by 
more than one point.  In addition, it has a positive, statistically significant at the p<.005 level, 
relationship with human rights. 
Table 6.6 International Decisions and Human Rights 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP -0.601 0.262668 0.022 
De Facto 1.394 0.477297 0.004 
Polity 0.023 0.019516 0.244 
De Jure 0.441 0.230451 0.055 
Intl Decisions -0.502 0.837077 0.549 
    Chi-Square 26.290 
 
0.0001 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn- 
world-table accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
De Jure: Constitutional protections of constitutional court autonomy 
International Decisions: Decisions including references to international law 
N = 112 
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As in the previous chapters, it is worth reviewing this model using GDP per capita.  Table 6.7 
presents the results.  Although GDP per capita retains the negative relationship with human rights and 
has a greater impact (a one point change results in over a one point change in human rights), it is no 
longer statistically significant at the p<.05 level.  The impact of de jure constitutional court autonomy 
increases slightly although it remains below a one-point change to human rights.  The statistical 
significance of de jure constitutional court autonomy increases.  The statistical significance of the other 
variables decrease as does their impact.   
Table 6.7 International Decisions and Human Rights with GDP per capita 
 
Coefficient Error Significance 
GDP per capita -1.096 0.854629 0.200 
De Facto 1.222 0.50083 0.015 
Polity 0.016 0.019095 0.399 
De Jure 0.673 0.278728 0.016 
Intl Decisions -0.311 0.850559 0.715 
    Chi-Square 22.980 
 
0.0003 
Dependent Variable: CIRI Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed December 30, 2012 
GDP source: Penn World Table available at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn- 
world-table accessed January 14, 2014 
Polity: Polity scores available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm   accessed January 
14, 2014 
De Facto: De facto Constitutional Court autonomy 
De Jure: Constitutional protections of constitutional court autonomy 
International Decisions: Decisions including references to international law 
N = 112 
 
6.3 Discussion  
Both the statistical and visual analysis of the data rejects the third hypothesis, constitutional 
courts in countries with a negotiated transition to democracy will use international human rights law in 
their decisions more than constitutional courts in countries where the transition to democracy was 
unilateral.  This analysis indicates that the opposite is occurring.  The fewer political groups involved in 
the transition to democracy, particularly the creating of the constitution, the more likely constitutional 
courts will reference international law in their decisions.   
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This seems to contradict research arguing that rights protections increase when the constitution 
creating process is more inclusive (Finkel, 1994; Pruess, 1991).  However, two bodies of research 
support this finding. 
First, research posits that legislatures are more likely to comply with constitutional court 
decisions based on international obligations (Arden, 2008).  As argued above, when one group 
dominates the political transition to democracy they are likely to structure the political and legal system 
to protect their interests (Pruess, 1991; Sajo, 1995).  A possible explanation for the results of this test is 
that decisions referencing international law challenge the political power of the legislature.  In such a 
situation, the constitutional court might use international law to justify their actions.   
Second, constitutional courts need to protect their legitimacy since they have no concrete 
enforcement methods at their disposal (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  To ensure the legitimacy of their 
decisions constitutional courts rely on legal reasoning (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  Constitutional courts 
may refer to international law to support their legal reasoning (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  In addition, 
reliance on legal reasoning, and international law, is a way constitutional courts could increase their 
autonomy vis-à-vis the legislature (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  Since research indicates transitions to 
democracy dominated by a single group results in political and legal systems structured to protect their 
interests, the resulting constitutional court could use international law to protect and expand their 
legitimacy. 
The corollaries serve to validate the role of international law in constitutional court decisions.  
Combined the corollaries indicate that there is a negative relationship between human rights 
protections, democracy, and the use of international law in constitutional court decisions 
(Schimmelfennig,2006; Hirschl, 2004).  Although not surprising, this dissertation presents quantifiable, 
statistically significant, support for these theories. 
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6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter tested the third hypothesis; constitutional courts in countries with a negotiated 
transition to democracy will use international human rights law in their decisions more than 
constitutional courts in countries where the transition to democracy was unilateral.  Although rejecting 
this hypothesis, the test supported accepting the opposite, constitutional courts in countries with a 
unilateral transition to democracy will use international human rights law in their decisions more than 
constitutional courts in countries where the transition to democracy was negotiated.   
Two important points for better understanding the research question result from this finding.  
The research question seeks to understand whether constitutional courts protect rights by reducing the 
autonomy of the legislature.  This test shows first that constitutional courts in countries where the ‘rules 
of the game’ under democracy were unilaterally established are more likely to reference international 
law in their decisions.  Existing research posits that this may result from the constitutional court 
attempting to protect its legitimacy or ensure legislative compliance with the decisions (Schimmelfennig, 
2006; Finkel 1994; Pruess, 1991).  Both explanations indicate an effort by the constitutional court to 
ensure legislative compliance with its decisions.  Since constitutional courts overturn legislative actions, 
this is an explanation of how constitutional courts reduce the autonomy of the legislature. 
Second, the results of this test indicate that international human rights law is important to 
protection of rights by national constitutional courts.  Existing research posits that the structure of 
governments created by a dominant political protect their interests (Pruess, 1991; Sajo, 1995).  The 
resulting political and legal systems also ensure the continued dominance by such groups (Pruess, 1991; 
Sajo, 1995).  In this situation, the legislature has little incentive to extend human rights protections, 
particularly when they threaten the dominant political powers.  However, by using international human 
rights law in their decisions constitutional courts provide incentive to the legislature.    
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7 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation seeks to explain why national constitutional courts can influence national 
legislatures in the name of human rights.  Through the test of three hypotheses, this dissertation 
advanced understanding of the relationship between national constitutional courts and legislatures in 
the pursuit of human rights protections.  Additional areas of research to further our understanding of 
this topic also emerged.   
This chapter reviews the findings of this dissertation and presents avenues for further research.  
The first section briefly reviews the research question and hypotheses.  In the second section is a 
summary hypotheses test results.  The third section presents avenues for future research. 
7.1 Research Question and Hypothesis  
This dissertation started with three examples where the appointed constitutional court 
overruled acts of the popularly elected legislature to protect human rights.  These cases demonstrate 
the ability of the constitutional court to limit the actions of the legislature.  The constitutional court’s 
influence over the legislature further increases as the legislature considers past and future constitutional 
court decisions as they create new laws.  To what extent does the constitutional court affect the 
autonomy, or freedom to act, of the legislature to protect human rights? 
Three hypotheses test different aspects of potential answers to this research question.  The first 
hypothesis, that increasing constitutional court autonomy increases the protection of human rights, 
tests the basic premise underlying the research question.  This hypothesis tests whether the human 
rights benefit from increasing constitutional court autonomy over the legislature.  The basis for this 
hypothesis is research positing that constitutional courts are becoming niche vendors for human rights 
protections (Alter, 2001; Conant, 2001).  This dissertation posits that to gain respect as a protector of 
human rights constitutional courts must affect the autonomy of legislatures.  Impacts to legislative 
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autonomy include overruling legislative actions and providing guidelines for designing laws.  This 
hypothesis seeks to demonstrate that the more a constitutional court protects human rights the more 
the legislature is constrained in its actions.   
The second hypothesis, that as supranational constraints intended to increase the consolidation 
of democracy and protection of human rights increase, national constitutional courts increase 
constraints on national legislatures, explores the relationship between supranational constraints, 
constitutional courts, and legislatures.  This hypothesis builds on research posting an increase in legal, as 
opposed to political, resolution of disputes (Gearty, 2006; Finnemore, 2003).  It also builds on Stone’s 
research (1990) indicating both a direct and indirect influence on constitutional courts.  This hypothesis 
posits that the external human rights dialogue translates into the constitutional court influencing the 
legislature both directly and indirectly.  
Finally, the third hypothesis, Constitutional courts in countries with a negotiated transition to 
democracy will use international human rights law in their decisions more than constitutional courts in 
countries where the transition to democracy was unilateral, tests the relationship between the 
formation of the government during the transition to democracy and the constitutional court’s influence 
over the legislature.  This hypothesis also builds on work regarding the increased legalization of disputes 
(Gearty, 2006; Finnemore, 2003).  However, this hypothesis assesses the political and legal culture 
resulting from the transition to democracy.  This hypothesis posits that where the transition to 
democracy was inclusive, thus ensuring a dialogue among political factions, constitutional courts use 
international human rights law to protect and extend human rights.  
7.2 Hypothesis Results  
The results of testing the hypothesis increased our understanding of the relationship between 
the constitutional court, the legislature, and human rights.  Each of the three hypotheses provided a 
unique, and important, insight. 
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The test of the first hypothesis, that increasing constitutional court autonomy increases the 
protection of human rights, demonstrated the value of limiting both constitutional court and legislative 
autonomy.  The findings indicate that increased constitutional court autonomy, particularly allowing 
them to set their own processes, correlates to increased human rights protections.  This limits legislative 
autonomy because it increases the ability to have legislative actions overturned.  However, 
constitutional protections ensuring constitutional court autonomy were neither necessary nor sufficient 
to ensure human rights protections.  This indicates that limiting some areas of constitutional court 
autonomy, and increasing legislative autonomy in those areas, is important.  In other words, increased 
human rights protections seem to benefit from limits on both legislative and constitutional court 
autonomy. 
The test of the second hypothesis, that as supranational constraints intended to increase the 
consolidation of democracy and protection of human rights increase, national constitutional courts 
increase constraints on national legislatures, indicates a correlation between effective  (i.e. include 
strong incentives for compliance and disincentives if ignored) supranational constraints and increased 
constitutional court constraints on the legislature.  Testing of two corollaries further clarified this 
relationship.  The first corollary, that as constitutional court constraints on the legislature increase 
human rights protections increase, demonstrated a negative correlation between constitutional court 
constraints on the legislature and the protection of human rights.  Testing the second corollary, that as 
supranational constraints increase human rights protections increase, reinforced the finding that 
effective constraints benefit human rights protections.  The combination of these results indicates that 
there is no easy answer to the protection of human rights. 
Finally, the test of the third hypothesis, constitutional courts in countries with a negotiated 
transition to democracy use international human rights law in their decisions more than constitutional 
courts in countries where the transition to democracy was unilateral, indicates a reverse correlation.  
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Constitutional courts in countries with a unilateral transition to democracy issued more decisions using 
international human rights law.  One explanation is that these constitutional courts use more 
international human rights law for one of two reasons.  First, they rely on international human rights law 
to increase their legitimacy (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  Alternately, the constitutional courts use 
international human rights law to ensure legislative compliance (Arden, 2008).    
7.3 Additional Considerations 
One of the arguments presented earlier in this dissertation was that context is important.  
Consequently, the results presented require additional information about the countries to ensure 
correct interpretation. 
One consideration is perceptions of judicial corruption and the perceived legitimacy of the 
judiciary.  The constitutional court is, after all, a judicial institution.  Consequently, negative perceptions 
of the judiciary affect the functioning of the constitutional court as well as other national courts.  One 
aspect is judicial corruption.  There is variance in the perceived judicial corruption between the four key 
cases.  In 2009 94% of respondents in Romania perceived corruption in the judiciary versus 85% in 
Poland and 77% in the Czech Republic.43  Another aspect is trust in the judiciary.  In October 2004 the 
Eurobarometer included a question on trust in the national judiciary.  According to this survey, 77% of 
Polish respondents tended not to trust the national judiciary compared to 65% of Slovak respondents, 
63% of Romanian respondents, and 61% of Czech respondents.44  There was some improvement by 
November 2010.  At that time 51% of Polish respondents, 62% of Czech respondents, 65% of Slovakian 
                                                          
43
 Based on Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2009 available at 
http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2009 accessed January 27, 2014.  The 
percentage includes responses of 3, 4, and “extremely corrupt” to the question “To what extent is this category 
affected by corruption in your country: Judiciary?”  There was no data available for the Slovak Republic.  
44
 Based on Eurobarometer Survey available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=2196&nationID=17,24,29,26,&startdate=2004
.10&enddate=2010.11   accessed  January 27, 2014.  Reponses to ‘Trust in Institutions” question and  “National 
legal system” subcategory.   
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respondents, and 68% of Romanian respondents did not trust the judiciary.45  A final aspect is the 
comparison of the national judiciary to other judiciaries.  A 2013 European Union report showed that 
55% of Czech, 58% Slovakian, 60% Polish, and 69% Romanian respondents felt their national judiciary 
was worse than that of other European countries.46   
To determine the ability of the constitutional court to influence the parliament compare the 
trust in the national parliament.  Based on the Eurobarometer the percent tending not to trust the 
national parliament in October 2004 were 87% Polish, 75% Czech, 67% Slovakian, and 60% Romanian 
respondents.47  Perceptions of the national parliament deteriorated.  In  June 2010 when 86% Czech, 
85% Romanian, 69% Polish, and 56% Slovak respondents tended not to trust the institution.48 
This context is particularly helpful when considering constitutional court references to 
international law.  Table 7.1 adds to the information presented in Table 6.2 to include the 2010 lack of 
trust in the judiciary and parliament.  This shows that the use of international law in constitutional court 
decisions roughly trends with lack of trust in the parliament.  Figure 7.1 presents a visual representation 
of this data.   
Table 7.1Constitutional Court References to Intl. Law, Judicial and Parliamentary Trust 
Country 
Percent 
Intl 
Law 
Judicial 
Trust  
Parl 
Trust 
Czech 85.50% 62% 86% 
                                                          
45
 Based on Eurobarometer Survey available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=2196&nationID=17,24,29,26,&startdate=2004
.10&enddate=2010.11   accessed  January 27, 2014.  Reponses to ‘Trust in Institutions” question and  “National 
legal system” subcategory.   
46
 Based on Justice in the EU available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_385_en.pdf   accessed January 
27, 2014.  This represents the “Total Worse” response to the question “In general how would you rate the justice 
system in (OUR COUNTRY) compared to other justice systems in the EU?” 
47
 Based on Eurobarometer Survey available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=2192&nationID=17,24,29,26,&startdate=2004
.10&enddate=2010.06   accessed January 27, 2014.  Responses to “Trust in Institutions” question and  “National 
Parliament” subcategory.   
48
 Based on Eurobarometer Survey available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=2192&nationID=17,24,29,26,&startdate=2004
.10&enddate=2010.06   accessed January 27, 2014.  Responses to “Trust in Institutions” question and  “National 
Parliament” subcategory.   
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Republic 
Poland 34% 51% 69% 
Romania 42.20% 68% 85% 
Slovak 
Republic 
22.30% 65% 56% 
Trust in Judiciary and Parliament Source: Eurobaromenter
 
Figure 7.1 Constitutional Court References to Intl. Law, Judicial and Parliamentary Trust 
 
This context opens a new possibility for use of international law in constitutional court decisions.  
Rather than the constitutional court using international law to legitimize its decisions, it may be using 
international law to counter lack of trust in the lawmaking institution.   
It is also possible that trust in the judiciary and parliament relate to the constitutional court’s 
ability to constrain parliament.  Hirschl (2004) argues that high court active in protecting rights 
unintentionally undermines its own legitimacy.  His research on countries in the Westminster tradition 
supports this hypothesis (Hirschl, 2004).  Since post-communist countries share, at least initially, the 
skepticism of the judiciary with the Westminster tradition it is possible that his hypothesis is also 
applicable to the cases in this dissertation.  On the other hand, the perception is that constitutional 
courts will protect democracy and human rights (Albi, 2009).  Therefore, in the post-communist Central 
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European context the legitimacy of constitutional courts, along with their ability to influence human 
rights and the legislature, would increase as they demonstrate their usefulness (Schimmelfennig, 2006).  
Figures 7.2 through 7.5 illustrate the relationship between human rights and trust in the judiciary and 
parliament.  For the purposes of these Figures institutional trust lags one year.   
 
Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Figure 7.2 Czech Republic – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, and Human Rights 
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Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Figure 7.3 Poland – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, and Human Rights 
 
 
Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Figure 7.4 Romania – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, and Human Rights 
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Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Figure 7.5 Slovak Republic – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, and Human Rights 
 
Although no obvious correlation between  human rights and either trust measure, human rights 
trends closer to trust in the judiciary than trust in the parliament.  It is important to note that the 
Eurobarometer measures trust in the judiciary not specifically the constitutional court.  Since European 
courts at all levels have the ability to protect human rights (Koopmans, 2003), this is not an explanation 
for the results in this dissertation.  However, it serves to contextualize the findings. 
Another way of looking at the context of judicial and parliamentary trust is whether t it 
influences the ability of the constitutional court to constrain the legislature.  Figures 7.6 through 7.9 
illustrate this relationship.   
Once again, there is no clear correlation.  However, the ability of the constitutional court to 
constrain the legislature more closely tracks with the trust in the parliament than in the judiciary.  This is 
particularly noticeable where there are significant gaps between trust in the judiciary and constitutional 
constraints on the legislature.  When judicial trust is higher, constitutional constraints on the legislature 
are lower and vice versa.   
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Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
Figure 7.6 Czech Republic – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints 
 
 
 
Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
Figure 7.7 Poland – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints 
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Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
Figure 7.8 Romania – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints 
 
 
Judicial and Parliament Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at 
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
Figure 7.9 Slovak Republic – Judicial Trust, Parliament Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints 
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exception of the Slovak Republic human rights trend closer to constitutional court constraints on the 
legislature than trust in the judiciary.   
 
Judicial Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm 
accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Figure 7.10 Czech – Judicial Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints, and Human Rights 
 
 
Judicial Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm 
accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
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Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Figure 7.11 Poland – Judicial Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints, and Human Rights 
 
 
Judicial Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm 
accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Figure 7.12 Romania – Judicial Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints, and Human Rights 
 
 
Judicial Trust Source: Eurobarometer available at ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm 
accessed January 27, 2014 
Auton represents constitutional court constraints on the legislature 
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Human Rights Source: CIRI Human Rights Data Project available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ accessed 
December 30, 2012 
Figure 7.13 Slovak – Judicial Trust, Constitutional Court Constraints, and Human Rights 
 
While this data is limited and does not allow generalizations, it does allow additional context for 
the findings in this dissertation.  The results of these cases do not provide information that will apply to 
a broad range of situations.  However, despite their unique situations the information provides insight 
that will help asses other situations.  Most importantly, it shows that protecting human rights is not as 
easy as having a country agree to international treaties, or instituting a constitutional court, or 
constraining the majoritarian voice of the legislature.  It demonstrates that there is a complex 
relationship between all of these factors, as well as their parts, which need to be evaluated in the 
context of institutional trust. 
7.4 Impact on Research Questions 
The research question asks what allows constitutional courts to constrain the autonomy of 
legislatures in the protection of human rights.  The answer to this question requires three steps.  The 
first step verifies that constitutional courts constrain the autonomy of legislatures.  More specifically, 
this step looks for a correlation between constitutional court constraints on the legislature and 
increased human rights protections.  The second step determines how this is accomplished.  In other 
words, it looks for ways that the constitutional court can constrain the legislature.  The final step 
assesses the impact of these constraints on human rights. 
The results of the hypotheses tests address these three points.  The first point is whether 
constitutional courts constrain the autonomy of the legislature.  Tests of the second hypothesis, as 
supranational constraints intended to increase the consolidation of democracy and protection of human 
rights increase, national constitutional courts increase constraints on national legislatures, demonstrate 
that national constitutional courts do constrain national legislatures.  Information from the legislative 
debates demonstrates this in two ways.  First, quantitative analysis indicates a statistically significant 
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correlation between constitutional court constraints on the legislature and the protection of human 
rights.  Second, statements in the legislative debates indicate consideration of constitutional court past 
and future decisions.  Because legislatures consider the actions of constitutional courts, they are 
constrained in their ability to act. 
Second, the tests of all three hypotheses provide insight into how constitutional courts are able 
to constrain national legislatures.  Tests of the first hypothesis, that increasing constitutional court 
autonomy increases the protection of human rights, indicates the importance of the constitutional court 
and legislature to check each other’s actions.  In other words, the separation of powers among branches 
of government improves the protection of human rights.  Furthermore, the results indicate the 
importance of both de facto and de jure constraints.  Tests of the second hypothesis, as supranational 
constraints intended to increase the consolidation of democracy and protection of human rights 
increase, national constitutional courts increase constraints on national legislatures, indicate an 
influence of effective supranational constraints.  Increased supranational constraints correlate with the 
increased ability of constitutional courts to influence legislative behavior.  Finally, tests of the third 
hypothesis, as supranational constraints intended to increase the consolidation of democracy and 
protection of human rights increase, national constitutional courts increase constraints on national 
legislatures, indicate constitutional courts created under exclusive conditions are more likely to use 
international law in their decisions.  In other words, when a single group creates the rules of the game 
the constitutional court is more likely to base their decisions on international law.  Taken together, these 
results indicate that supranational influences, such as supranational constraints and international law, 
combine with the separation of powers to enable constitutional courts to influence national legislatures. 
Third, the testing the first hypothesis indicates that both constitutional court constraints on 
national legislatures and legislative constraints on constitutional courts correlate with increased 
protections of human rights.  This substantiates the importance of both separation of powers and 
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checks and balances.  Furthermore, tests of the second and third hypothesis indicate the importance of 
international influences in the protection of human rights.  This validates the efforts of both 
international law and organizations such as the European Union.   
Figure 2.1 from Chapter 2 (reproduced here as Figure 7.14) provides an illustration of these 
findings.  The feedback loop between the constitutional court and legislature indicates the checks and 
balances between the two institutions.  Results of the first hypothesis testing support this process.  
International influences, filtered through national circumstances reflect the findings of the remaining 
hypotheses.  As tests of the second hypotheses demonstrate, supranational constraints filtered through 
constitutional court constraints on the legislature impact human rights.  However, supranational 
constraints do not correlation directly with increased protections of human rights.  Tests of the third 
hypothesis indicate that constitutional court decisions are more likely to reference international law 
when the transition to democracy is less inclusive.  Once again, this indicates a filtering of international 
influences by the constitutional court.   
In answer to the research question, both the democratic idea of checks and balances and 
international influences allow constitutional courts to constrain national legislatures as they protect 
human rights.  Furthermore, the correlation of these factors to increased protections of human rights 
indicates the important role of constitutional courts in the protection of human rights.   
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Figure 7.14 Constitutional Court Interactions 
 
 
7.5 Relation to Existing Research 
In Chapter Two this dissertation reviews three areas of existing research.  The first explains 
judicial autonomy in relation to judicial independence.  This resulted in two conclusions.  First, that 
some amount of judicial independence is necessary to protect human rights (Staton et al, 2010; Keith, 
2002).  Tests of the first hypothesis substantiate this conclusion.  Second, democracies benefit from less 
than complete independence for the judiciary (Finn, 2004).  Tests of the first hypothesis also support 
this position.  Consequently, the findings of this dissertation support an autonomous judiciary that 
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decides without influence but is subject to checks against abuse by the legislature (Staton et al, 2010, 
Rios-Figueroa and Staton, 2009; Finn, 2004).  Substantiating this are the findings that a de jure 
autonomous constitutional court whose decisions are subject to review by the legislature correlates 
with increased human rights protections.   
The next area of research reviewed involved interactions between constitutional courts and 
legislatures.  This review found several areas of research lacking.  The first was the impact of the 
interactions between constitutional courts and legislatures and human rights.  The findings presented 
here indicate that interactions between constitutional courts and legislatures benefit the protection of 
human rights.  In particular, legislative checks on the constitutional court and constitutional court 
constraints on the legislature both correlate with increased protections of human rights.  Chapter Two 
also stated that existing research said little about the context of the use of international law.  This 
dissertation demonstrates that constitutional courts use international law in their decisions more 
frequently when there was little inclusion in the constitution drafting process.  Finally, this section 
identified the lack of research on the supranational impact on institutional autonomy.  This dissertation 
demonstrates that supranational influences filter through the constitutional court enabling it to 
constrain the legislature.  It further demonstrates that the supranational impact on the protection of 
human rights is indirect rather than direct.   
Finally, Chapter Two reviews the five authors directly influencing the hypotheses in this 
dissertation.  The first work reviewed in this section is Schimmelfennig (2006).  Schimmelfennig (2006) 
posited that national constitutional courts defend their jurisdiction by becoming protectors of human 
rights.  Two findings of this dissertation reflect Schimmelfennig’s work (2006).  This dissertation 
indicates that constitutional courts filter international constraints through to the national legislature to 
increase protection of human rights.  When the transition to democracy was less inclusive constitutional 
courts increase the use of international human rights law in their decisions.  Together these findings 
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support Schimmelfennig’s (2006) view that national constitutional courts use tools available to them to 
increase human rights protections.  This dissertation does not address whether constitutional courts are 
better protectors of human rights than other available options.  Nor does it address the perceived ability 
of constitutional courts to protect human rights.  However, by demonstrating that constitutional courts 
position themselves between the national and international this dissertation advances our 
understanding of the constitutional court’s protection of human rights. 
Chapter Two also examines the work of Maveety and Grosskopf (2004).  This research posited 
that constitutional courts work at the national and international level (Maveety and Grosskopf, 2004).  
As mentioned above, this dissertation demonstrates that constitutional courts filter international 
constraints into national protection of human rights.  Furthermore, it demonstrates that constitutional 
courts respond to international influences, in the form of international constraints and international law.  
Consequently, this dissertation fully supports Maveety and Grosskopf’s  (2004) work. 
Stone’s (1990) research posited that past, present, and future decisions of constitutional courts 
alter the legislative process.  This dissertation supports Stone (1990) both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  Tests of the second hypothesis quantitatively correlate increased protections of human 
rights with increased constitutional court constraints on national legislatures.  Furthermore, qualitative 
review of legislative debates indicates that national legislatures consider constitutional court decisions 
in three ways.  First, legislatures change legislation in response to current rulings of the constitutional 
courts.  Second, as they debate new legislation the legislatures consider compliance with past rulings of 
the constitutional court.  Finally, legislators threaten, and use, constitutional court review of legislation 
to alter laws to their policy preferences.   
Finally, this dissertation builds on Finnemore’s (2003) work on the legalization of issues.  This is 
particularly relevant in post-communist Europe where demand for the protection of individual rights 
was not common to the legal culture (Sajo, 1995).  This dissertation offers limited evidence to support 
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an increased legal demand for the protection of human rights.  The most compelling evidence is the 
increased reference to constitutional court decisions in Romania and Poland.49   
Although this dissertation improves understanding of the role of constitutional courts, 
legislatures, and human rights additional research is needed.   
7.6 Future Research  
Based on the results in this dissertation, two areas need additional research.  The first is the role 
of human rights advocates in constitutional court cases.  Since constitutional courts require a case 
before they can protect human rights, it is important to understand the impact of strategic litigation on 
the circumstances studied in this dissertation.  Are there national circumstances that support human 
rights litigation?  Do litigants need to present international human rights law before the constitutional 
court is aware of it?   
Second, more research is needed on why legislatures take cases to the constitutional courts.  
The legislative debates clearly indicated that legislators use the threat of constitutional court action in 
two ways.  When drafting legislation, they consider what challenge at the constitutional court are 
possible and by whom.  They then either choose to address the problems before passing the legislation 
or leave the possibility open.  Alternately, one group may threaten a challenge if a particular point is, or 
is not, included in the legislation.   
7.7 Conclusion 
Do constitutional courts decrease legislative autonomy to protect human rights?  This is the 
research question underlying this dissertation.  Based on the testing of the hypotheses this dissertation 
makes two contributions to the answer of this question.  First, constitutional courts do limit the actions 
of the legislature thus limiting their autonomy or freedom to act.  For the constitutional court to ensure 
                                                          
49
 See Table 5.1 
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human rights protections, this dissertation demonstrates that broad access to the constitutional court is 
important.  In other words, the ability to raise issues to the constitutional court should be open to every 
citizen not just particular actors.  This increases the likelihood that legislative actions will be overturned.  
However, this dissertation also indicates that checks on the constitutional court’s autonomy are also 
important.   
Second, constitutional court limits on legislative autonomy can protect human rights when a 
single political faction dominated the political and legal system design.  This is important because it 
allows the constitutional court to protect against both violations of human rights and abuse of power. 
In other words, yes, constitutional courts decrease legislative autonomy.  However, in doing so, 
they ensure that promote democratic protections.  At the same time, legislatures need to also check and 
balance the constitutional court. 
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